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OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING the content and problems of collective bargaining, as well as trade union activities, were examined. A study group sponsored by the Committee for Economic Development admonished the parties to bargaining to "reexamine their own interests in the wage determination process" to determine if they have not been "too narrowly and mechanically" construed. Some settlements may have "adversely" affected employment.

Frank Pierson, of Swarthmore College, in an IRRA paper, asserted that "a small number of very large unions" have been able to push wage levels in some industries to a level higher than economic circumstances can explain, carrying other industries along. A pamphlet published by the United Steelworkers of America contended that productivity increases, "even with a significant rise in steel demand," would create an unemployment situation that only shorter working hours could alleviate, and that the very increase in unit output made the shortened hours feasible. Counter to this thesis, the American Iron and Steel Institute, in its own pamphlet, argued that increased employment in steel "depends on . . . ability to expand sales," which requires a better competitive position. Most displacement is due to temporary declines in output and sales.

Jack Stieber, of Michigan State University, predicted before the IRRA, that bargaining in 1962 probably would not emphasize work rules, "neither in steel nor in most other mass production industries," but rather would center on income stability and adjustment to technological change.

Sol Barkin, of the Textile Workers Union of America, in a report sponsored by the Fund for the Republic, sounded a tocsin for the trade union movement to abandon the "old remedies, the old approaches" if it is to meet the challenge of a "new, different, vastly larger work force." Philip

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Taft, of Brown University, in his presidential address to the IRRA, felt that the "crisis" in the labor movement was "he intellectual creation of the old leftwinger. . . .' Claims of lack of democracy have involved "many charges but not much proof." Racketeering "is endemic to certain . . . industrial environments." The idea of a national wage policy based on overall annual productivity rates rests on a "statistical mirage." A union leader's "primary interest" should not be to weigh "the effect his bargains may have on price levels" and other factors "emphasized by economists."

JACK BARBASH, of the University of Wisconsin, in an IRRA address, hoped for improved interdisciplinary research in the study of unionism. Currently, he notes "the rendering of the same facts in different semantic systems."

Taking the long historical view, Maurice Neufeld, of Cornell University, criticized the developing practices of some labor experts and labor economists. Of the former, he said:

Year in, year out, they rove from one collective bargaining racetrack to another, gathering tips, speculating about the winners, and masterminding the results once announced. Away from the course, they delight in administrative orders, arbitral awards, and judicial decisions. They prefer the domestic scene, but when abroad, on occasion, follow routine by also playing the horses there. When this round turns monotonous, some venture into the theory of games, while others fashionably weave, out of recent industrialism and industrial man, the web of rules, convinced that they repeal the rule of the Webbs. All of them attain the summit of speculative inquiry when they argue the virtues of free collective bargaining.

Of the latter:

Labor economists . . . accepted history as an indispensable asset. Today, some who follow that tradition, at least in part, pursue narrow interests in order to garner fresh knowledge. .. Insensitive to broad change, they virtually ceded to the general economists the task of dealing with wage-push inflation and the role of unions in emergent economies-two central issues in labor economics during the postwar decades. Other labor economists draw deserved admiration for their attempts to devise large concepts of integrative character. But they too usually ignore history since its waywardness might tend to ruffle the formal elegance of their typologies. Still other labor economists have turned, almost full-face, from institutional analysis to seek neo-classical certainty once For all too many labor economists . . . the course of economic thought, let alone the sweep of human affairs, remains quite simply a course, taught or taken.

more.

A Review of American Labor in 1961

PHYLLIS GROOM*

THE PROFOUND EFFECT of our changing technology upon labor-management relations and union affairs was demonstrated by many of the developments in collective bargaining and in the decisions of various branches of the Government during 1961. Organized labor made some headway at the AFL-CIO convention in organizing and in finding ways to minimize jurisdictional disputes. Labor did not resolve the issue of how fast to move toward full equality in union membership for Negroes but governmental action did make possible expanded employment opportunities for minority groups. Principal areas of concern in the economy were persistent unemployment and foreign trade. The number of persons who had been unemployed 15 weeks or more reached a peak of 2.1 million in April. By November, this group had dropped to 1.1 million, but it was 150,000 more than a year earlier.

Labor-Management Relations

Labor, Management, and the Public. A third force in labor-management relations was evoked in more than one situation in 1961. There were the activities of public representatives chosen by the parties themselves, as in the Kaiser Corp. committee proposal. There was mediation by Government officials who entered situations both at the parties' requests and upon their own initiative, as exemplified by the assistance given by the Secretary of Labor and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in the job security agreement between the Southern Pacific Railroad and the Order of Railroad Telegraphers. Finally, there was the appointment, in mid-February, of the President's Advisory Committee on Labor

Management Policy. The President's Committee was established as a result of a suggestion made in August 1960 by Arthur J. Goldberg, prior to his appointment as Secretary of Labor.

In January 1961, the tripartite committee set up by the 1959 contract between the Kaiser Steel Corp. and the United Steelworkers of America to develop a long-range plan for sharing economic progress made some proposals, which were approved by the union and the company, to promote "collective bargaining which is not imposed but agreed upon." So as to minimize reliance on contract deadline pressures, the committee agreed to meet on a regular basis. If necessary, the committee proposed that it be convened no later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the current agreement to review the status of negotiations. Upon the basis of the review, the public members of the committee would then be authorized to: take no action or postpone action pending further bargaining; observe bargaining sessions; engage in mediation efforts; report privately to the parties, summarizing their positions, defining the disputed issues, and making nonbinding recommendations; and, finally, issue a public report either before or after the contract term date but not until the company and the union have had every reasonable opportunity to come to an agreement.

The 21 members of the Labor-Management Policy Committee represent the top levels of Government, business, unions, and public life; the chairmanship is held alternately by the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor, with Secretary Goldberg serving for the first year. In July, the Committee divided into five groups to study (1) free and responsible collective bargaining and industrial peace, (2) economic growth and unemployment, (3) automation, technological advance, industrial productivity, and higher standards of living, (4) policies to ensure that American products are competitive in world markets, and (5) sound wage and price policies. Reports on collective bargaining and automation were submitted to the full Committee in November, but they had not been published by the end of the year.

After 3 years of bargaining, the Railroad Telegraphers and the Southern Pacific Railroad agreed upon a method for the protection of employees as

Of the Office of Publications, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

jobs are abolished as a result of technological change and other factors. The agreement, reached after mediation efforts helped avert a scheduled strike, sets a level of 1,000 jobs from which there can be a 2-percent reduction each year provided there are at least this many vacancies caused by normal turnover. The 2-percent reduction does not apply to jobs abolished because of the introduction of new central traffic control systems or line abandonment, but workers affected by these conditions are to be offered other jobs.

Collective Bargaining. Among the major collective bargaining demands during 1961, as in other recent years, were the maintenance of jobs and income and the reduction of the impact of loss of jobs in industries affected by technological change or plant relocation. The most significant achievements were in the automobile and meatpacking agreements.

In the auto industry, changes in the supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) programs substantially improved benefits for the unemployed and extended coverage to those on short workweeks. The maximum duration of benefits was doubled and now runs for a year. Benefits, including State unemployment compensation, were changed from 65 percent of take-home pay to 62 percent of regular straight-time pay before taxes. Maximum weekly payments from the SUB fund were raised from $30 to $40, plus $1.50 for each dependent up to four. Under the short workweek provision, employees are to be paid 50 percent of the regular hourly rate for each hour lost below 40 in the event of unscheduled short weeks and 65 percent for most scheduled short weeks. At American Motors, improved job security provisions, as well as other benefits, were to be financed from a "progress sharing" fund into which the company agreed to pay 10 percent of profits before taxes (computed on the balance remaining after an amount equal to 10 percent of the stockholders' equity has been set aside). At Chrysler, where the SUB fund was depleted by heavy layoffs earlier in the year, a maximum of 5 cents of the wage increase was to be diverted to the fund as well as the amount saved by not making the first raise retroactive.

Among related improvements in the auto industry were an increase in pensions to $2.80 a month for each year of credited service,' a

25-percent increase in the separation allowance payable from the SUB trust fund (except at American Motors), and a provision for a moving allowance of $55 to $580 for employees who can qualify for transfer to another plant 50 miles or more distant.

The Armour and Co. agreements with the Meat Cutters and the Packinghouse Workers unions provided for 90-day notice of plant shutdowns, with guaranteed earnings during this period and technological adjustment pay for those with 5 years' service who are subsequently laid off. Workers who apply for transfer to other plants organized by the same union will be paid $65 a week (including unemployment compensation and earnings from any other work) until they are transferred or their eligibility for transfer expires, up to a maximum of 26 to 39 weeks, depending on length of service. Eligible employees who do not want to transfer will receive severance pay, which was increased by this year's

contract.

The new Armour contract ended contributions to the automation fund established under the 1959 negotiations. Of the money remaining in the fund, up to $50,000 a year was allocated for the expenses of the automation fund committee, and the remainder is to be used for allowances for retraining and for moving expenses of transferred employees, as provided by the committee.

The Meat Cutters concluded companywide seniority agreements with Swift & Co., which give workers laid off because of a plant shutdown the right to transfer to another plant provided they qualify for jobs there. A moving allowance up to $500 was provided and separation pay was increased.

Indicators of Labor's Welfare. The economy rose sharply after the turning point of the 1960-61 recession in February, although the upswing in employment lagged as usual. Total employment in November reached 67.3 million, 167,000 higher than a year earlier. The gain occurred mostly in services and government. Manufacturing employment gained a half million between February and November, but was still a half million below the prerecession peak. Unemployment hovered

1 The first 1-cent increase in the cost-of-living allowance is to be applied to the increased cost of pensions.

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around 6.8 percent of the labor force (seasonally adjusted) during most of the year, but it dropped abruptly to 6.1 percent in November.2 Total unemployment benefits paid during the first 9 months amounted to $2.9 billion, $848 million more than was paid during the comparable period in 1960. Other economic indicators began to show recovery in March. Hours of work in manufacturing increased during most of the year, reaching in November the third highest level for that month in the postwar period. Total wage and salary disbursements rose strongly after February and, by October, had reached $287 billion, 5 percent higher than the prerecession peak in July 1960. Factory average hourly earnings increased 7 cents an hour-to $2.36-from January to November. The Consumer Price Index remained relatively stable over the year, rising slightly from 127.4 in January to 128.4 in October. Almost 3.4 million workers received wage increases under major collective bargaining contracts negotiated during 1961. In terms of workers affected, the most common wage increases were 2% to 3 percent and 11⁄2 to 2 percent.* Most of these workers also received increased supplementary benefits. Some 250,000 received supplementary benefits but no wage increases; most were employed in the cotton garment industry, where pension and insurance benefits were improved. The median increase for the 2.4 million workers covered by deferred increases in 1961 amounted to 8 cents an hour.

At the end of 1961, an estimated 2.5 million workers were covered by major collective bargaining contracts containing cost-of-living clauses— about the same as at the beginning of the year. Increases gained under these clauses were about the same or slightly lower than those of 1960

As a result of discussion on the high level of unemployment, questions had been raised concerning methods, procedures, and concepts of obtaining and analyzing employment and unemployment data. On November 10, the President appointed a committee of technical experts "to appraise the status of [Government] information available on employment and unemployment, and to make recommendations for any changes or improvements that current conditions seem to require."

Those affecting 1,000 or more workers in all industries except construction, service, trade, finance, and government.

♦ Most workers in this range were employed by the General Motors Corp. under United Auto Workers contracts in which the annual improvement increase of 21⁄2 percent was reduced by 2 cents an hour the first year to offset some of the company's cost of assuming the entire health insurance bill. The Ford and Chrysler contracts signed in October and November were similar to the General Motors contract, but the reduction in the annual improvement increase was 3 cents an hour at Chrysler.

The October report was an elaboration of recommendations published in preliminary form on May 25, 1961.

owing both to the relative stability of the Consumer Price Index during the year and to restrictions in many 1959-60 contracts on the operation of the clause. They ranged from 1 cent in auto and related industries to 3 cents in meatpacking.

Strikes. According to preliminary Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates, total strike idleness in 1961 amounted to 16.5 million man-days, about the 1957 level and lower than all other years since World War II. The highest strike level during the year occurred when the UAW struck against Ford and General Motors for varying periods between September 11 and October 11.

A strike by five maritime unions that began on June 16 and affected all U.S. coasts was halted when the President invoked the national emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act on June 26 by appointing a board of inquiry to study the dispute. The organizing of "runaway" shipping, a major issue in the dispute, was handled in various ways by the contracts that were reached. The National Maritime Union agreements provided for a board appointed by the Secretary of Labor to study the problem. Another group submitted the matter to arbitration. The Seafarers and the Marine Engineers won the right of access to organize crews of foreign flag vessels from 58 companies operating both U.S. and foreign flag ships from South Atlantic and Gulf ports.

The Flight Engineers February strike against seven airlines was triggered by a National Mediation Board report which found that with the advent of jet planes, the engineers' duties coincided with many of those of the pilots. The Board had therefore recommended that the flight engineers and the pilots of United Airlines choose one union to represent them, thus bringing to a head the jurisdictional conflict between the 3,500-member Flight Engineers and the 13,700member Air Line Pilots Association at a time when many pilots were on furlough because bigger planes were making fewer flights necessary and when all but four airlines had agreed on three-man pilot-trained crews for jets. In mid-November, the Flight Engineers president, Ronald A. Brown, said that his union would agree to negotiate on the basis of the recommendations made in late October by a Commission appointed by President John F. Kennedy to study the dispute. The Com

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mission, headed by Professor Nathan Feinsinger, recommended bringing the number of crewmen down to three on all lines, requiring all engineers hired in the future to be pilots, and the safeguarding of present pilots and engineers from any loss in pay as a result of the first recommendation for up to 4 years. The Commission also recommended that during the transition period, engineers be given a certain amount of flight training by the airlines. Finally, it advised merger of the two unions.

Shortly after congressional hearings which revealed delays and excessive costs in the missile and space programs, early in May the President established a tripartite Missile Sites Labor Commission, of which Secretary Goldberg is chairman. The purpose of the Commission is to develop policies and procedures of adjustment of labor problems and to insure the economical operation of programs at missile and space sites.

Unions and companies involved in the missile program promised support to the Commission and gave no-strike, no-lockout pledges as evidence of their cooperation. In the following 3 months, only 768 man-days were lost as a result of strikes, according to a report the Secretary submitted to President Kennedy in mid-October. In November, a 3-day jurisdictional strike that idled an estimated 2,000 workers ended after Secretary Goldberg ordered a return to work and the unions agreed to submit the dispute to the construction industry's National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes.

Union Affairs

1961 brought neither sizable advances nor major reversals within organized labor; such modest gains as it did obtain outside the area of collective bargaining were largely in the field of legislation. This was apparent not only at the Federation level but also in the affairs of individual unions.

The AFL-CIO. Facing the delegates to the biennial convention of the AFL-CIO which opened on December 7 in Miami were problems that had been with the Federation since the merger 6 years earlier. Building upon earlier schemes to resolve jurisdictional conflicts, the convention adopted a plan which involved concessions from both the building trades and the industrial union

factions. At the first level, complaints are to be handled by mediators selected from within the labor movement by AFL-CIO President George Meany. If a complaint is not settled within 14 days after the appointment of a mediator or mediators, an impartial umpire will hear and determine the case, basing his decision on the established collective bargaining and work relationships of the parties. His decision may be appealed to the president, who is to refer it to a subcommittee of the Executive Council. The subcommittee may either disallow the appeal or refer it to the Executive Council, which may overturn the umpire's decision by majority vote. The plan specifically prohibits recourse to the courts and provides its own penalties for failure to comply with a decision. Decisions are to be limited to specific disputes and may not determine the general jurisdiction of any affiliate. Boycotts are not covered under the procedure. The only dissent to the new procedure came from the International Typographical Union which fears it will interfere with the ITU's autonomy.

Among the numerous customary resolutions was a call for a major organizing effort. To carry out the Federation's organizing and other programs the convention raised the monthly per capita tax by 2 cents to 7 cents a member. The convention also promised to revive the organizing campaign among the West Coast farm workers which was dropped during the summer of 1961. Any hope of a membership gain through reentry of the Teamsters was deflated by a resolution on reaffiliation of "cleansed" unions that was interpreted as requiring James R. Hoffa's removal from the Teamsters' presidency as a condition of readmission. However, late in the fall, several former Teamster locals in Cincinnati received charters from the Federation after having voted to disaffiliate from the Teamsters.

A major theme of convention speeches by both President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg was the necessity for improving the Nation's foreign trade policies and the concomitant adjustments by business and labor. A convention resolution supported the Administration's trade proposals, but the collective bargaining resolution failed to reflect the "wage restraint"" policy which was proposed as an aid in increasing the Nation's exports.

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