APOLLO APPLICATIONS

(D. E. Serrill, speaker)

The Boeing Co. does not have a contractual responsibility for Apollo Applications spacecraft hardware. However, continuing systems analysis and systems study efforts are maintained in order to access future requirements for launch vehicles, including the requirements for the Saturn V vehicles which will be needed to support the Apollo Applications Program. These Boeing studies are consistent with the recommendations of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, establishing a need for a 3-per-year production rate for the Saturn V for planning purposes. Additionally, through the studies, Boeing has identified low-Earth orbital missions, synchronous orbital missions, lunar logistic missions, and deep space missions which will require a launch vehicle having a capability of placing 40,000 to 100,000 pounds in low-Earth orbit. Analysis of all the potential launch vehicle alternatives for the intermediate payload capability range shows that the S-IC/S-IVB launch vehicle configuration provides the most cost effective approach.

The Apollo Program provides the hardware and know-how to permit a logical progression into the AAP missions. Figure 10 shows the extrapolation, from the Apollo Program, which portrays the potential evolution which can extend our capability through extensions to the basic Apollo Lunar Program and through a progression of Earth orbital activities. In the lunar activities, AAP can provide for mapping and extended lunar surface exploration.

In the Earth orbital regime, AAP can progress through the S-IVB Workshop to the ground launch laboratory program; and, eventually, to an integrated space station that can be used for extended Earth orbital operations which will posture the United States for future manned planetary missions. Concurrent with these activities, unmanned Earth orbital missions, including synchronous orbit communication satellites and other space probes, will gather data for future space program planning and evaluation."

Mission analysis associated with this baseline program indicates a need for an intermediate vehicle for resupply of a ground-launched laboratory, for resupply of men and equipment for an integrated space station module, for the launch of synchronous orbit communication payloads, for unmanned lunar logistics payloads, and for unmanned deep space missions.

Several candidate launch vehicles (fig. 11) have been proposed to fill the "40,000- to 100,000-pound-to-low-Earth-orbit" payload gap which now exists between the capabilities of the uprated Saturn I or Titan IIIM and the Saturn V.

Where intermediate payloads could be divided to permit a multiple launch situation, the currently available uprated Saturn I and the soon-to-be-available Titan IIIM might be considered for such missions. In the true intermediate class is the uprated, elongated Saturn I with 120-inch solid rocket motor strap-ons utilizing the S-IVB as a second stage; as well as a new 260-inch solid propellant motor first stage, with an S-IVB second stage. Another possible configuration is the Titan IIIG which is a new 15-foot diameter liquid core with new 156

inch diameter solid propellant rocket motor strap-ons. A fourth candidate intermediate launch vehicle is the S-IC/S-IVB configuration. Performance of this vehicle is flexible and can be tailored to specific mission requirements. By varying the number of F-1 engines installed on the first stage, the payload capability can be adjusted between 36,000 to 133,000 pounds for low Earth orbital missions.

Studies indicate the S-IC/S-IVB vehicle to be the most desirable from all aspects, including its low development cost, availability, and the utilization of proven hardware. This vehicle provides the lowest systems, unit, and program cost in terms of hardware procurement, systems engineering and integration, and launch operations since it would be additive to the basic Saturn V Program, and utilizes the existing production and launch facilities at the 6-per-year rate for which the facilities have been designed.

While considering the S-IC/S-IVB application for the intermediate vehicle requirement, the Boeing Co. has also studied the future growth possibilities that can be developed utilizing a modified S-IC stage that stages the four outboard engines, thereby increasing the capability and versatility of the S-IC/S-IVB family of launch vehicles.

It is concluded that the Saturn V, or its derivative launch vehicles, can efficiently and cost effectively launch all the intermediate and large payloads that can be identified for NASA's future programs. The forthcoming Government deliberations should include consideration of a NASA launch vehicle family composed of Saturn V's and Saturn V derivatives that can launch intermediate and large payloads, and which will utilize efficiently the production, test, and launch facilities built for Apollo.

APOLLO TECHNICAL INTEGRATION AND EVALUATION PROGRAM, CONTRACT NASW-1650

(C. P. Martin, speaker)

The objectives of the Apollo Technical Integration and Evaluation (TIE) Program are to assist NASA in landing astronauts on the Moon and returning them to Earth safely, and to accomplish this in the quickest way. The key to meeting these objectives is to minimize both the number of flights and the time between flights. This requires rigid configuration control to insure the delivery of trouble-free hardware to KSC and a rapid evaluation of flight accomplishments. To accomplish this, the Boeing Co. has assigned a number of technical and management personnel to the Apollo Program to assist the Apollo Program Office in Washington, D.C., the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Tex., and the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala. These personnel take policy and technical direction from the Boeing Co.'s Space Division Assistant Division Manager located in Washington, D.C.

Since the beginning of this activity, some basic NASA/Boeing agreements have been developed that govern the Apollo TIE Program. First, NASA retains the authority and responsibility for final technical decisions. Second, Boeing will not direct NASA or other Apollo contractor personnel. Third, Boeing will not work on any task requiring access to other contractors' financial data. Fourth, Boeing will be

given access to other Apollo Program data. Therefore, the TIE role is one of an adviser or consultant who performs technical assessments, makes recommendations, and increases NASA management's technical visibility of problem areas.

The letter contract which authorized the TIE activities was signed on June 15, 1967. It lists the basic activities to be performed by Boeing, such as configuration management, interface integration and control, program control, design reviews, launch readiness reviews, safety, mission analysis, management systems, et cetera, to be performed at the various locations. Since the signing of the letter contract, work has been accomplished in all of these areas. Additionally, there has been an effort to prepare a definitive work statement. A work statement was prepared by Boeing with the assistance of NASA personnel and was submitted to NASA in September. Figure 12 shows five of the major activities which are indicative of the 12 tasks that are in the Boeing-recom

DEFINITIVE CONTRACT ACTIVITIES (PROPOSED)

PROGRAM INTEGRATION

ASSIST NASA IN MAINTAINING AN OVERVIEW OF THE APOLLO PROGRAM

DETERMINE AREAS NEEDING AUGMENTATION

DETERMINE AND RECOMMEND NECESSARY ACTIONS IN SUITABLE FORM FOR NASA TO IMPLEMENT ●MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION OF NECESSARY ACTIONS TO ASSURE COMPLETION

ENGINEERING EVALUATION

TECHNICALLY EVALUATE PROGRAM SPECIFICATIONS

TECHNICALLY ANALYZE SELECTED CRITICAL DRAWINGS FOR CONFORMITY WITH SPECIFICATIONS
IDENTIFY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SELECTED SYSTEM HARDWARE AND RELEASED ENGINEERING DRAWINGS
OVERIFY THAT CRITICAL SUBSYSTEMS ANOMALIES DO NOT IMPACT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

● ANALYZE PROPOSED CHANGES FOR TECHNICAL ADEQUACY AND SCHEDULE IMPACT
●MONITOR REVIEWS AND INSPECTIONS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS

PROCESS INTERFACE AND CONFIGURATION CHANGES

PERFORM SECRETARIAT FUNCTIONS AND SUPPORT CONFIGURATION CONTROL BOARDS

PREPARE SUMMARIES OF BOARD ACTIONS, SPECIFICATION STATUS, AND TOTAL CHANGE STATUS

FLIGHT READINESS

● ANALYZE FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW DOCUMENTS FOR TECHNICAL ADEQUACY, CRITICAL PROBLEMS, IMPACT OF WAIVERS. HIGH RISK AREAS, SCHEDULE IMPACT, IMPACT OF OUTSTANDING ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSALS, AND OPEN ITEMS IDENTIFY AND TRACK OPEN ITEMS UNTIL CLOSE-OUT

SUPPORT THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF FLIGHT READINESS REVIEWS

ASSESS THE READINESS FOR LAUNCH OF THE INTEGRATED SPACE VEHICLE AND LAUNCH COMPLEX

MISSION ANALYSIS

AS SURE THAT DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR MISSION ANALYSIS HAS BEEN PROVIDED
ASSESS FLIGHT RESULTS

● DETERMINE IMPACT ON SUBSEQUENT TEST PROGRAMS, HARDWARE, AND MISSIONS

FIGURE 12

mended, definitive work statement; program integration, engineering evaluation, configuration management, flight readiness assessment, and mission analysis. To accomplish these activities, an Apollo Program Directive has been issued which defines how data will be interchanged on the Apollo TIE Program between field centers, other NASA contractors, and Boeing Apollo TIE personnel. Three-party working agreements have been implemented to facilitate this data exchange. Additionally, Boeing is building a communication system for effectively linking the four Boeing Apollo TIE locations together. The Boeing-owned simulation center in Huntsville will provide the memory and computational capability through a versatile digital and analog computer system.

Through September, the Boeing Co. has approximately 900 direct personnel working on the Apollo TIE Program. Boeing and NASA are targeting a firm contract to be in effect the first quarter of 1968.

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

OCTOBER 13, 1967

BRIEFING FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OVERSIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF STUDY

The October 13 visit of the House Oversight Subcommittee staff to the St. Louis site of the McDonnell Astronautics Co. afforded the opportunity to review and display the past and current accomplishments as well as a preview of its future plans. Mr. Walter F. Burke, president of the company, was the host.

Graphics 2-2 through 6-16 describe the company's management structure, manpower assignment, and facility capability. This section also displays a current status report and operating plan for the Airlock project.

Graphics 8-22 through 8-68 present a number of advanced programs and concepts developed by McDonnell-Douglas. These include a Logistics System Evolution, Tip Tank Orbital Vehicle Concept, Advanced Test Vehicle and Multi-purpose Reusable Spacecraft.

Outline map of the United States and Canada indicating the major offices and

facilities of the corporation.