The $12,200,000 was divided into two separate categories: $10,200,000 was designated for the aircraft program in which remote sensing techniques, sensors and data handling systems were to be developed and tested, using specially outfitted aircraft; and $2 million was for feasibility, definition and design studies pertaining to an earth resources technology satellite.

The report stated:

The committee is disappointed in the very limited effort planned for research and development of an earth resources survey system in fiscal year 1969. Because of the enormous potential of such a system, the committee might have supported a larger request, had the Administration proposed and justified efficient use of such funds.

An effective ERS system, in terms of its potential benefits to mankind, could represent the greatest direct return on investment of any aspect of the space program. Its aim is to discover resources, to improve their exploitation and management, to conserve those we have, and to help in applying them for the public good. In agriculture, for example, crop growth, yield, and damage assessment data could be obtained. Management of water resources is another of several critical areas in which major contributions could be made by such a system. Within the limited budget requested, however, the committee urges a somewhat different emphasis, and therefore recommends redistribution of the $12,200,000 requested by allotting $7,700,000 for the aircraft program, and $4,500,000 for satellite development. This redistribution would require an increased effort in design and development of the satellite during the forthcoming fiscal year, with a commensurate reduction in the aircraft program.

The committee has taken this action so as to make clear Congress' desire that the earth resources satellite program should be undertaken without unnecessary delay. The committee urges NASA to pursue an aggressive development program, preferably oriented toward relatively small, inexpensive satellites using Scout launch vehicles initially, and then progressing to large multisensor satellites when practicable. The committee strongly believes that such an approach will be more effective in achieving an operational earth resources satellite system at an earlier date than with any of the alternative approaches known to be under consideration within NASA.

Following submission of the phase A report in October 1967, there was a lapse of activity for several months, until about April 1968, due to the refusal of the Bureau of the Budget to approve more than $2 million for the ERTS project for fiscal year 1969.

According to NASA, however, some in-house effort had continued at Goddard Space Flight Center since early 1968 to evolve a work statement for a combined phase B and C.

Certain aspects of the phase B study are currently being undertaken at Goddard and will run parallel with the contractor effort. NASA reportedly expects to go out on bid for these combined phases early in 1969.

Phase B involves a project definition study including the definition of system parameters and appropriate system and subsystem tradeoffs. Phase B studies are to be completed in calendar year 1969.

Phase C is usually comprised of two parts: the first part consists of two or three detailed design studies; the second part covers a final systems design. Phase D includes systems development, fabrication, and flight test.

The contractual combined phases B and C effort is expected to be underway by the end of June 1969.

NASA now estimates that the first ERTS could be launched late in calendar year 1971, or early in calendar year 1972, if initiated in fiscal year 1970.

Costs to date directly relatable to ERTS are zero. NASA reports, however, that approximately $22 million has been expended on earth

resources activities during the period of fiscal year 1964 through fiscal year 1968. These funds have come from OSSA supporting research and technology budgets, and have been expended largely in connection with the aircraft program.

Despite the strong recommendation of the House Science and Astronautics Committee, noted above, to increase the funding during fiscal year 1969 from $2 million to $4.5 million for work on the satellite. with a comparable reduction in the level of support for the aircraft program, NASA has informed the committee that only $2 million is planned to be obligated in fiscal year 1969 for ERTS studies.

Until the phase C studies are completed, total cost estimates must be considered tentative, but NASA currently estimates that two ERTS satellites could be developed and flown for approximately $45 million over a 4-year period.

NASA's relationships with the user agencies had been informal until quite recently. On July 15, 1968, a NASA management instruction was issued which established the Earth Resources Survey Program Review Committee and set forth its functions.

This management instruction states:

NASA is engaged in developing space and aeronautics applications in agriculture, forestry, geography, geology, hydrology, and oceanography. NASA desires its research and development program in the development of space technology to be responsive to the needs of the many agencies of the Federal Government which have a direct interest in earth resources survey data. It is, therefore, determined necessary and in the public interest to establish an interagency committee to insure effective multiagency planning and review and a fully coordinated program.

The Committee is comprised of officials from the Department of Agriculture, the Department of the Navy, the Environmental Science Services Administration of the Department of Commerce, the Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and is responsible for

(a) Reviewing and analyzing the total program in earth resources survey, including any substantive issues which may arise;

(b) Providing advice and recommendations to NASA concerning the current and future responsiveness of the NASA research and development program to user agency requirements; and

(c) Providing advice and recommendations to user agencies aimed at achieving maximum integration of requirements and a coordinated national program.

The first regular meeting of the Committee was held on July 16, 1968. Agreement was reached on the management instruction establishing the Committee, and on the policy regarding attendance of observers, e.g., from Dr. Hornig's office and the Bureau of the Budget. Subsequent meetings were held on October 3, and November 5, 1968, at which matters relating to user agencies requirements, among other items, were discussed.

The ERTS program requirements have been specified as follows: The satellite will be placed in a near polar orbit so as to provide almost global coverage with repetitive observations over specific areas approximately every 4 weeks. The orbit will be sun-synchronous so as to obtain a nearly constant ground scene illumination angle of about 9:30 a.m. A circular orbit at approximately 500 nautical miles will provide minimum image distortion, and image overlap and sidelap

of about 10 percent. The image format will be approximately 100 by 100 nautical miles, and a minimum operating lifetime in orbit will be

1 year.

There is general agreement that the primary source of data needed by most users in the near future will be in the form of pictures from high resolution television cameras. Accordingly, the first ERTS satellite will probably be equipped with three 2-inch return beam vidicons, each sensitive to a different frequency, two within the visible spectrum and one in the near infrared; a video tape recorder; and a data collection system. Also under active consideration are an optical and infrared scanner, and a microwave scatterometer.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. An earth resources satellite system unquestionably presents NASA with an excellent opportunity, perhaps the best possible opportunity, to achieve tangible economic returns from the substantial investment already made by the American taxpayer in the U.S. space program. The unique observation and data collection capabilities of the earth orbiting satellite are such that it promises to become an instrument having a profound impact upon the discovery, management, utilization, and conservation of the world's natural resources within the next few years. The successful exploitation of remote sensing techniques will help to meet the needs of several agencies of Government, and ultimately the effects will strongly influence the economy in general. Among those who have studied its implications, there is virtual unanimity that an ERS system constitutes an idea whose time has arrived, and many believe that NASA's response is overdue.

The pace of the program to date has been much too leisurely, and financial support has been inadequate. On the present schedule, the first ERTS will be launched in about 3 years, late 1971 or early 1972. Inasmuch as the origins of the program date back to 1964, approximately 8 years will have passed before the first launch, despite repeated urgings from Interior, Agriculture, and the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications for the earliest possible launch. By contrast, the most complex and difficult program ever undertaken by NASA, the Apollo Program, will have been completed in about 8 years. Furthermore, no project of OSSA has had a comparable history of delay as has ERS.

It is strongly recommended that NASA concentrate a much larger portion of its efforts and resources on this project, and the launch schedule should be compressed, if possible. With funding requirements declining in certain programs, especially Apollo, this may be an appropriate time for NASA to reexamine funding priorities. NASA should give the most serious consideration to the recommendation of the National Academy of Sciences' summer study to the effect that funding for the applications satellite program should be at least doubled, perhaps tripled.

2. Precise determination of cost effectiveness at this early stage in the development of an ERS system is not possible, and any attempt to achieve such precision could be misleading. The magnitude of the economic benefits simply cannot be calculated in the absence of the type of data which the system is designed to produce.

On the other hand, numerous studies have been conducted by academic and industrial organizations, and they are unanimous in the conclusion that an operational ERS system has great economic potential, and some predict spectacularly profitable results measured in billions of dollars annually. Moreover, it seems reasonable to anticipate the presence of elements of serendipity. As one witness before our committee stated, "No matter how much preflight planning and evaluating is done, there is always a huge jump in the understanding of a mission's potential after the actual mission data start to become available."

Moreover, the National Academy of Sciences has observed that "other benefits, less measurable and longer range, could add even more to the welfare of our planet by contributing to a better understanding of its total resources and by encouraging international cooperation in the wise utilization of these resources.'

Even in the absence of hard figures, intuitive judgment should justify the expenditure of venture capital on a program as promising as ERS. In any case, cost-benefit analysis should not be a crucial consideration during the research and development phase; nor has it been applied, to our knowledge, to other NASA programs in the past. 3. An ERS satellite development project might well have been proposed as a part of the Applications Technology Satellite Program. The ATS program has included a variety of spacecraft launched into different orbits. Particular ATS spacecraft bear no resemblance to others in terms of design or mission objectives. This is entirely understandable since the ATS program was presented to Congress as having the objectives of "designing and developing spacecraft capable of performing communications, meteorological, gravity gradient stabilization, scientific, and other technology experiments in medium and synchronous orbits."

Certainly, the scope of the ATS program is broad enough to include an ERS effort, and it is regrettable that ERTS was presented as a "new start" to the Bureau of the Budget at a time of a declining space budget when any new start predictably would be at a great disadvantage in the competition for shrinking resources. It is noteworthy that ATS-F. & G., new and different from earlier ATS spacecraft in virtually every sense, was presented as part of an on-going program and survived the scrutiny of the Budget Bureau, whereas "new start" ERTS failed to gain full approval.

Apart from that unfortunate strategy, NASA's stewardship of the ERS program to date has been disappointing. Well-organized and persuasive presentations to the Budget Bureau evidently have been lacking. As the Director of the Budget has observed: "Previous plans for using satellites (for ERS purposes) have been too vague and have not been well coordinated."

NASA should now assume leadership in organizing the efforts of the various interested agencies so that a single, forceful governmentwide position may be adopted, particularly for future presentations to the Bureau of the Budget.

4. The conclusion is inescapable that an automated ERS spacecraft project has been delayed because earth resources experiments were, as a matter of NASA policy, designated to be carried out as part of the manned space flight program. Presumably such experiments have been viewed as a partial justification for the Apollo

Applications Program, and this may well have been the major obstacle to the exploitation of existing technology for development of an automated ERS spacecraft.

There are several reasons why an ERS system should utilize automated spacecraft rather than continue as part of the manned space flight effort. Foremost among these reasons is the much higher cost. of manned systems. Manned missions are so extremely expensive that, in view of NASA's declining budget, there may be very few Apollo Applications flights in the decade of the seventies, and a meaningful ERS program should not be required to wait upon such a contingent activity as Apollo Applications. This should not be construed as criticism of the Apollo Applications Program, which can be justified on other grounds, such as medical research and investigating man's capabilities to perform in space. That men will play a meaningful future role in space is generally accepted, and Apollo Applications will help to define that role.

Recognizing cost as a basic consideration, however, the report of the President's Science Advisory Committee issued in February 1967 entitled "The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period" recommended that "before a manned earth resources survey is included in the Apollo Applications Program, detailed cost-benefit studies be completed which treat manned versus unmanned methods for accomplishing these tasks." It should also be pointed out that a truly productive ERS system will require much longer periods in orbit than are now contemplated for manned space flights. Moreover, as noted elsewhere in this report, NASA has observed that the orbital inclinations in manned flights generally are not considered ideal for ERS work. Certainly, routine data acquisition over long periods from carefully preselected orbits must be done, as a practical matter, using automated spacecraft.

As the National Academy of Sciences concluded in its 1967 interim report on its space applications study:

The use of manned vehicles per se does not at present appear necessary or economically desirable for the operation of the various space systems considered by this study group. It is believed that the systems proposed for providing nearterm practical and economical benefits to the U.S. public and to mankind generally will be achieved more effectively and economically with automated devices and vehicles.

5. A vigorous aircraft program appears to be justified on the basis that preliminary testing of new instruments, and refinement of existing devices, can be done more cheaply in aircraft than in spacecraft. One might wish that the aircraft program had been more vigorous in the past. Nevertheless, in view of (a) currently limited resources; (b) several years work already completed on sensors; (c) general agreement on the instrument complement for early ERTS satellites; and (d) the feasibility of modifying existing spacecraft for the earth resources survey mission, a program emphasizing aggressive development of an automated spacecraft directed toward an early flight schedule should be undertaken without delay, even at the expense of reduced activity in the aircraft program.

6. In the interest of economy and efficiency, technical responsibility for the design and development of an automated spacecraft should be assigned to a NASA center that has a staff of highly trained personnel experienced in the development of earth-oriented unmanned spacecraft. In any case, the assignment should not go to a NASA center