no harm if annual sanction is given to some special taxes e. g. the Income Tax, by way of introducing an element of elasticity in finance.

177. We have now completed our account of the constitution and functions of the Indian Ligislature. We must next proceed to consider the devices

Control over Finance.

adopted to enable the Legislature to control the finances of the Government of India. As in the provincial Council they are (a) the Statutory position of the Auditor-General, (b) the strengthening of the Finance Department, and finally, (c) the institution of the Committee on Public Accounts.

The Committee is to consist of not more than 12 members including the chairman, of whom not less than 3rds must be elected by non-official members. As to its functions, the Committee, in scrutinizing the Audit and Appropriation Accounts of the Governor-General in Council, must satisfy itself that the money voted by the Assembly has been spent within the scope of the demand granted by the Assembly. It will bring to the notice of the Assembly every reappropriation from one grant to another grant, every reappropriation out of the grant which is not made in accordance with rule, and all expenditure which the Finance Department has requested should be brought to the notice of the Assembly.

The Auditor General is now independent of the Executive Government. Hitherto he reported to the Secretary of State and the Executive Government. But in future his duties will be more important because he will be the constitutional means by which the Assembly will be able to decide whether money voted by it for any particular purpose has been duly spent within the scope of that purpose.

no

The Audit Department has two very important functions to examine the Sanctions, and secondly to examine the expenditure incurred under a Sanction. Now Officer or Department can incur any expenditure without proper sanction-and the first function of the Audit Department is to scrutinise these Sanctions-to see not only that they are within the rules, or within the power of the Sanctioning authority, put to see also whether they fall within the proper canons of finance. Again an officer might draw money against Sanction, or might improperly withold it or offend the financial rules in other ways. The Auditor must get these errors rectified by the responsible authorities, and failing that, to report on the matter and bring it to the notice of the Assembly. And it would then be the duty of the Assembly, either by Resolution or by other constitutional means within their powers, to bring pressure on Government to take proper action in the matter. The Assembly might also be able to compare the scale of expenditure of one Department with that of another and suggest economies It is in this way that the Public Accounts Committee in England also exercises an enormous influence over public expenditure in the direction of thrift and economy.

The election of Members to this Committee is carried on in accordance with the principle of proportionate representation by means of the single transferable vote.

By the same method is elected another Committee of the Assembly known as the 'Standing Finance Committee.' The difference between the two Committees was thus put by the Hon. Mr. W. M. Hailey: the operations of the Committee on Public Accounts are of a post-mortem nature, that is to say, it only deals with expenditure after it has been incurred. The Standing Finance Committee on the other hand deals with proposals of expenditure before they are

sanctioned or come on to the Budget. The demands for grants which the Government have to make are voluminous and it is impossible for Government to supply information. about each of them. The duty of the Standing Finance Committee is to examine, on behalf of the Assembly, thig imformation some time before the Budget, and to scrutinise the details of the several estimates before they are for-. mally presented as the Budget. Again during the course of the year unforeseen or extra expenditure is required to be incurred and it would be the duty of the Standing Finance Committee to deal with such proposals on behalf of the Assembly before they are laid before it. Again the Committee might examine Schemes for fresh expenditure which are put forward by Departments.

In these and other ways, the Assembly, with the help of its two Committees, might be able to exercise a strict control over finance, and direct it, by bringing to bear upon it non-official criticism, into more fruitful and nation-building channels.

Closer Relations between the Legislature and the Execu

tive.

178. For reasons already given in connection with the provincial Councils, these relations have been established by making members of the Executive Council ex-officio members of one or the other Chamber, by the appointment of Council Secretaries, and of Standing and Select Committees. Thus Section 29 provides that the Governor General may at his discretion appoint from among the Members of the Legislative Assembly Council Secretaries to hold office during his pleasure and to discharge such duties in assisting the Members of his Executive Council as he may assign to them. Their duties will be similar to those of the Parliamentary Under Secretaries in England. Their salary is

to be fixed by the Indian Legislature and they will cease to hold office if they cease for more than six months to be Members of the Legislative Assembly.

The appointment of "Standing Committees." was strongly opposed by the Goverment of India on the general ground that they would impede business, induce delay, weaken the sense of responsibility of the executive, open the door to intrigue, and though avowedly advisory in character, will gradually come to engross the powers of the executive. The Joint Committee, however, advised that such Standing Committees should be formed. But their composition and attachment to the Departments was left entirely to the Central Government.

179. Criticism-Having explained the changes that have been made in the Central Government, we finally

Criticism.

come to offer a few criticisms upon them. Though the Reforms Scheme ex-hypothesi requires that the Government of India's responsibility to Parliament must remain unimpaired, it was possible to introduce there also the principle of ministerial responsibility to electorates as in the Provincial Governments.

Sir Shankaran Nair has well pointed out this defect in the Reforms. "This (want of ministerial responsibility) can be defended only on the ground that many of the Departments of administration have been transferred to the Provincial Governments, and that those retained by the Government of India are far too important to be handed over to responsible Indian Ministers before the experiments have justified themselves in the provinces. These, of course, are subjects which concern Peace and order and the good Government of the country, Foreign States, Army & navy, and also questions in which the interests of England or her people are greatly involved. There are however, questions, which only concern the internal administration of the country and which have been recognised as fit for transfer to a Minister and the Legislative Council. In all those

cases, therefore, in which the Government of India retain a right to interfere with the transferred subjects there should be no objection to introducing responsibility in the Central Government. Indeed responsible Government in them seems to be necessary in order to carry out the principles indicated in the Report. It is proposed to allow powers of interference to the Government of India in the transferred Departments of the Provinces. Ex hypothesi these are subjects which ordinarily should be dealt with by Ministers in accordance with the will of the local legislature; and if it is proposed to remove these from the jurisdiction of the local Minister and of the legislative Council for reasons which have nothing to do with their capacity to deal with questions of that character, it is but reasonable that in the Government of India also the decision of such questions should be left to the Legislature and an Indian Minister. If necessary an Indian Member of the Executive Council may be an Indian Minister for this purpose."

But the Government of India strongly deprecated the the idea of a Minister attached to the Government of India whose duty was to supervise the administation of transferred subjects in the Provinces, because they felt that this was essentially the task of the Governor who was to watch and guide the great experiment in the Provinces. Lord Meston also denied that there was in the Government of India's field of administration a class of domestic subjects and a class of subjects of a higher scale. All the Central subjects directly or indirectly related to external affairs or were affected by international arrangements or involved great financial or fiscal issues.

But this plea of the Government of India does not seem convincining. Without going into the controversy we may say generally that the introduction of responsibility in theCentral Government was both practicable and advisable for the following reasons. (1) If Dyarchy in the Central Government is inevitable ten years hence, it was not impossible now. (2)