Consistent with established policy, the views expressed in this article are the private views of the author and do not necessarily carry official sanction of any Department or Agency of the Government. The fact of publication by the JAG Journal does not imply endorsement of content but indicates merely that the subject treated is one which merits attention.

NCREASED EMPHASIS ON the subject of arms control by the press and other news media is making a major contribution to the growing awareness of the general public to the significant role the subject has assumed in the international arena. Due to the ability of informed and interested citizens to influence the order of things in our democracy, it is important that we be fully and impartially informed. If our knowledge is limited to distorted impressions of the nuclear aspects of armaments, our reasoning may become preoccupied with the "horrors of mass destruction" or may be directed only to those facets which appeal to the idealistic side of human nature. In either case, such rationalization may well prove dangerous to international security.

It is my purpose in this article to highlight some of the significant implications of arms control which must be taken into account but which are often by-passed in public writings in favor of other aspects-principally those concerning nuclear weapons-which, presumably, have more reader appeal. I propose to discuss from the military point of view:

-the environment into which arms control arrangements would be fitted,

-some of the basic questions which arise in connection with arms control,

-answers to some of those questions which are provided by current proposals,

-the possible impact of current proposals, and
-some possibilities for further progress.

*Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley, U.S. Navy, in addition to a distinguished career in Naval Aviation, has since 1958 served as Military Advisor in a number of international negotiations. He participated in the studies in Washington on Surprise Attack and later technical discussions in Geneva, Switzerland, where five Communist and five Western nations negotiated. Later he served as the Senior Military Advisor to the Secretary of State at the Western Foreign Ministers' Conference in Paris and Washington. In 1959 at Geneva, Admiral Dudley was the Military Advisor to the Foreign Ministers' negotiations between the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union on the German question and Berlin. During 1960, as the representative of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he served as the Senior U.S. Military Advisor at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva.

Let me say at the outset that I use the term "arms control" to include all limitation, reduction, inspection, and verification by international agreement of the armed forces and armaments of States. Therefore, in my view, the term "arms control" includes those actions which many refer to as "disarmament".

Basic to any plan or program for international security, including arms control, are factors which may affect security arrangements. An accepted plan for maintaining our security may consider, but should not be based solely upon, philosophical or theoretical assumptions. Some of the hard facts that must be considered are:

a. The nature of the Communist threat.

b. The continuing Communist objective of world domination.

c. The record of broken Soviet promises.

d. The continuing Sino-Soviet build-up in firepower, despite announced reductions in manpower.

e. The vulnerability of many nations to Communist aggression.

These factors compel those responsible for the security of the Free World to insist on concrete measures of detection, inspection, and verification, as the only acceptable basis for any arms control agreement under present conditions. As President Kennedy said in his Inaugural Address: "sincerity must always be subject to proof".

The world condition fashionably termed "the cold war" is a product of attempts by the Soviet Union to expand the area under its influence and control, particularly since the end of World War II. As a consequence, the United States and other nations of the Free World are allied politically, economically, and militarily in opposition to this threat.

We are all familiar with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the other major alliances to which the United States is committed: all are important to the security of the Free World. In addition, the United States has bilateral agreements with individual nations such as Canada, Turkey, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, the Philippines, and others. Actually, we are aligned with approximately 50

different nations in treaties, alliances, and agreements related to military assistance programs and other mutual security matters.

THE COLD WAR has become quite Warm in various parts of the globe and in some cases has actually resulted in limited military actionssome not so limited. These are familiar: Berlin, Hungary, the Middle East, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, Tibet, and Indio-China. More recently are Laos, the Congo (with a big question mark for the rest of Africa), and Cuba. In all, there have been some twenty-seven instances since World War II in which military force has been employed either in a shooting role, or in a backup or stabilizing role as in Lebanon.

An examination of arms control should recognize and consider the security factors and the political alliances, treaties, and agreements mentioned above. These require among other things a posture of military operational readiness adequate to meet the variety of military situations which the Sino-Soviet Bloc is capable of creating.

Within the foregoing context, let us examine the types of measures contained in recent arms control proposals. These affect the whole spectrum of national military power: activities in space, missiles, nuclear weapons, fissionable materials, production and storage of armaments, peacekeeping machinery, an international disarmament organization, and the amount of money that each nation may spend on armaments.

The latest arms control proposals advocated by the Soviet Union, ourselves, and our Allies, cover a wide range of restrictions on national power and even on national sovereignty. These proposals include measures which would:

a. Numerically limit or demobilize all military manpower,

b. Numerically limit or destroy all armaments and warheads,

c. Restrict the deployment or readiness of military forces and their armaments,

d. Restrict or halt the production of armaments and warheads,

e. Eliminate military staffs and military instruction, f. Create an international organization to inspect and verify the implementation of arms control measures, and

g. Create an international organization to preserve world peace and enforce the carrying out of the agreements.

Proposals such as these are complex even when presented in summary form. When examined in detail, the complexities and implications for international security become even more apparent. The following questions reflect

but a few of the problems which must be considered with respect to the various types of current proposals:

a. What effect would reductions in military manpower have on the deployment of forces, armaments, and weapons?

b. What international definition of military manpower would ensure that all such personnel are accounted for? Should para-military forces and forces organized primarily for internal security purposes be included? How should civilians employed by the armed forces directly, or through contract, be accounted for?

c. What should be done about existing stocks of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons for which no adequate means of detection has been discovered?

d. When, in an arms control program, should the development and production of armaments and weapons be brought under control?

e. Should there be any restrictions on the sovereign right of nations to maintain the combat readiness of their remaining forces and armaments?

f. Should nations accept restrictions on the rights of their citizens which might be required to permit effective and reciprocal inspection and verification of arms control measures?

g. Should nations agree to the creation and expansion of an international force to preserve world peace as national military establishments are reduced? Should national military establishments ever be reduced to the point that the only guarantee of national security would be an international force? Finally, what aspects of national sovereignty would have to be surrendered to permit an international force to be effective?

These are only a few of the questions which arise in the field of arms control. I do not propose to try here to answer these questions. However, I will describe and compare current governmental proposals, in order that the reader may judge for himself how the Soviet Union and the United States have dealt with these problems.

Before discussing the latest U.S. disarmament proposals, I wish to point out that our Western (the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the United States) arms control proposals prior to 1960 called for balanced, phased, safeguarded, and interrelated measures which would be conditioned by progress in the settlement of international political issues. It would have been difficult-some thought impossible to reach agreement on such a far-reaching, tightly integrated program. In 1960, the explicit requirement that there be political progress was dropped in the hope that some arms control agreement would be easier to reach, and that political progress might thereby be facilitated by such agreements.

THE U.S. DISARMAMENT program presented at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, on 27 June 1960 was arranged in three stages. Measures in each stage were preceded by international studies to design suitable systems for verification and inspection. The program as a whole was to be carried out in such a manner that no State, whether or not a party to the agreements, obtained a military advantage over other States as a result of the program. Also, the three stages contained balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures, each of which was to be carried out in an agreed period of time, but without advance commitment as to the period for accomplishing the over-all program. Implementation of the program would be under the supervision of an international disarmament control organization which would establish the necessary inspection and verification system for each measure before initiating implementation of the measure under consideration.

The second and third stages would not be negotiated until agreement had been reached on the first stage, and then would not be carried out until the first stage had been completed and verified. Also, all militarily significant nations would have to agree to participate in the second and third stage measures before their implementation would be initiated.

Transition from one stage to the next would be dependent upon agreement by the United Nations Security Council that all measures in preceding stages had been implemented and verified, and that verification arrangements necessary for the next stage were installed and operating effectively.

c. Inspection measures to reduce the possibility of surprise attack or war by accident or miscalculation.

d. Initial limitation of U.S. and USSR force levels to 2.5 million each and initial limits on force levels of other States which might participate at this point. e. The placing of agreed types and quantities of armaments in depots under international supervision pending their final disposition.

f. Collection of data pertaining to military budgets and expenditures.

SECOND CATEGORY, STAGE ONE MEASURES
INCLUDE:

a. Initial force level ceilings for other militarily significant States.

b. Reduction of force levels of the United States and the USSR to 2.1 million each and to agreed levels for other militarily significant States.

c. Further deposits of armaments under international supervision.

d. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons when agreed limitations or reductions in force levels and armaments have been implemented and verified.

e. Transfers of agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production to peaceful uses when the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons has occurred and has been verified.

Stage Two provides for additional reductions in armed forces and armaments, following agreement by all nations in a worldwide conference. Stage Two also provides for the creation of an international peace force and its progressive expansion to maintain peace as national military establishments are further reduced.

Stage Three includes the final reductions of national armed forces and armaments to levels. required for internal security and the maintenance of international peace; destruction of all armaments except those required by agreed remaining national military forces and by the international peace force; cessation of production of armaments except for agreed types and quantities for use by remaining national military forces and by the international peace force.

Throughout the plan, provision is made for agreement upon, and installation and effective operation of, the necessary verification and inspection arrangements prior to initiating the implementation of any given measure. Also, the U.S. plan requires that verification and inspection be adequate both to confirm that agreed measures are being carried out, and more importantly, to detect violations or evasions. In fact, this is the key issue between the United States and the Soviets on control arrangements. The Soviets stated a willingness for verification to confirm that an agreed number of aircraft, for example, are destroyed, but refused to acJUNE 1961

cept verification which could assure that remaining numbers of aircraft were within agreed limits. We are more concerned with what is left.

THE SOVIET PROPOSALS made by Mr. Khrushchev, in September 1960, differ considerably from those of the United States. The basic difference on the question of inspection and verification is worthy of note. The Soviets would restrict inspection to the observation of the demobilizing of manpower, the destruction of armaments, and the cessation of armaments production in those plants formerly engaged in such production. In other words, a soldier conceivably might be demobilized at one base under international inspection and in thirty minutes be re-inducted in an uninspected base ten miles away.

With respect to the timing and scope of specific measures, the differences between the United States and the Soviets also are great: a. In Stage One, the Soviets propose that:

(1) All means for delivery of nuclear weapons would be destroyed and their production stopped.

(2) Force levels would be reduced to 1.7 million each for the United States and the USSR and to fixed levels for all other States. Conventional weapons and munitions thus released would be destroyed or used for peaceful purposes.

(3) All troops would be withdrawn from foreign territories, and foreign military bases would be eliminated.

(4) Pending destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons-no "special" devices would be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space; no warships would leave their territorial waters; no military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction would fly beyond the limits of their national territory. (5) Missile launchings would be exclusively for peaceful purposes.

(6) There would be no transfers of nuclear weapons or information necessary for their manufacture and no production of nuclear weapons by States not already possessing them.

b. In Stage Two, the Soviets propose:

(1) A complete prohibition on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; cessation of manufacture of such weapons; the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons.

(2) Further reductions in force levels, armaments, and military expenditures.

c. In Stage Three, the Soviets propose:

(1) The abolition of armed forces.

(2) Destruction of all remaining armaments and ammunition.

(3) Cessation of all military production.

(4) Abolition of all war ministries, general staffs, military services, military training, and military and paramilitary organizations.

It is important to note also that the Soviets

insist that each nation must commit itself irrevocably in advance to carry out the complete disarmament program in a specified period of time. They have suggested four years for this purpose.

The foregoing comments are intended to demonstrate the answers-or lack of answers-to the questions posed earlier, which are contained in current disarmament proposals. Also described are proposals which illustrate some of the basic differences between the United States and the Soviets, the most important of which

are:

a. Timing and scope of inspection and verification, b. The balancing of measures pertaining to force levels and various types of armaments and warheads,

c. The ultimate levels of national military forces and armaments, and

d. The timing of the program as a whole.

In considering the impact of current disarmament proposals, it will help keep this discussion within reasonable bounds if we concentrate on one type of measure which has been included in all proposed programs, the manpower and armaments measure.

Everyone appears to have a view on this one. I believe a discussion of it will reflect the impact pattern of other measures. In the U.S. proposals this measure begins in Stage One with the establishment of force levels of 2.5 million each for the United States and the USSR, and the storage of some armaments. Subsequently, in Stage One, after other nations have become parties to the agreement, the forces of the United States and the USSR would be reduced to 2.1 million each and additional quantities and types of armaments would be limited numerically. Corresponding limits would also be established for other participating nations.

Appropriate inspection and verification measures are to be installed at the time agreement is reached on the 2.1 million force levels and operating effectively before the reductions from 2.5 to 2.1 levels are begun.

Let us examine a force reduction from 2.5 million to 2.1 million. This, of course, is 400,000 men or almost one-sixth of current active U.S. military manpower.

THE FIRST REQUIREMENT is for agreement on a useful definition of "Armed Forces". The United States has not only its Allies, but also the Sino-Soviet Bloc to consider in reaching agreement on this seemingly small matter of a definition. Depending on the definition agreed upon the impact of force level proposals made heretofore could vary significantly.

(Continued on page 71)

Consistent with established policy, the views expressed in this article are the private views of the author and do not necessarily carry official sanction of any Department or Agency of the Government. The fact of publication by the JAG Journal does not imply endorsement of content but indicates merely that the subject treated is one which merits attention.

THE

HE AGE-OLD POLITICAL phenomenon of nationalism defies any attempt to be compressed into a concise and meaningful brief definition. Instead of a single interpretive statement, one must approach it through the medium of "multiple choice" definitions relying on the distinction of long-term vis-à-vis short-term perspectives.

THE LONG-TERM view stresses the fact that nationalism has been one of the oldest motivating forces in human history and, both as an ancient and a truly unique social factor, has had a lasting impact on the evolution of human traditions, cultural mores and ethical patterns of behavior. An eminent social scientist has stated that modern nationalism has been based on "the relative discrepancy of human memories" which on the one hand has produced pleasure, pride and varying degrees of national satisfaction, and on the other hand has just as frequently led nations to outbursts of hatred, bitterness and angry vindictiveness. Interestingly enough, the spectrum of these emotions range all the way from the exuberant euphoria of the Nazi Germans' "Tomorrow The World" complex-a slogan bursting with globally arrogant national pride to the dejected melancholia of a typically "have not" nation which has given up hope and is reduced to a modicum of national aspirations or expectations. The gloomy but expressive Russian phrase of "purging one's soul" clearly connotes this aura of personal or national dissatisfaction.

*Professor Andrew Gyorgy specializes in international politics and Soviet Communism. He holds the degrees A.B. and J.D. from the Law School of the University of Budapest. He has studied at the Sorbonne University, Paris, and the University of California, where he was awarded the M.A. and Ph. D. degrees. Professor Gyorgy is a frequent lecturer at the Armed Forces Staff College and the Naval War College, where he occupied the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy for the academic year 1958-1959. Formerly of the faculties of Yale University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Gyorgy has been Professor of Government at Boston University since 1952. He is the author of several books dealing with geopolitics and international relations.

Viewing nationalism from a long-term perspective, George Kennan remarked some years ago that:

...

The national state pattern is not, should not be, and cannot be a fixed and static thing. History has shown that the will and the capacity of individual peoples to contribute to their world environment is constantly changing . . . The function of a system of international relationships is not to inhibit this process of change by imposing a legal strait jacket upon it. Thus Kennan accurately notes that nationalism is a highly relative concept, both in time and space. Obviously men give their devotion to the "nation" concept for different reasons, in different quantities and varying degrees of intensity. French nationalism is different from English, the Chinese is not the same as Japanese, and the Chilean differs from Brazilian.

What is a minimally valid definition of the "nation" concept? Summarizing a recent article by Boyd C. Shafer, entitled "NationalismSome Myths and Realities," it is clear that the "nation" idea implies at least some unit of territory, a people with a common past, common cultural characteristics (including common language), and an independent government-either actual or hoped for. An abbreviated, but truly "classic" definition of nationalism would offer a more-or-less harmonious composite of these four principal characteristics:

the commonly shared territory,
the cultural community,

the common history, and

the jointly developed and organized governmental system.

The sum total of these features would then constitute the "nation" idea which is central to the concept of "nationalism."

What complicates the task of subjecting nationalism to a concise scrutiny is that an immense diversity of human emotions is tied up with each of the four major characteristics mentioned above. Love of native land; high esteem for fellow-nationals; distrust of foreigners; pride in one's own national achievements; sorrow in national tragedies; admiration of one's