SUMMARY

The Apollo program has now entered its flight phase with the national objective of a lunar landing in this decade. The tragic accident of January 27, 1967, was a major factor in causing revisions in the flight schedule of the Apollo program. However, both NASA and industrial management have responded to the need to correct deficiencies found as a result of this accident and to recover momentum in the program. The Apollo Applications program has also been affected by the change in the Apollo schedule to the extent that revisions to the Apollo Applications program were still under consideration at the time of the completion of this study (November 30, 1967). Currently the following key items are assessed by NASA management to be pacing the progress of the programs:

(a) Completion of Apollo 204 accident related changes to the command module and lunar module including: (1) flammable materials reduction and isolation; (2) unified hatch qualification on the command module; (3) qualification of strengthened parachute assembly for the command module; (4) spacecraft weight growth control.

(b) Completion of qualification of the ascent engine of the lunar module.

(c) Qualification of the environmental control system for the command module.

(d) Successful qualification of a lightweight S-II (second stage Saturn V) stage vehicle; and

(e) Successful completion and testing of "software" programs for simulated and actual lunar flights.

Significant delays in obtainment of the qualification and flight demonstration of these items could affect both the program schedule and costs adversely. It is the finding of this study that the NASA industry team is continuing to effectively employ its resources in the solution of those problems which currently face the program. NASA has indicated that, given the stretchout in the Apollo program caused by the Apollo 204 accident, NASA is not constrained by total funding for the Apollo program during fiscal year 1968. The continued reduction in total effort in the Apollo program as the program passed its peak effort in fiscal year 1967 is beginning to cause dislocation in the contractor and NASA center effort to the extent that personnel that will be needed during the flight portion of the program may not be available in the event a major flight problem occurs. Timely support for the Apollo Applications program and other post-Apollo effort could have a major effect on minimizing this problem.

Since the completion of this study NASA has eliminated the Apollo Applications IA flight for earth resources survey and the restructured the program. Continued reduction in the Apollo Applications effort

will likely cause dislocations in the NASA-industry technical base developed over the past decade.

A major challenge exists for NASA and key industrial contractors to accomplish the Apollo schedule. If major unanticipated flight problems occur during the next 12 months, NASA's ability to respond without major schedule changes and cost increases could be seriously jeopardized.

CONCLUSIONS

This study is based on information obtained in staff conferences with the NASA and key industrial contractors of the Apollo program. Conclusions are as follows:

(a) A number of difficult engineering problems remain to be solved in the Apollo program in two general areas: (1) Apollo 204 accidentrelated spacecraft changes and (2) engineering changes associated with normal development testing.

(b) NASA has successfully completed flammability testing of the lunar module and appears to be in a position to accomplish similar but more difficult flammability qualification of the command module.

(c) Weight growth has continued to be a problem in the command and service module and lunar module and was further complicated by changes associated with the Apollo 204 accident; however, changes in the lift-to-drag ratio of the command module and attendant reduction in ballast is keeping it within the total weight budget even with the addition of a new unified hatch and strengthened parachute assembly. The lunar module is at its weight limit for the expected performance of its propulsion system and will require continued vigorous effort to remain within the weight limitations.

(d) NASA has moved to strengthen the management visibility of potential Apollo safety problems at the NASA centers and key industrial contractors.

(e) Elimination of the propulsion instability potential of the ascent engine of the lunar module has continued to be a problem. Two alternate injector systems are now under test. One system operated successfully during the Apollo 5 flight, but final qualification will be required to assure that the problem is eliminated.

(f) It appears that NASA and the key industrial contractors are recovering momentum following the Apollo 204 accident and are utilizing the information derived effectively to improve the safety and efficiency of equipment and operations.

(g) Schedule slippages occasioned by the Apollo 204 accident have limited the projected Saturn V flights to a total of nine by the end of this decade and consequently reduced the probability of a lunar landing in this decade. However, barring major difficulties, NASA considers that a lunar landing in this decade can be accomplished.

(h) Changes in the Apollo schedule and less than NASA anticipated fund availability for Apollo Applications has caused slippage of the Apollo Applications schedule by approximately 1 year. With personnel levels in the Apollo program declining at approximately 4,000 people per month, adequate support to the planned Apollo applications program following the Apollo lunar landing could be a major problem.