3. Substantial progress in staffing, planning, and establishing operating modes. 4. Hardware and operations plans for early missions underway. 5. Some decisions still to be made. 6. Ready to proceed rapidly as soon as funded and fully authorized. MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER OCTOBER 9, 1967 BRIEFING FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM SUMMARY (By Mr. George M. Low) Immediately after the AS-204 accident a complete reassessment was made of the Apollo Spacecraft Program (fig. 2 (67-46721)). This was based on an internal reassessment and the findings of the Apollo 204 review board under Dr. Thompson. During the reassessment, emphasis was given to the fire control program for manned spacecraft. A number of design changes were made to the spacecraft to make it safer for manned flight. Changes were also made to test and checkout procedures and additional tests were added to the ground test program. Since the visit of the committee staff to MSC in October of 1966, a number of changes have been made in the key personnel of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (fig. 1). Mr. George M. Low joined the program in April of 1967 as Program Manager and Brig. Gen. C. H. Bolender was assigned in June of 1967 as Manager of the Lunar Module. Mr. Kenneth S. Kleinknecht was assigned a similar position for the Command and Service Module. Mr. Kleinknecht was Program Manager for Project Mercury and was Deputy Manager under Mr. Charles Matthews in the Gemini Program. Mr. Scott H. Simpkinson was assigned from the Gemini Program as Assistant Manager for Flight Safety. Mr. William H. Gray, the former resident manager for Gemini at McDonnell Corporation has been reassigned to the position of NASA Resident Manager for North American Rockwell Corporation at Downey. Walter J. Kapryan has been assigned as Assistant Program Manager and Resident Manager at KSC. All major decisions in the Apollo Spacecraft Program are now made at the weekly meeting of the Configuration Control Board which consists of senior people at MSC. Major fire related changes have been made as discussed with Congress in May 1967 (fig. 3). These have included redesign of the plumbing lines and shields, the unified hatch, substitution of nonflammable nonmetallic materials for flammable materials where possible, containment of materials where not possible, firebreaks placed strategically throughout the spacecraft, addition of a fire extinguisher, and NASA AS-204 EFFECT AS-204 LED TO A COMPLETE PROGRAM REASSESSMENT WITH FIGURE 2.-NASA-S-67-46721-AS-204 accident effect: Immediately after the accident, a complete reassessment was made of the Apollo Spacecraft Program. This was based on the review board under Dr. Thompson, and the whole Apollo program. Emphasis was given to the Fire Control Program. A number of design changes were made that related to both the fire and other aspects of crew safety. A review was made of our tests and checkout system and some procedural changes were made, particularly in the relationships with KSC. A substantial number of additional tests were added to the ground test program. other changes. This program is supported by a flammability test program with results reviewed by a senior Flammability Test Review Board chaired by Dr. Gilruth and by absolute material configuration control. Substitution materials and coating for circuit breakers have proved to be the most difficult problems. Some flammable materials will still remain within the spacecraft. These include a small amount of polyurethane foam as a helmet cushion, Velcro hooks made of nylon, cotton underwear, and Silicone rubber oxygen supply hoses, and paper procedures books. These materials have been retained either because no substitute is available to do the job (as Silicone oxygen hoses and Velcro hook) or the substitute has a defect which renders it unsuitable for operational use (Beta cloth underwear proved too uncomfortable in wear tests). All flammable materials will be controlled by procedures so that they are stowed when not in use and the amount exposed at any given time is limited. FIGURE 1.-NASA-S-67-46722-Apollo spacecraft program organization chart: The Apollo Spacecraft Program Office organization has not changed very much since the staff of the committee was here in October of 1966. There have been a number of changes of key people. Mr. Low joined the program in April of 1967. General Bolender was assigned in about June of 1967. Prior to his assignment to the Apollo Spacecraft Program, he was a Mission Director under OMSF. His current responsibility is management of the lunar module effort. A similar job for the command and service module is assigned to Mr. Kenneth Kleinknecht. Mr. Kleinknecht was the last Program Manager for Project Mercury and was Deputy Manager under Mr. Matthews in the Gemini program. Mr. Simpkinson is now assigned as Assistant Manager for Flight Safety. He held the operations and test division job in Gemini and prior to that was on the Mercury program. His one specific assignment by charter is to head the Incident Investigations and Recording Panel. This is a panel to look at failures or other accidents. He also heads a team of personnel who look at all checkout procedures used at MSC from a safety point of view. The reliability and Quality Assurance Division headed by Mr. Bill Bland reports to Aleck Bond at the center management level. He will continue to carry a dash-line responsibility to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office. Mr. Bill Gray is assigned as resident manager at Downey. He was the former resident manager for Gemini at McDonnell. Walter Kapryan is assistant manager and resident manager at KSC. He reports to the program manager at KSC. A major fire hazard proved to be the conformal coatings applied to the circuit breakers. These coatings are extremely flammable and fire propagates from one to the other readily because of their proximity. A new conformal coating has been found for the command module called Ladicote. For the LM each circuit breaker is covered with a Beta cloth bag. Both Ladicote and the Beta cloth bags have passed component fire tests and are adequate. Both create maintenance problems if a defective component must be changed. Other coatings, such as metal sleeves are being investigated. A fire extinguisher using fuel-cell water was planned (fig. 4). However, fuel-cell water contains entrained hydrogen which makes it unsuitable for use on fires. A portable extinguisher containing water and a methyl cellulose gelling agent has been developed for the command module. A water extinguisher will be used for the lunar module. NASA S-87-48728 FIRE CONTROL PROGRAM MATERIAL SUBSTITUTIONS • MATERIAL CONTAINMENT AND FIRE BREAKS • MATERIAL CONFIGURATION CONTROL FLAMMABILITY TEST PROGRAM FIRE EXTINGUISHER IGNITION REVIEW AND TESTS FIGURE 3.-NASA-S-67-46726-Fire control program: The Fire Control Program involves the substitution of materials, that is, materials that do not burn for materials that do burn; and containment of materials where we are unable to replace them, that is placing them in metal containers or having firebreakers between groups of materials and having an absolute configuration control. The flammability testing program has been established to determine how the flammable materials react when placed in the spacecraft environment and provided with an ignition source. A fire extinguisher has also been developed for use within the spacecraft. We also reviewed ignition sources under various test conditions. Fire testing to verify the new materials and designs has begun with tests of small components and subcomponents. This will extend through larger combinations of components through complete boilerplate mockups of the command module and lunar module. Boilerplate mockups also contain panel closeouts that have been added to cover exposed plumbing and wiring and the metal stowage containers that will contain the flammable materials during flight. The fire test program has not been accomplished before, so a major problem will be evaluation of the results. Rather than prescribe pass-fail criteria, a Flammability Test Review Board has been established. The board will review the test procedures before test and evaluate the results. The test and checkout responsibilities between MSC and KSC have been further refined (fig. 39). MSC now presents to KSC a test and checkout requirements document. This document spells out what tests shall be conducted; what subsystems shall be tested; where at KSC is the capability of making the tests; and in what sequence of tests it is appropriate to conduct these particular subsystem tests. A companion |