post or to give any kind of allowance or personal pay, or to make the grant of land or the assignment of land revenue or to make any other pecuniary concessions.

Previous reference to the Finance Department is necessary for any proposals being submitted to the local Govern ment or Council, which involved the abandonment of revenue for which credit has been already taken, or involved expenditure for which no provision has been made in the Budget.

Every report made by the Finance Department on any matter on which it is required to advise or report under these rules, is forwarded to the Department concerned and if the Finance Department so requires, is submitted by the Department concerned to the Governor for the orders of the local Government. The Governor may, if he thinks fit, direct that any such report be laid before the Committee on Public Accounts.

Audit.

139. The second way of exercising control over provincial finance is by the institution of a strong audit. The old audit system was obsessed by codes and formalities arising out of an elaborate system of accounts and technical safeguards against misfeasance. It inquired into expenditure not on the ground of its necessity or propriety, but solely on the ground of its proper authorisation, and sanction But the audit to be effective must be independent of the Local Government in all questions of control, discipline and method. For this purpose two safeguards have been adopted-first, the Department of the Comptroller and Auditor General has been made a Central Subject. This will secure a strong audit of provincial expenditure by a body quite independent of the provincial executive. And secondly, the position of the Auditor-General has been made statutory under section 36 of the Act. His pay,

duties, and conditions of employment have been regulated by rules made by the Secretary of State in Council. He has been empowered to conduct his audit with reference to certain canons of financial propriety that have been laid down, and he is to bring to the notice of the local Government, and the Committee on Public Accounts any breach of the financial canons which he might detect.

Committee on Public Account.

140. And finally we come to the control to be exercised by the Legislature over provincial finance. The chief object of the relaxation of the control which the Central Government hitherto exercised over provincial finance was that popular control should take its place. The enlarged powers of voting upon the budget no doubt is one way of establishing this control. But as the budget discussion lasts only for a few days, the Council ought to have some means of watching the financial doings of the executive throughout the year, and of getting rectified any irregularity in or departure from a strict adherence to the budget arrangements that it might come across. This is no doubt properly the work of the Finance Department and the Audit Department; and as aleady explained rules have been made for the proper discharge of this function by both these Departments. But the Council ought to know what these checking authorities have to say. For this purpose a "Committee on Public Accounts" has been instituted in each provincial Council. The Rules require-"As soon as may be after the commencement of each financial year, a Committee on Public Accounts shall be constituted for the purpose of dealing with audit and appropriation accounts of the Province and such other matters as the Finance Department may refer to the Committee."

Two-third members of this Committee are to be elected by the non-official Members of the Council according

to the principle of proportionate representation by means of the single transferable vote; the remaining members are nominated by the Governor.

The Finance Member is the Chairman of the Committee and in the case of an equality of votes on any matter, has a second or casting vote.

In scrutinizing the audit and appropriation accounts of the province, it is the duty of the Committee to satisfy itself that the money voted by the Council has been spent within the scope of the demand granted by the Council.

It is also the duty of the Committee to bring to the notice of the Council (i) every reappropriation from one grant to another grant, (ii) every reappropriation within a grant which is not made in accordance with the Rules regulating the functions of the Finance Department or which has the effect of increasing the expenditure on an item the provision for which has been specifically reduced by vote of the Council, (iii) all expenditure which the Finance Department has requested should be brought before the Council.

Reappropriations and Excess grants.

financial year

141. Besides this Committee on Public Accounts the Council has a second means of checking provincial finance. It consists in certain provisions in the budget-procedure about excess grants and reappropriations. Thus when money has been spent on any service for which the vote of the Council is necessary during any in excess of the amount granted for that service and for that purpose, a demand for the excess has to be presented to the Council as though it was a demand for a grant. Again, when the demand voted in the budget is found to be insufficient for the purposes of the current year, or when the need arises during the current year for expenditure for which the vote of the Council is necessary, a demand for a

supplementary or additional grant has to be submitted to the Council as though it was a demand for fresh grant.

By these Provisions as to excess grants and reappropriation the Council has adequate opportunities for checking the executive in the disbursement of provincial reve

nues.

142. For the proper discharge of its legislative functions the Council appoints Select Committees for considering Bills after their introduction. The procedure that is generally followed has. been already referred to.

Select Commit

tee.

Links between the Executive and the Legisla

ture.

143. But a Council can not be said to have fully served its purpose if it does not make for the harmonious working of the executive and the legislature; for the theory that the legislature and the executive should be independent of each other has been shown to be impracticable As is well known, in the British Parliament -which is the model for all our Councils-the Cabinet which is the executive, is merely a Committee of the Legislature and leads it and also in a way controls it. Similarly we have the members of the Executive Coucil ex-officio members of the Legislative Council. The Ministers who form part of the executive-are the elected members of the Council. But it is necessary that the Members of the Legislative Councils should have greater opportunities of learning the details of administration, and the intricacies of Parliamentary procedure. Not only would this make their criticism at once sober and effective, but it would train at least some of them to fill with distinction the role of Ministers in course of time. This has been secured in the new Councils by the appointment of Council-Secretaries, of Standing Committees, and of Select Committees. Thus section 4 (4) provides that the Governor may at his discre

tion appoint from among the non-official Members of the local Legislature Council-Secretaries, who shall hold office during his pleasure and discharge such duties in assisting Members of the Executive Council and Ministers, as he may assign to them. Their position is analogous to the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of Departments in England. But no appointment has hitherto been made under this section.

The Committee on Public Account is the only Standing Committee that has hitherto been appointed. But the utility of such Committees is obvious. As the Joint Committee say "It may often greatly assist the political education of India if Standing Committees of the Legislative Bodies are attached to certain Departments of Government; but they only express the opinion on the understanding that the appointment of such Committees, their composition, and the regulations which govern their procedure, shall be matters wholly and exclusively within the discre-tion of the Governor-General or the Governor as the case may be."

We have already referred to the Select Committees.

144. We have now completed the picture of the government of a province under the Reformed Regime. We have considered the two halves of the Execu

Summary.

tive, the relations of each with the Governor, and of the Executive as a whole with the Legislature; and then we turned to the constitution and functions of the Legislature.

145. It is now time to pass an opinion upon the merits and drawbacks of this system of Government, which is conveniently called "dyarchy." But, as the Joint Committee point out, it was the only way of giving effect to the Announcement

Criticism of Dyarchy.

of August 20, 1917. "It (Bill) partitions the domain of Pro