Argument for Appellant. 249 U. S. The fact that the repairs are made under superintendence of the shipowner does not destroy the maritime nature of such a contract. P. 129. For the purpose of repairing a vessel for a voyage, the owner of a shipyard, marine railway and machine shops, agreed to furnish materials and men to work under supervision of the shipowner, and to tow the vessel in and haul her out upon the land next the shops, as required in the repairs, by means of the railway, stated prices being exacted for labor, use of tug and scow, hauling out, use of railway, materials, etc. Held, an entire marine contract, for the repair of the vessel, not involving a lease, or agreement in the nature of a lease, of the railway and machine shops, the use of these being but incidental. P. 128. Affirmed. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Jackson H. Ralston, with whom Mr. Frank W. Aitken, Mr. H. W. Glensor and Mr. Ernest Clewe were on the brief, for appellant: The contract involved in this case did not call for the performance by libelant of any service on or for a ship, either on water or land, but merely for the supply of a marine railway shipyard and equipment. Appellant did not bargain for making repairs or for the results of the use of the equipment, labor and materials supplied by libelant, but for the use thereof by itself. The testimony of the parties forecloses any other construction. Such a contract does not relate to "navigation, business or commerce of the sea." The subject-matter of a contract is the test for determining whether or not admiralty has jurisdiction. Subjectmatter must not be confused with the object of a contract, Leland v. Ship Medora, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8237; The Paola R, 32 Fed. Rep. 174; De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3776; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 26; The Eclipse, 135 U. S. 599, 608; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52; nor must the old single test of location be entirely disregarded, The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17; 119. Argument for Appellant. Ransom v. Mayo, Fed. Cas. Nos. 11571, 11571A; Bradley v. Bolles, Fed. Cas. No. 1773; Pritchard v. Lady Horatia, Fed. Cas. No. 11438; Boon v. The Hornet, Fed. Cas. No. 1640. Wortman v. Griffith, Fed. Cas. No. 18057, and The Vidal Sala, 12 Fed. Rep. 207, distinguished. Under the subject-matter test as so limited, admiralty has no jurisdiction of the present case for two reasons, first, because the repairs to the vessel were made wholly upon land in a shipyard in no sense a part of the sea, and second, because the repairs were made solely by appellant, the libelant only furnishing the plant. In other words, the claim of libelant is merely for charges for the use and occupation of its marine railway and shipyard, a subject which under the decision in the The Robert W. Parsons, is not within the admiralty jurisdiction. See also Berton v. Dry Dock Co., 219 Fed. Rep. 763, 769. For admiralty jurisdiction the contract must be maritime as a whole; and, even if this were not so, the contract here could not be severed, inasmuch as the libel was brought on the contract as an entirety. Furthermore, if there could be any such segregation of items, there would be no jurisdiction in admiralty inasmuch as the only items in dispute for overtime rent-are not maritime at all. To give admiralty jurisdiction, the contract must be maritime in all its elements. Plummer v. Webb, Fed. Cas. No. 11233; The Vidal Sala, 12 Fed. Rep. 207, 208. The Act of Congress of 1910 does not purport to give jurisdiction in this case. If such were its purpose the attempt would be nugatory. The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575; The Sinaloa, 209 Fed. Rep. 287, 288. An extension of admiralty jurisdiction to cases like this would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the field of ordinary contracts and result in a denial to litigants of the right of trial by jury and other incidents of common-law procedure which are jealously guarded by the Federal Constitution and the constitutions of the several States. Mr. Warren Gregory and Mr. Allen L. Chickering, for appellee, submitted. MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court. This is a direct appeal under § 238, Judicial Code (Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1157), involving only the question whether the cause was within the admiralty jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States. Both parties are corporations of the State of California. Appellee, which for convenience may be referred to as the "Shipbuilding Company," filed its libel in personam against appellant, which we may call the "Steamship Company," to recover a balance claimed to be due for certain work and labor done, services rendered, and materials furnished in and about the repairing of the steamship Yucatan. The Steamship Company filed an answer denying material averments of the libel, and a cross-libel setting up a claim for damages for delay in the making of the repairs. The cause having been heard upon the pleadings and proofs, there was a decree for a recovery in favor of the Shipbuilding Company and a dismissal of the cross-libel. After this the After this the Steamship Company filed a motion to arrest and vacate the decree and to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction. The motion was submitted to the court upon the pleadings, the proofs taken upon the hearings of the merits, and some slight additional proof. It was denied, and the present appeal followed. The facts were these: In the month of May, 1911, the Steamship Company was the owner of the American steamer Yucatan, which then lay moored or tied up at dock upon the waters of Puget Sound at Seattle, in the State of Washington. The vessel, which was of steel construction, was in need of extensive repairs. She had been wrecked, and had remained submerged for a long time; ice floes had torn away the upper decks, and some of her bottom plates also needed to be replaced. She was under charter for an Alaskan voyage, to be commenced as soon as the repairs could be completed. The Shipbuilding Company was the owner of a shipyard, marine railway, machine shops, and other equipment for building and repairing ships, situate upon and adjacent to the navigable waters of Puget Sound at Winslow, in the same State, and had in its employ numerous mechanics and laborers. Under these circumstances it was agreed between the parties that the Shipbuilding Company should tow the vessel from where she lay to the shipyard, haul her out as required upon the marine railway to a position on dry land adjacent to the machine shop-the place being known as the "dry dock," and the hauling out being described as "docking"-and should furnish mechanics, laborers, and foremen as needed, who were to work with other men already in the employ of the Steamship Company, and under its superintendence; and the Shipbuilding Company was also to furnish plates and other materials needed in the repairs, and the use of air compressors, steam hammers, riveters, boring machines, lathes, blacksmith forge, and the usual and necessary tools for the use of such machines. At the time the contract was made, another vessel (the Archer) was upon the dry dock, and it was uncertain how soon she could be returned to the water. It was understood that the Yucatan should be hauled out as soon as the Archer came off, should remain upon the dry dock only during such part of the work as required her to be in that position, and at other times should lie in the water alongside the plant. For the services to be performed and the materials and equipment Opinion of the Court. 249 U. S. to be furnished the Shipbuilding Company was to receive stated prices, thus: for labor of all classes, the actual rate of wages paid to the men plus 15 per cent.; for use of tug and scow, a stated sum per hour; for hauling out the vessel and the use of the marine railway, a stated sum for the first 24 hours, and a specified rate per day for 6 "lay days" immediately following the hauling out; for each working day thereafter, another rate; for vessel lying alongside the dock for repairs, no charge; for the running of air compressors, a certain charge per hour; for the use and operation of other machines, certain rates specified; and for materials supplied, invoice prices and cost of freight to plant, with 10 per cent. additional. The vessel was docked and repaired in the manner contemplated by the agreement; she was brought to the shipyard on the 27th of May, and lay in the water alongside of the dock there until the 17th of June, during which time upper decks and beams were put in and other work of a character that could be done as well while she was afloat as in the dry dock. On June 17 she was hauled out and remained in dry dock for about two weeks while her bottom plates were renewed. During the same period the propeller was removed to permit of an examination of the tail shaft, and as the shaft showed deterioration a new one was ordered to be supplied by a concern in San Francisco. Upon completion of the work upon the bottom plates, and on the 5th of July, the vessel was returned to the water and lay there for about two weeks awaiting arrival of the new tail shaft. When this arrived the vessel was again hauled out, the tail shaft and propeller were fitted, and the remaining repairs completed. Libelant's claim was for work and labor performed, services rendered, and materials furnished under the circumstances mentioned, and was based upon the agreed scale of compensation. The question in dispute is whether a claim thus grounded |