INDEX.

Head-note references are to pages.

Cross-references are to subjects; and the number of the note is
added in parenthesis, unless the reference is to all.

ABANDONMENT-See ABATEMENT.

ABATEMENT.

The presentation of a claim against a partnership for allowance
against the estate of one of the partners, who has died since
the commencement of a suit against the firm for its collec-
tion, will not operate as an abandonment of the suit. Van
Kleeck v. McCabe, 600.

ACCOUNTING.

Nash v.

Equity has no jurisdiction of a suit by an agent for an
accounting unless the account is a mutual one.
Burchard, 85.

See MANDAMUS (2, 3).

ADMISSIONS-See EVIDENCE (7, 23, 36).

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. Adverse possession of land, up to a marked boundary, for
30 years, establishes the right of the occupant to the premises
so occupied, although his original entry may not have been
under any title or claim of title. Sanscrainte v. Torongo, 69.
2. Evidence of general reputation that the land occupied by
a plaintiff in ejectment, who seeks to establish title by
adverse possession, was claimed to be owned by him, is
admissible. Id.

AGENT-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AID SUBSCRIPTIONS-See CONTRACT (5, 6); EQUITABLE LIEN.

APPEAL-See HIGHWAYS (1).

APPRAISAL-See EVIDENCE (19).

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

1. A creditor received from a debtor certain real-estate mortgages
and a bill of sale of personal property in payment, as he
claimed, of an existing indebtedness. About two months
afterwards the debtor made a general assignment of all his
property to a third party for the benefit of his creditors, and
the assignee sold the equity of redemption in the mortgaged
premises at public auction, and the creditor (mortgagee)
became the purchaser of a portion of the land covered by
his mortgages. In a suit brought by the creditor against a
judgment creditor of the debtor, whọ had sold the property
covered by the bill of sale on execution, the defendant was
permitted to prove said assignment and sale by the assignee,
which testimony is held admissible; there also being testi-
mony in the case tending to show that the debtor contem-
plated making the assignment before the transactions with
the plaintiff. Wessels v. Beeman, 481.

2. An assignment by one partner of his property for the benefit
of his creditors, which does not purport to convey the partner-
ship property, gives the assignee no title to said property or
right to its possession. Van Kleeck v. McCabe, 599.

ATTACHMENT-See CHATTEL MORTGAGE (2-6); LOG-LIEN LAW (1).
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-See EVIDENCE (39, 40).

BAIL-See CRIMINAL LAW.

BAILMENT.

A stock-broker who receives a certificate of stock from the
owner for safe-keeping, which he fails to deliver on demand,
having delivered it to the officers of the corporation without
the consent of the owner, who have cancelled it, is guilty of
its conversion, regardless of his intention in the premises.
Hubbell v. Blandy, 209.

BANKS AND BANKING-See PARTNERSHIP (7, 8).

BILL OF SALE-See EVIDENCE (32); LICENSE TO CUT TIMBER (2).

BILLS AND NOTES.

1. It is competent for the first indorser to secure the second
indorser, but the maker has no right to be subrogated to the
place of a second indorser. Nash v. Burchard, 85.

2. A joint maker of a promissory note cannot limit his
liability to that of an indorser by parol testimony that he
signed as a surety, and that, by an agreement with the
agent of the payee who took the note, he was to be released
unless notified of its non-payment. Aultman & Taylor Co.
v. Gorham, 233.

3. Where a mortgagor, in order to secure the release of the
property and further time, gives the mortgagee his promissory
note for the debt, which is signed by a third party at his
request before its delivery, there is a sufficient consideration
to hold both the maker and the surety. Id.

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS-See SHERIFF'S FEES.

BOUNDARY-See WATERS AND WATER-COURSES.

BOUNDARY LINE-See EVIDENCE (4).

BURDEN OF PROOF-See EVIDENCE (8, 22, 38, 39); TAXES (6).

CHARGE TO JURY.

1. In a suit upon a building contract the plaintiffs claimed
that they were to furnish and pay the men, who were to
work by the day, and they added 25 to 50 cents per day for
each man's work above the per diem actually paid them.
The defendant contested plaintiffs' extra charge, and also
claimed to recover pay for carrying the men to and from
their work. And it is held that the jury was properly
instructed that, if they deducted plaintiffs' extra charge from
their bill, they should also reject that of the defendant.
McDonnell v. Ford, 198.

2. Where the uncontradicted testimony shows the payment by
the plaintiffs of a certain sum of money for the benefit of
the defendant at his request, it is not error for the court to
state such fact to the jury. Id.

3. It is error to instruct the jury that the undisputed testi-
mony shows a certain state of facts when there is contra-

CHARGE TO JURY-Continued.

dictory testimony on the subject. Schroeder v. Farmers'
Fire Insurance Co., 310.

4. It is error for the court to refer in his charge to the jury
to the absence of the plaintiff, who is an assigned of the
claim sued upon, at the trial, he having no knowledge of
the facts in issue, and it being immaterial whether he was
present or not, as long as attorneys were present who were
fully authorized to represent him in the conduct of the
trial. Hitchcock v. Davis, 630.

See DAMAGES (1).

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

1. Where, on the purchase of a stock of goods, it was agreed
⚫ between the vendor and vendee and the vendee's father
that, if he would advance $500 to his daughter to apply on
the purchase price, he should be repaid out of the first sales
made by the vendee, who afterwards secured such loan by a
chattel mortgage of the goods, the vendor is estopped from
claiming any lien for the unpaid purchase money as against
an assignee of the mortgage. Finn v. Donahoe, 292.
2. Chattel-mortgaged goods were replevied from attaching cred-
itors by the mortgagees before the completion of an inven-
tory, and on the trial the defendants claimed the right
to recover on the ground that the attachment was made
subject to the mortgages, which were admitted to be valid,
and that defendants had the right to the joint possession of
the goods until the inventory was completed, and also on
the ground that the mortgages were being fraudulently used
to defeat the claims of other creditors. And it is held that
the defenses were antagonistic, and that evidence of such
fraudulent use of the mortgages was properly excluded.
Rosenfield v. Case, 295.

3. The contention that a sheriff who attaches chattel-mortgaged
property cannot be disturbed in his possession by the mort-
gagee until an inventory is completed, after which he has
the right to fix the character of his levy, and whether in
opposition or subject to the mortgage, has been settled in
the negative in Merrill v. Denton, 73 Mich. 634, 635. Id.
296.

4. An instruction that, if a sheriff levied an attachment upon
a stock of goods subject to a chattel mortgage, he cannot

CHATTEL Mortgage-Continued.

recover in a replevin suit brought by the mortgagee unless
the value of the goods exceeds the amount of the mortgage,
is sustained.

Id.

5. Where a mortgagee is entitled to the possession of the mort-
gaged property, as against attaching creditors, at the time
he replevies it, the after payment of his mortgage by a sec-
ond mortgagee will not affect his right to a judgment against
the defendants. Id.

6. The attachment of chattel-mortgaged property in opposition
to the mortgage, and the refusal of the officer to admit the
mortgagees to a joint possession, justifies them in demanding
possession under the insecurity clause in their mortgage,
whether the debt secured thereby is due or not due. Id.
7. In a suit between a plaintiff claiming personal property
under a bill of sale absolute on its face, and a creditor of
the vendor, the jury may consider the fact that the vendee
filed the bill of sale in the office of the township clerk of
the proper township as evidence bearing upon the claim made
by him that the transfer was absolute, and not by way of
security. Wessels v. Beeman, 482.

8. Two chattel mortgages were delivered to an agent for fore-
closure, to whom the mortgagor surrendered the property,
and then repossessed himself of it. The agent replevied it in
his own name, and completed the foreclosure by a sale of
the property to the mortgagee, after which the mortgagor
recovered a judgment for its return, which was complied
with. The mortgagor then sold the property to a third per-
son, who was sued by the mortgagee in trover after the
agent had recovered a final judgment in the replevin suit
determining the validity of the chattel mortgages, and the
vendee sought to retry said question, which he is held estop-
ped from doing by said judgment. Hoppin v. Avery, 551.

CONDITION-See WILL (1).

CONSIDERATION.

Where a mortgagor, in order to secure the release of the
property and further time, gives the mortgagee his promissory
note for the debt, which is signed by a third party at his
request before its delivery, there is a sufficient consideration