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have sustained any damages by reason of the granting of said injunctions," the master was authorized to examine witnesses and to give notice by publication that all persons having claims against the complainants by reason of the granting of the injunctions should present them within a time specified for the purpose.

Under this reference the appellants in cases Nos. 92 and 93 and the appellee in Nos. 94 and 95 intervened and presented claims for a refund of the difference paid by them in freight rates between the rates prescribed by the commission and those put in force by the railway companies. The master reported favorably upon these claims, dividing the amounts allowed into three periods, the first and second of which included the time elapsed between September 3, 1908, when the interlocutory injunctions were issued, and May 11, 1911, the date of the final decrees, and the third period included the time elapsed between the latter date and July 18, 1913, the date of the decrees entered upon the mandates. The railway companies filed exceptions to the master's report, which were sustained by the district court as to the claims involved in cases Nos. 92 and 93 and overruled as to those involved in Nos. 94 and 95, and a combined decree was made accordingly.

The parties aggrieved desiring to appeal, and being in doubt whether the appeal lay to this court or to the circuit court of appeals, prayed for and were allowed appeals to both courts. Hence the first question that confronts us is whether the decree is the subject of a direct appeal to this court.

We are clear that this question must be answered in the affirmative. The appeals from the final decrees in the main causes were brought direct to this court, because of the constitutional question, under §5 of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 827, which provided for such an appeal in the following

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cases, among others: "In any case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States. In any case in which the constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States." This section, of course, was the predecessor of § 238, Judicial Code, under which the present appeals were taken. And it is plain that the orders of the railroad commission were state laws within the meaning of this provision. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 183; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 555.

The provisions of the Judicial Code which regulate the jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals originated in § 6 of the Act of 1891. They must be construed together with those provisions of law that confer upon the district court (§ 24, Judicial Code), and formerly conferred upon the circuit court, original jurisdiction in suits of a civil nature arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and in suits between citizens of different States. By § 128 of the Code, the circuit courts of appeals are to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the final decisions of the district courts "in all cases other than those in which appeals and writs of error may be taken direct to the Supreme Court, as provided in section two hundred and thirty-eight, unless otherwise provided by law; and, except as provided in sections two hundred and thirty-nine and two hundred and forty, the judgments and decrees of the circuit courts of appeals shall be final in all cases in which the jurisdiction is dependent entirely" upon diversity of citizenship. Section 239 provides for the certification of questions by the circuit court of appeals to this court; § 240 permits this court to review by certiorari any case in which the judgment or decree of the circuit court of appeals is made final; and, by § 241, in any case in which the judgment or decree of that court is not made final, there may be an appeal or writ of error

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to this court where the matter in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars besides costs.

The present appeals relate to a decree made in a subordinate action ancillary to the main causes, in which, as has been stated, the federal jurisdiction was invoked solely upon the ground that the cases arose under the Constitution of the United States. It has been held repeatedly that jurisdiction of subordinate actions is to be attributed to the jurisdiction upon which the main suit rested, and hence that where jurisdiction of the main cause is predicated solely on diversity of citizenship and the decree therein is for this reason made final in the circuit court of appeals, the judgments and decrees in the ancillary litigation also are final. Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47; Gregory v. Van Ee, 160 U. S. 643; Rouse v. Hornsby, 161 U. S. 588; Pope v. Louisville, &c., Ry. Co., 173 U. S. 573, 577.

The proceeding out of which the decree now in question arose was not merely ancillary but was in effect a part of the main causes, taken for the purpose of carrying into effect the decrees of this court reversing the final decrees in the main causes and, at the same time, for the purpose of giving effect to a reservation of jurisdiction by the court below as contained in those final decrees. The supplementary decree that is now before us, since it simply brings to a conclusion those former suits pursuant to our decrees therein, must be treated as involving the construction and application of the Constitution of the United States and as being made in a case in which a state law was claimed to be in contravention of the Federal Constitution, within the meaning of § 238, Judicial Code.

Therefore the motions to dismiss must be denied.

Upon the merits, it will be convenient to take up first the case of the Southern Cotton Oil Company, appellee in Nos. 94 and 95, in whose favor claims were allowed by

the master as against each of the two railways and for each of the periods referred to. The railways excepted upon two grounds: (1) because the final decrees of May 11, 1911, discharging the injunction bonds and releasing the makers thereof from liability had the effect to relieve the railways and their sureties from all liability by reason of the granting of the injunctions; and (2) as to such claims for overcharges as accrued subsequent to the date of the final decrees, on the ground that upon the rendition of those decrees the injunction bonds ceased to be operative and created no further liability, and that the railways incurred no liability to the claimants under the final decrees. The district court overruled the exceptions and sustained the claims of the Oil Company as against the railway companies and the sureties with interest at 6 per cent. per annum from the respective dates that the overcharges were made.

We deal first with so much of the overcharges as accrued prior to the final decrees. In St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. McKnight, 244 U. S. 368, 373, doubt was expressed whether, in view of the form of the mandate, there was any power in the district court to determine the liability of the railway companies upon the bonds. But at that time our attention was not called to the fact that the mandates contained a provision authorizing further proceedings; a provision that removes all question of the power of the district court. In re Louisville, 231 U. S. 639, 645; Louisville v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 231 U. S. 652.

In support of the contention that the final decrees had the effect of discharging the complainants and their sureties from liability upon the bonds by reason of previous overcharges, it is pointed out that this part of the decrees was not appealed from nor was error assigned to the court's action in vacating the bonds and releasing the sureties. Whether, under the circumstances, the

action of this court in reversing the decrees in respect of their main provisions granting permanent injunctions had the effect of reversing also that portion which discharged the liability upon the injunction bonds is a question upon which we need not pass. For, irrespective of this, those clauses of the final decrees by which the district court retained jurisdiction for the purpose of making such further orders and decrees as might become necessary, coupled with the subsequent mandates of this court permitting further proceedings to be taken in conformity with our opinion and decrees and according to right and justice, empowered the district court to set aside so much of its final decrees as released the railways and their sureties from liabilities theretofore incurred under the injunction bonds. This is what the district court in effect did when it ordered the reference and sustained the claims of the Oil Company so far as they accrued prior to the final decrees.

It is argued that the condition of the bonds—that if it should eventually be decided that the order inhibiting the enforcement of the commission rates should not have been made the complainant should refund, etc.-never was broken because it was not at any time adjudged that the allowance of the temporary injunctions was improper. But this is to construe the bonds according to the letter and not according to the substance. The state statute and the orders of the railroad commission entitled shippers to the benefit of the rates thereby established; and they were thus entitled at all times except as it became necessary to stay the operation of the rates by equitable process in order to permit of a judicial investigation into the question of their adequacy. The burden of proof to show them inadequate was upon the railway companies; and when they failed to sustain this burden they at the same time showed that the injunctions ought not to have been allowed.