conditional contraband, and to make stated classes of articles alone subject to capture. These propositions were supported, and the British one opposed, by representatives of each of the four delegations, who endeavored to show that by their respective plans the principle of contraband would be retained, in justice to belligerents, and at the same time the rights of belligerents and the interests of commerce would be reconciled.

A number of the smaller powers,' on the other hand, gladly welcomed Great Britain's proposal, which seemed to them, in the words of the Marquis de Soveral, of Portugal, "a monument of profound wisdom and of great abnegation." After two sessions of the commission had been devoted to a discussion of the question, a vote was taken on the British proposition, which resulted in twentysix for, five against, and four abstentions.2

In

After this noteworthy but not unanimous vote, the whole question was referred to a special committee for examination and report. Lord Reay was made chairman of this committee, which comprised representatives of three delegations which had voted for the British proposition, and of four which had voted against it.3 opening its discussions, Lord Reay said that "the British proposition to abandon the principle of contraband of war not having been accepted unanimously, the committee should seek in the other propositions submitted to the commission the elements of a general agreement on the question." Five sessions were devoted to the discussion of these propositions by the committee, which came to

1 Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Belgium, and Argentina. 2 Delegations opposed: Germany, United States, France, Russia, and Montenegro; abstentions: Turkey, Roumania, Panama, and Japan.

3 Great Britain, Brazil, Chili; Germany, United States, France, Russia.

a practical agreement upon a list of twelve classes of artiIcles which should be considered "absolute" contraband of war; but on the question of what should constitute "conditional" contraband, the committee could not reach any general agreement. This fact was reported to the commission which, in its report to the conference, expressed the belief that, in the general and sincere desire for a regulation satisfactory to every one, the question should be submitted to a renewed consideration on the part of the governments interested.

The conference itself, in plenary session, did not take up the subject specifically, but intended it to be included in its resolution that the elaboration of a code of the laws and customs of maritime warfare shall have a place on the programme of the next conference.

4. Destruction of Neutral Prizes

This subject was brought before the IV Commission by President de Martens's questions:

"Is the destruction of merchant vessels, in time of war, under a neutral flag and loaded with troops or contraband of war, prohibited by legislation or by international practice? Is the destruction of all neutral prizes, by superior power, illegal according to legislation at present in force or according to the practice of naval warfare ?"

In answer to these questions, the British delegation proposed that the destruction of a neutral prize by its captor be forbidden, and that the captor be required to release every neutral ship which he is unable to take before a prize court. The United States delegation submitted a similar rule: "If, for any reason whatever, a captured neutral vessel can not be brought to adjudication,

this vessel should be released." The Japanese delegation submitted the same rule as the British, but made the following exceptions: 1. if the vessel is in the military or naval service of the enemy, or under his control for military or naval purposes; 2. if the vessel forcibly resists visitation or capture; 3. if the vessel tries by flight to escape visitation or capture.

The Russian delegation, on the other hand, made the exception to the rule prohibiting destruction a very elastic one; it proposed that the exception should be made in those cases where the preservation of the captured ship "might compromise the safety of the captor or the success of his operations." The argument upon which the delegation based this broad exception was that "absolute prohibition of the destruction of neutral prizes by belligerents would have as a consequence the establishment of a position of marked inferiority for those powers having no naval bases beyond the coasts of their own countries." The Russian naval delegate, in a speech before the commission, illustrated this argument by reference to the case of a neutral vessel captured by a belligerent in close proximity to a superior naval force of the enemy, or at a long distance from the belligerent's ports, or when the belligerent's ports are blockaded by the enemy.

Sir Ernest Satow, of Great Britain, replied to the Russian argument by insisting that if a belligerent, because of geographical location or of the insufficiency of maritime resources, finds it impossible to exercise effectually the right of seizing neutral ships carrying contraband of war or seeking to violate a blockade, then he should leave them at liberty; for, to give to belligerents the right of sinking neutral prizes would lead inevitably to abuses and would

expose every neutral ship to the risk of being sunk every time it met a belligerent war ship, whose captain would not fail to exercise the right as seemed good to himself, despite the orders which he may have received to act circumspectly. By such a rule, the neutral vessel would find itself in the same position as an enemy's vessel; and its position would be even worse than that, since its government would have no means of redressing the wrong done it, short of itself declaring war on the belligerent captor.

The United States delegation supported the British view of the question; while the German delegation took the Russian side. Count Tornielli, of Italy, said that the absolute prohibition of the destruction of neutral prizes would probably be acceptable to powers with few or no widely scattered colonial ports and naval bases beyond the coasts of their own countries, provided permission be granted to belligerents to convoy their prizes into neutral ports, to be kept there under sequestration; he proposed, accordingly, that the two questions be discussed in a joint meeting of the two committees of the III and IV Commissions. This proposition was adopted; but the result of the joint meeting was the practical failure of both the prohibition of the destruction of neutral prizes and the permission to convoy them within neutral ports.1

The rule that neutral powers may admit to their ports prizes either belligerent or neutral-was finally adopted by the conference; but it was deemed impossible to adopt any rule concerning the destruction of neutral prizes. Hence this latter subject, also, was left to be

1 Eleven delegations voted for the prohibition, four against it, and two abstained; nine voted for the permission, two against it, and six abstained.

included within the programme of the next conference, under the head of the laws and customs of naval warfare.

E. THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF NAVAL
WARFARE

a. THE CONFERENCE OF 1899

When the revision of the laws and customs of warfare on land was under discussion, Count Nigra, of the Italian delegation, endeavored to have extended to naval warfare the rules adopted in regard to bombardment on land; and Ambassador White and Captain Crozier, of the United States delegation, endeavored to have extended to naval warfare the rules adopted in regard to the treatment of private property on land. But the utmost that could be secured from the conference was the adoption, almost unanimously, of the desire that these two phases of naval warfare should be referred to the next conference. The great work of codification, accomplished by the Conference of 1899, was performed solely within the field of warfare on land; but its success in this field stimulated the Conference of 1907 in its noteworthy attempt to codify the laws and customs of warfare on the sea.

b. THE CONFERENCE OF 1907

The Russian programme for the Conference of 1907 included the following paragraph:

"As for maritime warfare, whose laws and customs differ on certain points from country to country, it is necessary to establish definite rules harmonious with the rights of belligerents and the interests of neutrals. A convention concerning these matters will have to be