receptacles or containers in which they are brought into the State. Under this law the oils cannot be lawfully sold at all until the importer has paid the inspection fees provided in the statute, after inspection. That inspection fees, so grossly in excess of the cost of inspection imposed upon articles brought into the State in interstate commerce are unconstitutional, was held in Foote & Co. v. Maryland, 232 U. S. 494. In that case the plaintiffs were engaged in the business of packing oysters in the City of Baltimore, and brought large quantities in from the State of Maryland and also from the waters of the States of Virginia and New Jersey. These oysters were inspected in Baltimore, where they were unloaded from vessels, by officials appointed under the provisions of the Maryland act which fixed an inspection fee of one cent per bushel to be paid one-half by the seller and one-half by the buyer. The case was brought to this court upon the ground that the inspection fee was excessive, and a burden upon interstate commerce, and levied an unlawful tax upon goods shipped into Maryland from other States. It was held that in view of the excessive nature of the inspection fees the requirement of the payment thereof necessarily imposed a burden upon interstate commerce in excess of the expenses of inspection, and that the act was, therefore, void. The subject was fully considered in an opinion by the late Mr. Justice Lamar, speaking for this court, and after recognizing the power of the State to impose reasonable inspection fees, and that such legislation will not be declared void unless the fees are obviously and largely beyond what is needed for the cost of inspection, he said: "If, therefore, it is shown, that the fees are disproportionate to the service rendered; or, that they include the cost of something beyond legitimate inspection to determine quality and condition, the tax must be declared void because such costs, by necessary operation, obstruct the freedom of commerce among

the States. McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 38; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 83; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64; Patapsco Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345, 354; Red 'C' Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380, 394; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501." (P. 504.) The principles stated in Foote & Co. v. Maryland were recognized in Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, decided by this court at this term, 248 U. S. 158. The inspection fees there in question were held not excessive, and we said (p. 162) "But if such inspection charge should be obviously and largely in excess of the cost of inspection, the act will be declared void because constituting, in its operation, an obstruction to and burden upon that commerce among the States the exclusive regulation of which is committed to Congress by the Constitution."

It is said that the Foote Case did not overrule the previous case of General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, and that the principles of that case should be controlling here. In the Crain Case this court sustained a tax upon oil which had been removed from the tank cars in which it was transported into Tennessee, and which, although destined for points beyond Tennessee, was then in storage in that State. The distinction between that case and the one now under consideration is obvious. Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, is also relied upon. In that case this court sustained a property tax upon grain brought from another State, but taken from the carrier and held by the owner in Illinois with full power of disposition in that State, and although intended to be ultimately forwarded to a point beyond the State, the property tax, after a review of the previous decisions of this court, was sustained.

We reach the conclusion that the statute imposing these excessive inspection fees, in the manner stated, upon all sales of oils brought into the State in interstate

commerce necessarily imposes a direct burden upon such commerce, and is, therefore, violative of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. We may remark that the conclusion at which we have arrived has been reached by the supreme courts of North Dakota and Ohio. Bartels Northern Oil Co. v. Jackman, 29 N. Dak. 236; Castle v. Mason, 91 Ohio St. 296.

It follows that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington must be

Reversed.

MCKINLEY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.

No. 417. Submitted March 3, 1919.-Decided April 14, 1919.

Congress, under the authority to raise and support armies, may make rules and regulations to protect the health and welfare of the men composing them against the evils of prostitution, and may leave the details of such regulations to the Secretary of War.

Conviction sustained, for setting up a house of ill fame within five miles of a military station, the distance designated by the Secretary of War, under the Act of May 18, 1917, c. 15, § 13, 40 Stat. 76. Affirmed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. R. Douglas Feagin for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Oliver C. Hancock was on the brief.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Porter and Mr. W. C. Herron for the United States.

Memorandum opinion by direction of the court, by MR. JUSTICE DAY.

Plaintiffs in error were indicted, convicted, and sentenced upon an indictment in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia for violation of a regulation of the Secretary of War made under the authority of the Act of Congress of May 18, 1917, c. 15, § 13, 40 Stat. 76, 83. This statute provides: "The Secretary of War is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed during the present war to do everything by him deemed necessary to suppress and prevent the keeping or setting up of houses of ill fame, brothels, or bawdy houses within such distance as he may deem needful of any military camp, station, fort, post, cantonment, training, or mobilization place, and any person, corporation, partnership, or association receiving or permitting to be received for immoral purposes any person into any place, structure, or building used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution within such distance of said places as may be designated, or shall permit any such person to remain for immoral purposes in any such place, structure, or building as aforesaid, or who shall violate any order, rule, or regulation issued to carry out the object and purpose of this section shall, unless otherwise punishable under the Articles of War, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than twelve months, or both."

Plaintiffs in error contend that Congress has no constitutional authority to pass this act. The indictment charged that the plaintiffs in error did unlawfully keep and set up a house of ill fame within the distance designated by the Secretary of War, under the authority of the act of Congress, to-wit, within five miles of a certain military station of the United States.

That Congress has the authority to raise and support armies and to make rules and regulations for the protection of the health and welfare of those composing them, is too well settled to require more than the statement of the proposition. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366.

Congress having adopted restrictions designed to guard and promote the health and efficiency of the men composing the army, in a matter so obvious as that embodied in the statute under consideration, may leave details to the regulation of the head of an executive department, and punish those who violate the restrictions. This is also well settled by the repeated decisions of this court. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506.

The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

COLUMBUS RAILWAY, POWER & LIGHT COMPANY . CITY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO, ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.

No. 715. Argued January 10, 1919. Decided April 14, 1919.

Constitutional questions not devoid of merit suffice as a basis for jurisdiction in the District Court, however they may be decided. P. 406.

Ordinances passed by the City of Columbus under authority of certain laws of Ohio and accepted by street railway companies, held contracts, binding the grantees to furnish street railway service for twenty-five years, at specified rates, in return for the use of the streets, and not permissive franchises which the grantees might surrender when they ceased to be remunerative. P. 407.

If a party charge himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he