vincial Government into two fields one of which is made over to the Ministers chosen from the elected members of the local Legislature while the other remains under the administration of the Governor in Council. This scheme has evoked apprehensions which are not unnatural in view of its novelty. But the Committee, after the most careful consideration of all suggested alternatives, are of opinion that it is the best way of giving effect to the spirit of the declared policy of His Majesty's Government. Its critics forget that the Announcement spoke of a substantial step in the direction of the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government, and not of the partial introduction of responsible government; and it is this distinction which justifies the method by which the Bill imposes responsibility, both on Ministers to the Legislative Council and on the members of the Legislative Council to their constituents, for the results of that part of the administration which is transferred to their charge."

This bifurcation of government has been opposed on the theoretical ground that the work of government is impartible. But to this we might reply that, in fact, Government is carried on by division into various Departments, though all derive their authority and driving force from the head of the executive. Similarly, in dyarchy also, the two halves of government are not only coordinated through the Governor, but are subordinate, though of course in varying degrees, to the Government of India and the Secretary of State. So long as dualism lasts the part of the Government which is responsible to the electorate cannot attain complete responsibility. But the form is avowedly a device for a period of transition and disappears as soon as fitness for full responsibility is established.

Nowhere has the new system of Government been more strongly criticised than in paragraph 354 of the Report

itself. "Hybrid executives, limited responsibility, assemblies partly elected and partly nominated, division of functions, reservation general or particular, are devices that can have no permanent abiding place. They bear on their face the evidence of their transitional character and they can be worked only if it is clearly recognised that that is their justification and purpose. They cannot be so devised as to be logical. They must be charged with potentialities of friction. Hope of avoiding mischief lies in facing the fact that they are temporary expedients for training purposes, and in providing that the goal is not merely kept in sight, but made attainable not by agitation, but by the operation of machinery inherent in the scheme itself."

Again in judging of this Scheme, it should always be remembered that it was to be piloted through Parliament under exceptionally difficult circumstances. Arm-chair politicans could have possibly devised schemes more perfect; but they could not have run the gauntlet of parliamentary criticism. Mr. Montague had to consider tne "strategy" of the Scheme. And if a Scheme in being more perfect had come to grief in Parliament, the opportunity of fulfilling the Announcement of 1917 might have gone, and the whole work might have been obliged to be begun over once again. It would have been a labour of Sisiphos-the stone recoiling upon those who labored to bear it on to the top of the hill and crushing them in return.

Dualism not introduced in the General Government.

CHAPTER VII.

The Government of India.

146. Having dicussed so far Provincial Government, let us now turn to the position of the Government of India under the new regime. Its treatment is contained in the Third Formula of the Report to which a reference has already been made. In as much as the Central Government is to remain responsible to Parliament in all essential matters, a division of functions into reserved and transferred is not introduced there. The reason for this extreme caution is thus given by the Joint Committee: "The problem is to design the first stage in a measured progress towards responsible Government. Any such stage, if it is to be a real advance, must, as the Committee conceive it, involve the creation of an electorate, and the bestowal of some share in the work and responsibilities of Government on those whom the electorate chooses to represent its interests. In the present circumstances of India, the electorate must at the outset be small and the administrative experience of its representatives must be limited. Before, therefore, the policy of His Majesty's Government can be fulfilled the electorate must grow and the practical experience in the conduct of public affairs must be enlarged. During this period the guardianship of the peace of India cannot be withdrawn from the care of the official agency which Parliament at present charges with the duties of administration, and the Committee regard it to be an essential feature of the Policy of His Majesty's Government that, except in so far as he is released from responsibility by the changes made under the Bill, the Governor-General in Council should remain in undisturbed responsibility to Parliament and

fully equipped with the necessary power to fulfill that responsibility."

147. There are only two directions in which the Central Government has been affected by the Reforms-Introduction of more Indians in the Executive

Scope of ReCouncil and an increase of the elective forms in the Centelement in the Central Legislature. ral Government.

Improvements

148. Before proceeding to consider these, it is necessary to explain how the Secretariat procedure of the Government of India has been simplified and improved and thus adapted to the new relation in which the Central Government will stand in future, both with reference to the local Governments, and the Secretary of State.

in the Secretariat.

We have already considered the way in which the Administration of India was shared between the Central Government and the various provincial Governments.

This dual administration was a constant source of friction, delay, and inelasticity. The Central Government had to consult the local Governments on all important questions which it had to refer again to the Secretary of State for final sanction; it was overworked and understaffed; above all it failed to educate Indians in self-Government on account of its essentially bureaucratic nature and its insistence upon administrative efficiency at the sacrifice of the political and material uplifting of the masses.

Now this can no longer continue. Provincial devolution in finance, legislation, and administration, as already described, will relieve the Government of India of much work. The relaxation of the control of the Secretary of State, as will be subsequently explained, will tend in the same direction.

Again the whole Secratariat procedure of the Central Government has been recently reorganized in the light of

the recommendations of a special committee appointed for that purpose under the presidency of Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith. There has been a fresh allocation of business among the various Departments; a separate portfolio of Industries and Munitions has been created; a separate Service, called the Imperial Secretariat Service, to be recruited by the 'Cental Staff Selection Board' has been created; and finally instructions have been issued for a more speedy despatch of business in the various Departments. And it is to be hoped that this reorganization will go a long way to help the Central Government to discharge its new duties under the Reformed Constitution with greater chances of success.

Executive Co

uncil.

149. We now return to the Executive Council. Before the Reforms it consisted of six Ordinary Members and the Commander-in-Chief; three of the ordinary Members were required to have ten years' service under the Crown in India. and one was required to be a barrister of 7 years' standing; in practice one of the Members has been an Indian since 1909; each Member was in charge of one or more portfolios.

The most obvious way of dealing with the Executive Council was, of course, the introduction of more Indians into it. The popular demand was that half of the members should be Indians. The Government of India was prepared to add one to the existing Indian member but was definitely opposed to have more than two Indians firstly on the ground that the resultant increase in the size of the Council would tell upon its efficiency, and secondly that there would be a weakening of its administrative experience, for the Indians will generally be mere politicians and not experienced administrators. The Joint Committee solved the difficulty in the following manner. "The