laboratories; the use by one agency of the laboratories of another; and when to start new facilities to meet newly emphasized problems such as transportation, pollution, housing, and crime.2

The greatest present obstacle to interagency use, according to Dr. Hornig, lies within the technical management of the agencies. He said:

The big problem is to determine when it is appropriate to use facilities in other agencies when this is the best procedure as opposed to contracting it out or building a new facility. The principal bar and the principal problem is that of the technical management in the agencies.3

Returning to policy: Policy that is not carried out is sterile and ineffective. Who then is responsible for developing present policy for laboratory utilization? The hearings show that Congress can look to no one agency, no one office, no one individual official. Rather responsibility is divided among the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Science and Technology, the Federal Council for Science and Technology and its Committee on Federal Laboratories, and the individual Federal departments and agencies that have or need laboratories. This division of interest and responsibility is not unexpected. It follows naturally from the basic organization of the Executive Branch with its numerous mission-oriented departments and agencies which, except for whatever influence present interagency coordinating mechanisms can exert, go their own ways. There is absent a strong centripetal force to pull these bits and pieces of policy into a coherent whole.

The problem facing Members of Congress and officials of the executive branch who are interested in furthering the effective use of Federal laboratories is to create policies and the means of carrying them out which are strong enough to deal with the centrifugal forces of present Federal organization.

How to do so is a standing interest of this subcommittee.

D. THE ECONOMY ACT OF 1932

The Economy Act provides that any executive department or independent establishment of the Government may place orders with any other executive department for materials, supplies, equipment, work, or services of any kind that the requisitioned agency may be able to render if (1) funds are available and (2) it is determined by the head of the requisitioning department to be in the interest of the Government.2

The basic idea behind the Economy Act was to "permit one bureau or department to work for another when it had facilities and the requesting bureau was without them." During the debate on the bill, there was some discussion concerning the role of private industry, particularly if industry could do the work as cheaply or more cheaply than the Government. It was not, as one Member noted "the intention of the Government to go into all kinds of work and to deprive private industry of work." Accordingly, a provision was added to the bill that "if such work or services can be as conveniently or more cheaply per

formed by private agencies, such work shall be let by competitive bids to such private agencies."

It will be noted that the provisions of the Economy Act are quite broad, and represent a general statement of policy in favor of Government economy. However, since its enactment in 1932, there have been a number of Comptroller General decisions, which, as the watchdog of the Congress over agency fiscal matters, have added a certain amount of specificity to the act. The Comptroller General has held, for example, that (1) the indefinite loan of equipment among agencies which might result in transfer without reimbursement was prohibited; (2) authority to procure services and supplies from other agencies rather than from commercial sources because of lower cost was regarded as permissive rather than mandatory; (3) payment of actual cost is required, including charges for depreciation."

A relevant decision of the Comptroller General holds that a performing agency should be in a position to supply what is needed without adding new plant and equipment.' Directly related to this was an unpublished decision, made in July 1954, affirming the concept that the performing agency must "already" be in a position to supply or equipped to render the service. The decision further stated that the Economy Act did not contemplate that one agency would acquire, even with its own funds, substantial equipment for the sole purpose of being able to supply services to other agencies, nor that it would request other agencies to support the construction of facilities."

In preliminary discussions prior to the hearings, the subcommittee had heard a number of reports indicating that the various decisions of the Comptroller General in regard to the Economy Act had circumvented the original purpose of the act and served to hinder rather than foster interagency cooperation. Consequently, the subcommittee went into this issue in some detail during the hearing, but could find no substantial evidence that this allegation was in fact true.

Dr. Gerald Tape, Commissioner of the AEC, referred to the Comptroller General decision holding that the performing agency must already be in a position to supply the services and equipment as "a potential limitation," and indicated that "we have been applying it as a matter of judgment and without too much difficulty" and "** we have walked around it."

*

Dr. Donald M. MacArthur, Deputy Director (Research and Technology), Office of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, set out the problem in these words:

I believe it could be a deterrent if this finding by the Comptroller General is literally interpreted where we are one agency and a laboratory from another agency could do some of our work but that work requires special equipment and special facilities. This interpretation says that you can't do that. As an example, if I am going to NASA asking one of their labs to do a special job for me because they have special expertise in terms of personnel to do the job or the task, but they have to acquire special equipment or special facilities

8 38 C.G. 334.

437 C.G. 16.

22 C.G. 74. 638 C.G. 734.

733 C.G. 565.

Unpublished Comptroller General decision B-119486, dated July 23, 1954.

to do it, I believe the interpretation that the Comptroller
General put on it inhibits this.

Dr. MacArthur went on to add, however, "but I don't think it has affected us seriously."

It should be pointed out that although the decision in question dealt only with facilities, the wording of the decision makes it clear that it is intended to include substantial increases in both facilities and equipment, and perhaps personnel as well.

What "substantial" means, however, is not clear. The case in question involved the National Bureau of Standards constructing a tiretesting building at a cost of approximately $150,000 in order that it could do certain work for the Department of the Army. It is not evident from the decision what the cost of the entire program would have involved and, consequently, it cannot be said with certainty whether the Comptroller General was referring to "substantial" in an absolute sense in that $150,000 is a substantial amount, or whether "substantial" was used in relation to the cost of the entire undertaking. From the subcommittee's standpoint, the latter is a more reasonable course to follow, and one which will carry out the original purpose of the Economy Act. However, the subcommittee is not prepared to recommend what percentage would be substantial, and believes the function is more appropriately the responsibility of the Comptroller General. As evidenced by the lack of decisions on this point, it is apparent that the agencies have not sought the guidance of the Comptroller General and have preferred instead "to walk around it." Such an approach is not designed to foster interagency cooperation, and the subcommittee recommends that the agencies meet the issue head on. If subsequent decisions of the Comptroller General are believed to be unreasonable, the subcommittee could then entertain appropriate corrective legislation. Until that proves to be the case, however, the subcommittee sees no reason why the Economy Act cannot continue to be the basis for interagency cooperation.

E. OTHER LEGISLATION

In addition to the general authority for interdepartmental work granted by the Economy Act of 1932, much of the legislation which established the function of the Department of Defense and the military departments contains language which either permits or fosters the use of services of other agencies.1

General authorization for cooperation between a specific agency and other agencies frequently exists in other statutes. Legislation relating to NASA, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Bureau of Standards provides in various ways and to varying degrees for the use of services and personnel of other agencies. For example, the Space Act 2 provides that NASA is authorized

to use, with their consent, the services, equipment, person-
nel, and facilities of Federal and other agencies with or with-

1 Dr. MacArthur in his testimony included a discussion of such legislation. Cf. hearings, p. 173. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, sec. 203(b) (6), Public Law 85-568.

out reimbursement, and on a similar basis to cooperate with
other public and private agencies and instrumentalities in
the use of services, equipment, and facilities. Each depart
ment and agency of the Federal Government shall cooperate
fully with the Administration in making its services, equip-
ment, personnel, and facilities available to the Administra-
tion, and any such department or agency is authorized, not-
withstanding any other provision of law, to transfer to or
to receive from the Administration, without reimbursement,
aeronautical and space vehicles, and supplies and equipment
other than administrative supplies or equipment.

F. EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Principal executive statements of policy for use of Federal laboratories have been articulated in two Executive orders. With a view to facilitating "the efficient use of scientific research equipment and facilities held by Federal agencies," President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10521, "Administration of Scientific Research by Agencies of the Federal Government," on March 17, 1954. In what has been termed the most basic statement concerning the efficient use of Federal equipment and facilities, the President ordered that

(a) The head of each agency engaged in scientific research shall, to the extent practicable, encourage and facilitate the sharing with other Federal agencies of major equipment and facilities;

(b) Federal agency shall procure new major equipment or facilities for scientific research purposes only after taking suitable steps to ascertain that the need cannot be met adequately from existing inventories or facilities of its own or other agencies; and

(c) The Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific Research and Development 3 shall take necessary steps to insure that each Federal agency engaged directly in scientific research is kept informed of selected major equipment and facilities which could serve the needs of more than one agency. Each Federal agency possessing such equipment and facilities shall maintain appropriate records to assist other agencies in arranging for their joint use or exchange.

To implement this directive, the Interdepartmental Committee prepared in 1955 a Government-wide inventory of major Federal laboratories and equipment. Subsequently, a supplement was issued in 1957. According to Dr. Allen V. Astin, the Director of the National Bureau of Standards and Chairman of the Federal Council's Laboratory Committee, "little or no use was ever made of the information.”

On March 13, 1959, the Interdepartmental Committee was abolished by Executive Order 10807, and in its place was created the Federal Council for Science and Technology, an interagency body representing the principal agencies with scientific or technical missions. The Federal Council was given the responsibility to consider problems and developments in the fields of science and technology and related activities affecting more than one Federal agency, including the recommendation of policies and other measures to "achieve more effective utilization

Executive Order 10521, 19 F.R. 54, Mar. 19, 1954, sec. 8. The text of this order is reprinted in appendix B of the hearings, pp. 368-370.

of the scientific and technological resources and facilities of Federal agencies including the elimination of unnecessary duplication."

Although the Interdepartmental Committee was abolished in 1957, the other provisions of section 8 of Executive Order 10521 concerning the sharing of equipment and facilities among Federal agencies and the admonition to agency heads not to procure new major equipment or facilities without ascertaining that the need cannot be met from existing inventories continue to apply and represent the policy of the administration. However, as will be discussed later, the gap between policy and reality, in this area at least, is clearly evident, and each agency apparently is free to go its own way.

G. THE BELL REPORT

The most comprehensive guidance for Government agencies concerning the use of private institutions to perform scientific research and development work is embodied in a 1962 Bureau of the Budget's "Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and Development," popularly known as the Bell report. In response to a request by President Kennedy in 1961 to Bureau Director David E. Bell, the report was jointly prepared and issued by the heads of the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Civil Service Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Science Foundation, as well as the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

The Bell report discussed the various ways in which the Federal Government can fulfill its research and development needs, and discussed the advantages of direct Federal operations and the various patterns of contracting then in use. "Not all arrangements," the report said, "are equally suitable for all purposes and under all circumstances, and discriminating choices must be made among them by the Government agencies having research and development responsibilities."

The report recommended that these choices should be based primarily on two considerations:

(1) Getting the job done effectively and efficiently, with due regard to the long-term strength of the Nation's scientific and technical resources, and

(2) Avoiding assignments of work which would create inherent conflicts of interest.

In the course of its review of Government experience in contracting with private concerns, the group found evidence which it said left no doubt that "the effects of the substantial increase in contracting out Federal research and development work on the Government's own ability to execute research and development work have been deleterious." Accordingly, the Bell report devoted part 4 to proposals to improve the Government's ability to carry out research and development activities directly in its own laboratories.

5

"Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and Development," compiled by the Bureau of the Budget, Apr. 30, 1962 (the Bell report). Printed as S. Doc. No. 94, 87th Cong., second sess., 1962. Principal excerpts from the Bell report are reprinted in appendix B to these hearings, pp. 339-367.

Hearings, p. 362.