and the latter to the Secretary of State for India and to Parliament. Nothing brings out more clearly the position of the non-official members than their description as "additional members" of the Council. They were 'added' to the ordinary' members of the executive council for a definite purpose-for the passing, namely, of laws, and since 1892, for the discussion of the budget; and the object of this expansion was to secure the association' of the people with Government. But this association' has its limits. They were nearly reached under the Reforms of Lord Morley. The principle of 'Assosiation' is merely a means to an end and as such is incapable of becoming the goal of political ambition. That goal is 'Responsible government' and 'association with government' is a period of probation for it. And thus, during this period of probation the sphere in which the old Council could influence the policy or action of Government was avowedly limited and unimportant, and therefore though great expectations were formed of them on their first expansion the people became disillusioned as to their utility with lapse of time. The new De parture. 97. The recent Reforms, however, start with giving substantial responsibility in provincial matters as already fully explained, and this required a correspondingly fundamental change in the Legislative Council. It will be best to consider this change in two aspects-the constitution of the Council and its functions, the latter being taken up in the next chapter. 98. Constitution.-Following Ilbert we shall study this under the three heads of Numbers, Proportion of officials and non-officials, and the Method of appointment. Bearing upon these the Report laid down the following comprehensive Constitution of the Council. ། formula: "We propose that there shall be an enlarged Legislative Council, differing in size and composition from Province to Province, with a substantial elective majority, elected by direct election, on a broad franchise, with such communal and special representation as may be necessary." What we have now to do is to show how the vital questions, here so briefly mentioned, have been dealt with in the Act and by the Rules framed under it. 99. Numbers. Numbers.-The old Councils of Bengal, Madras, a maximum of 50 Members, and those of the Punjab, Burma, and Assam, of 30. The actual strength in most of the newly created Councils was considerably below the limit prescribed by the Act. The reason why the Members could not be further increased lay in the requirement that every Council had to possess a substantial official element; and then the number of officials that could be spared, without serious inconvenience to administration, became the upward limit to which or about which non-officials could be introduced into the Council. But such a requirement is inconsistent with the Reforms. A few officials-in addition to the Executive Councillors who are Members ex-officio-might indeed continue, but their raison de tre is not the furnishing to Government with the requisite votes to pass or reject a given piece of legislation or resolution, but rather the stabilizing influence which they will bring to bear upon the debates on account of their first-hand and living touch with administration. The diverse interests in the province ought to get a seat in the council, which at the same time ought not to be unmanageably large, or diluted with mediocrity or nepotism. Upon these new principles accordingly the minimum strength of the Councils has been fixed by a schedule to the Act, as follows: Disappearance of the official bloc. 100. It is important to understand why the official bloc has been dispensed with in the new Councils. In the old Councils, though the officials were not. actually in majority, they formed the mainstay of the Government in the face of strong opposition by popular representatives. It was felt that there were other safeguards against nonofficial opposition, than the one of having an official majority. The non-officials could obstruct Government in one of two ways-by refusing to pass the required legislation, or by insisting upon passing legislation opposed by Government. The first difficulty could be removed by the power of concurrent legislation which the Indian Legislative Council always claimed and exercised over all provinces; the second by the power of veto which the Governor could exercise, and by the further circumstance that, in any case, laws introduced in a Provincial Council were subject to statutory restrictions. But though an official majority was thus unnecessry, an official bloc was felt indispensable. The officials had freedom neither of speech nor of vote, and often there was a conflict between their conscience and the requirements of discipline, and even the non-officials were irritated by their apparently meaningless opposition, which thus widened the cleavage between the Government and the people. But though the non-officials were, in theory, in majority, in practice, their influence was compromised by certain factors; for it has to be remembered that a non-official majority was not the same thing as an elective majority. The former was largely composed of nominated members some of whom were Europeans. Now the European non official element in the Council-elected or nominatedgenerally indentified itself with the Government, and the other nominited non-officials, with a few honourable exceptions, did the same. And the old Councils were so constituted that the officials, and the European and Indian nominated non-officials, who generally voted in favour of Government, were in a majority over the elected non-officials who were thus rendered powerless. There was a general feeling that the Legislative Councils were mere automatons the wires which were pulled by official hierarchy and this engendered disappointment and dissatisfaction. ΙΟΙ. But this fine balance of officials and non-officials is out of place in the Reformed Councils. It was originally proposed to give the proportion of elected and nominated Members in Schedules attached to the Act itself. But this would have introduced a rigidity in the composition of Proportion of Elected and Nominated Members. the Council which was neither necessary nor desirable. The Act now merely lays down the total strength of the Councils. But to safegaurd against possible harm being done to the council by executive action, the Act provides hat "of the members of each Council not more than 20 p. c. shall be official members and at least 70 p. c. shall be elected members." Subject to the maintenance of the above proportion, the members might exceed the number specified in the schedule. It will be seen that the power of the Governor to nominate non-officials is narrowed to only 10 p. c. of the total strength. It is furthers restricted in practice by the requirement that some interests or classes have to be represented by nomination as a result of rules e. g. In the case of the Bombay Legislative Council, the Governor is required to nominate members to represent the AngloIndian Community, the Indian Christian Community, the labouring classes, clases which in the opinion of the Governor, are Depressed Classes, and the cotton trade in Bombay. Thus in the new Legislative Council of the Governor of Bombay, there will be, the four Members of the Executive Council ex-officio, 86 elected members, 25 nominated members, including the four members of the Executive Council, not more than 16 officials, and the five non-officials to represent the interests and classes above referred to102. The Governor has been allowed to retain the right which he enjoyed under the old regime, of nominating a person "having special knowledge Expert Mem or experience of the subject matter of a bers Bill which has been introduced into the Council. Only one member for Assam, and two for each of the other provinces can be so nominated. And the persons so nominated are to have, in relation to the Bill, and for the period to which they are nominated, all the rights of the members of the Council. They are to be in addition to the numbers above referred to. Historical. 103. We finally come to the method of appointment. Let us first briefly trace the growth of the elective principle in the legislative Councils of India. The Act of 1861 knew only the principle of "nomination" pure and simple, the other extreme of "Election" pure and simple being long opposed on the ground of its novelty in and unsuitability to the conditions of India. The Act of 1892 hit upon a middle course by incorporating what is known "the Kimberley Clause" which empowered the Government of India, to make Rules under the Act for the constitution of the Councils. They were informed "where corporations have been established with definite powers upon a recognised administrative basis, or where associations have been formed upon a substan |