A logical development program schedule is presented that commences with the Saturn IB/Minuteman that can be available in 18 months followed by the Saturn IB with a Centaur in 24 months and, finally, the Saturn IB with 4-120inch SRM's in 27 months. The development cost of the Saturn IB/Minuteman is $20 million and that associated with the 120-inch SRM is $125 million.

THE BOEING CO. APOLLO/SATURN V PROGRAM

BRIEFING

NEW ORLEANS, LA., OCTOBER 10, 1967

BRIEFING TO SUBCOMMITTEE ON NASA OVERSIGHT STAFF, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUMMARY ABSTRACT BOEING APOLLO/SATURN V PROGRAM BRIEFING

Boeing activities in support of the Apollo/Saturn V Program are illustrated in figure 1, and include the Saturn V effort conducted under contract NAS8-5608 and the Apollo Technical Integration and Evaluation (TIE) Program under contract NASW-1650 which was authorized this year. Contract NAS8-5608 is divided into three parts which are referred to as "schedules." Schedules I and II provide for support of the Marshall Space Flight Center, and schedule III is in support of the Kennedy Space Center. Schedule I concerns design, assembly, and test of the S-IC stages, the first stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle. This activity is primarily performed at the Michoud Assembly Facility and the Mississippi Test Facility. Schedule II is the Saturn V Systems Mission Support Task, which includes work in the following types of functions: Systems Engineering and Integration, Flight and Mission Analysis, GSE Design, Development Test, Logistics Support and Program Management Support. These activities are primarily performed at Huntsville. Schedule III activities support activation of Launch Complex 39, launch operations related to the S-IC stage, and operation of S-IC stage and Saturn V common ground support equipment.

Boeing Space Division is also performing an Apollo Technical Integration and Evaluation Task (TIE) in support of the Apollo Program Office in Washington, D.C., Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, and Manned Space Center. To accommodate this increased responsibility, the Space Division has made several organizational and personnel changes. The letter contract authorizing the TIE activity was signed on June 15, 1967. Since that time, emphasis in this activity has been in support of NASA in the assessment of the flight readiness of the AS-501 space vehicle.

Since July 1966, many program milestones have been accomplished and are indicated in figure 2. At the Michoud Assembly Facility, S-IC stage production is continuing. S-IC-3 and 4 have been accepted by NASA. Stages through S-IC-8 are now structurally_complete. The Mississippi Test Facility has been activated. The S-IC-T has completed two firings to demonstrate MTF capability and the S-IC-4 and -5 have successfully completed their firings there. However, the launch delays at Cape Kennedy combined with the ahead-of-schedule

BOEING SATURN V/APOLLO MAJOR ROLES

APOLLO TECHNICAL INTEGRATION & EVALUATION (TIE) NASW-16.50 APOLLO PROGRAM OFFICE

S-IC stage production position created a situation which required that NASA direct Boeing to delay deliveries of S-IC stages to Cape Kennedy. This will require negotiation of a new schedule. In the interim, Boeing is reassigning personnel to minimize the impact of the delays. BOEING SATURN/APOLLO PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

At Huntsville, Boeing has completed all documentation including trajectory analysis and prelaunch systems analysis required to support the AS-501 launch and work is progressing on documentation required to support subsequent missions. In addition, Boeing has successfully completed the Dynamic Test Program.

At Cape Kennedy, the AS-501 space vehicle has been erected and moved to the pad and the AS-502 space vehicle is also being processed. Boeing does not have a contractual responsibility for Apollo Applications spacecraft hardware. However, Boeing is performing continuing systems analysis and systems study efforts in order to assess the future requirements for launch vehicles, including identifying the requirements for the Saturn V vehicles which will be authorized on the Apollo Applications Program. Through these studies, Boeing has identified low Earth orbital missions, synchronous orbital missions, lunar logistic missions, and deep space missions which will require a launch vehicle having a capability of placing 40,000 to 100,000 pounds in low Earth orbit. Analysis of all the potential launch vehicle alternatives for the intermediate payload capability range indicates that the S-IC/S-IVB launch vehicle configuration provides the most cost effective approach. Performance of this vehicle can be tailored to specific intermediate payload mission requirements by varying the number of F-1 engines installed on the first stage.

Manpower for contract NAS8-5608 peaked during calendar year 1965, and has declined steadily since then (fig. 3). After the AS-501 launch, personnel requirements are expected to diminish more rapidly.

TOTAL BOEING PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FORECAST SATURN PROGRAM THROUGH SA-515

Figure 4 summarizes the significant aspects of the Boeing Apollo/ Saturn Program activities.

BOEING SUMMARY

BOEING IS MAKING ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL CHANGES TO ACCOMPLISH THE ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TIE PROGRAM WHILE MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THE NAS8-5608 CONTRACT COMMITMENTS

SCHEDULES I & IA, II AND III ACTIVITIES ARE SUPPORTING NASA-
DIRECTED REQUIREMENTS.

COSTS ARE ON OR UNDERRUNNING TARGETS

CONCERTED AND COORDINATED EFFORT TO INSURE SUCCESSFUL AS-501
PROCESSING AND LAUNCH

S-IC STAGE PROGRAM (SCHEDULES I & IA) IS FACED WITH A SERIOUS PROBLEM DUE TO THE NECESSITY TO INTERRUPT MAJOR STAGE TESTING ACTIVITIES AND STAGE DELIVERIES BECAUSE OF APOLLO PROGRAM LAUNCH DELAYS

FIGURE 4

AV79298

S-IC STAGE PROGRAM-CONTRACT NAS8-5608, SCHEDULES I AND IA

(F. L. Coenen, speaker)

A brief introduction depicting the status of the S-IC Program during 1966 and 1967, along with a preview of anticipated events for 1968, is shown in figure 5.

The S-IC Program (schedules I and IA) is ahead of the contracted delivery schedule on all stages. The contract cost underrun reported in July 1966 has increased. Technical problems concerning the S-IC stage are being resolved as they are identified and, at this time, no technical problems that would impact a successful launch are known. Boeing direct manpower at Michoud and MTF peaked in early 1965, and has steadily declined since that time. Because the S-IC stage production program is ahead of the contracted schedules and the program launch schedule is being delayed, MSFC has directed Boeing to (a) delay the shipment of NASA accepted stages S-IC-3 and 4 to KSC, (b) suspend testing of the S-IC-5 and -6, and place the stages in storage, and (c) continue the fabrication, assembly, and postmanufacturing checkout of stages S-IC-7 and on, after which these stages are to be placed in storage. The present Boeing schedule position, NASA redirection, and Boeing's estimated revised schedule for shipment of S-IC stages to KSC is summarized in figure 6.

As a result of this schedule redirection, Boeing has started to reassign MTF personnel to other activities until they can again be utilized