Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative PerspectiveCambridge University Press, 2007 M09 3 Why have dominant parties persisted in power for decades in countries spread across the globe? Why did most eventually lose? Why Dominant Parties Lose develops a theory of single-party dominance, its durability, and its breakdown into fully competitive democracy. Greene shows that dominant parties turn public resources into patronage goods to bias electoral competition in their favor and virtually win elections before election day without resorting to electoral fraud or bone-crushing repression. Opposition parties fail because their resource disadvantages force them to form as niche parties with appeals that are out of step with the average voter. When the political economy of dominance erodes, the partisan playing field becomes fairer and opposition parties can expand into catchall competitors that threaten the dominant party at the polls. Greene uses this argument to show why Mexico transformed from a dominant party authoritarian regime under PRI rule to a fully competitive democracy. |
Contents
Section 1 | 33 |
Section 2 | 36 |
Section 3 | 71 |
Section 4 | 108 |
Section 5 | 119 |
Section 6 | 139 |
Section 7 | 153 |
Section 8 | 163 |
Section 9 | 167 |
Section 10 | 173 |
Section 11 | 210 |
Section 12 | 255 |
Section 13 | 297 |
Other editions - View all
Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene No preview available - 2007 |
Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene No preview available - 2009 |
Common terms and phrases
2000 elections affiliation alliance argue authoritarian benefits C´ardenas campaign candidates and activists Cárdenas centrist challenger parties chance of winning Chapter coalition coordination core constituencies costs of participation democratic District dominant party systems DPARs early joiners economic policy effects electoral fraud elite activists expand federal Freedom House fully closed authoritarian fully competitive democracies groups ideological incumbent incumbent’s independent issues Iztapalapa join the opposition Labastida leaders leftwing Malaysia market for votes message-seekers Mexican Socialist Party Mexico Party Personnel Miguel Hidalgo moderate niche parties niche-oriented office-seekers opposition forces opposition parties opposition party development organizations PAN and PRD PAN's party elites Party Personnel Surveys party’s patronage PEMEX policy appeals policy preferences political polls PRD elites predicted presidency presidential PRI’s public bureaucracy recruitment repression resource advantages result sector single-party dominance social state-owned enterprises strategy Taiwan theory tion UMNO variables vote share