Determination.-A positive method does not exist for insuring identification and documentation of all possible hazards involved in test operations. Responsible Organization.-KSC. Action. A positive method for ensuring identification and documentation of all possible hazards involved in test operations has been developed and published as APOP No. G-102, Safety Considerations for Checkout Procedures, released July 17, 1967. This procedure defines and implements a methodical means of evaluating the hazard level of all spacecraft procedures. The procedures that have been evaluated as hazardous are then compared with a set of checklists to ensure compliance with safety practices. Additional details are provided in Panel Finding 13-1, Finding No. 14 Finding. Requirements for the review and concurrence of KSC S/C test procedures by MSC are not well defined. Determination. The present review system does not insure that MSC concurs with released KSC test procedures. Responsible Organization.-KSC. Action. A revised review system that ensures that MSC concurs with released KSC test procedures is defined in APOP No. 0-202 Preparation and Release of Test and Checkout Procedures, dated July 26, 1967. Presently, all spacecraft test procedures review copies are forwarded to MSC for review and comment. The MSC flight crew checklist information is required to be furnished to KSC-SCO 40 days before the scheduled test date with all MSC procedures comments due no later than 15 days before the scheduled test date. MSC is also to approve, by signature, all spacecraft test procedures that include the participation of the flight crew. Panel No. 14 Finding No. 4 SECURITY OF OPERATIONS Finding.-Apollo Preflight Operations Procedure (APOP) 0-201, dated October 17, 1966, and January 24, 1967, concerning access control of test and work areas, required that: (1) access controls to spacecraft work areas be exercised by the contractor; (2) the contractor maintain a log of all personnel permitted access during "off-shift"/non-work periods; (3) the contractor control Command Module ingress-egress, and maintain a log concerning same. Determination. The procedures established in the APOP were not followed in that: (1) the contractor failed to exercise adequate access controls on the fifth, sixth, and seventh spacecraft levels; (2) the contractor failed to maintain an "off-shift" log; (3) the Command Module ingress-egress log was inadequately maintained. Responsible Organization.-KSC. Action.-NASA KSC Quality Control personnel will enforce a new set of controls as defined in APOP No. 0-203 Access to the Command and Service Modules (CSM), released May 22, 1967. This procedure is described in Panel Finding 1-4, and provides for improved personnel and material access control and ingress-egress log maintenance. Finding No. 5 Finding. The investigative program, which was used as the basis for authorizing access to LC 34, consisted of a determination that a National Agency Check (NAC) investigation had been conducted on each Government or contractor employee. In the absence of an NAC, an escort was required. (Similar provisions existed at the Mission Control Center/Houston.) Determination. This practice provides inadequate support for the objective of NASA management that great care be taken to assign reliable and trustworthy persons to perform critical work during mission periods. Responsible Organization.—KSC. Action. Mission-critical positions have been identified and incumbents are being submitted for required investigation. The investigation program will be completed before the first manned mission and will ensure that only reliable and trustworthy persons perform critical work during mission periods. Finding No. 6 Finding. (a) Access to the Astronaut Quarters and the Suiting Room was limited by an access list attached to the Security Post Orders, to those few people having an official reason to be there, i.e., astronauts, biomedical people, suit technicians, etc. Compliance with this procedure was enforced by KSĈ uniformed security patrolmen. The Van used to transport the astronauts from their Quarters to the Launch Complex was inspected, driven, and remained under the control of KSC Security personnel when astronaut activity was involved. Uniformed security personnel escorted the Van when astronauts were being transported. (b) The purchase, handling, and delivery of the astronauts' food (non-flight) served in their Quarters is processed through the contractor's routine channels. (c) Only the results of an NAC are available to NASA management in their evaluation of the reliability and trustworthiness of support personnel in the Astronaut Quarters. Determination.-The personnel access controls for the Astronaut Quarters, the Suiting Room, and the Van were adequate. Inadequate safeguards are provided concerning the purchase, handling, and delivery of astronauts' food (non-flight), notwithstanding the fact that it is known by persons coming in contact with it that it is to be consumed by the astronauts. NASA management has insufficient knowledge to fully evaluate the reliability and trustworthiness of support personnel in the Astronaut Quarters. Responsible Organization. KSC. Action. The KSC Procurement Office in conjunction with the KSC Security Office and the MSC Mission Support Office at KSC has negotiated a contract with Automatic Retailers of America to provide food support to the astronaut quarters (Contract NAS-10-5385). Astronaut quarters primary and back-up contractor personnel in this and the cleaning services area have been identified and their security papers will be forwarded for investigation as obtained. Astronaut food will be personally purchased, delivered, and handled only by the above referenced persons for whom security personnel investigations have been conducted, rather than through routine food procurement channels. Security and Mission Support Office personnel will monitor the contractor's performance for adherence to the intent of the contract. Personnel investigations and evaluations will be complete before the permanent billeting of the crews for the first manned mission. Purchase, delivery, and handling procedures will also be implemented before the permanent billeting of the crew for the first manned mission. Panel No. 20 IN-FLIGHT FIRE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS REVIEW Finding No. 1 Finding. An in-flight fire procedure was published and available to the crew for the Apollo 204 Mission. The procedure was analyzed with reference to the Apollo 204 Command Module 012 configuration. Determination.-Based on this review, it is the judgment that the existing inflight fire procedures are deficient in the following areas: a. The cabin fans should be turned off as the first item of the procedural check list. This may help prevent the spread of a fire by minimizing cabin air currents. b. The procedure should have specified the length of time to keep the cabin depressurized to insure the fire had been extinguished and that all materials had cooled to below their ignition temperature. Responsible Organization.- MSC. Action.-Inflight fire procedures have been modified to incorporate the results. of hardware improvements made by CCA 1326, (hatch vent), CCA 1315 RB (cabin repressurization), CCA 1311 (repressurization controls), CCA 1397 (emergency oxygen system-masks), and RECP 7C348 (portable fire extinguisher). The modified procedures will be incorporated in revisions to the Apollo Abort Summary Document, 67-IN-2, for all manned missions and appropriate Apollo Operations Handbooks. Hardware changes are effective with the first manned spacecraft. This area is discussed further under Panel Finding 7-3. Finding No. 3 Finding.-Coordination with Panel 8, Materials Review, and Panel 5, Origin and propagation of Fire, indicates many materials combustible in 100% 5 psi oxygen were on board Apollo 204 Command Module 012. Determination.-It is the judgment of the Panel that these materials would yield a dangerous propagation rate in case of fire in the Command Module during boost, orbital and entry phases of flight. Responsible Organization.—MSC. Action.-Nonmetallic material selection criteria and control of material location in the command module are described under Panel Finding 8-1a. Finding No. 4 Finding.-Lengthy suit donning times were incompatible with fire propagation times. Determination.—The published in-flight fire procedure was impractical in view of the rapid fire propagation rate expected for an Apollo 204 in-flight fire. Responsible Organization.-MSC. Action.-Practice with spacesuit operations will be conducted based on new procedures prior to any manned flights in the near actual environment of the command module simulator and first manned spacecraft. An auxiliary breathing oxygen system and portable fire extinguishers will be installed to provide a means for combating spacecraft fires until time permits donning pressure suits. Finding No. 5 Finding. The Command Module depressurization time from 5 psi to 0.5 psi can vary from 1 minute and 45 seconds to 3 minutes and 20 seconds, based on the flight phase ambient pressure. Determination.-The depressurization time is too slow to effectively combat a cabin fire. Responsible Organization.—MSC. Action. With the capability of the new outward opening unified hatch, the spacecraft does not require depressurization prior to crew egress for emergencies on the pad. In addition, portable flight crew operated fire extinguishers are being provided as described in Panel Finding 13-7. Finding No. 6 Finding. The emergency cabin repressurization time from a vacuum to 3.5 psi is 35 minutes. Determination. -The time required to repressurize the cabin to a minimum acceptable pressure is excessive in view of the possible fire damage to the closed loop pressure suit circuit. Responsible Organization.-MSC. Action.-The cabin repressurization time as a post-fire action will be decreased to a reasonable value compatible with the potential fire damage to the ECS suit loop and spacecraft interior. CCA 1315 RB to NAR provides for additional gaseous oxygen tanks in the command module. The new tanks supplement the present system and permit repressurization of the cabin from 0 to 3 pounds per square inch in 1 minute. The change is effective for all manned spacecraft. Finding No. 7 Finding Actuation of the suit circuit return valve, the cabin repressurization valve, and emergency cabin repressurization valve are critical in producing an adequate cabin decompression and subsequent repressurization. Determination.-The placement of ECS controls and displays complicates the execution of the existing in-flight fire procedure. Responsible Organization. MSC. Action.-CCA 1311 to NAR provides for remote operation of the suit circuit return valve and a permanent handle for the emergency cabin repressurization valve. CCA 1315 provides for rapid cabin repressurization with the cabin repressurization valve located to be accessible to the crew. The changes are effective on all manned spacecraft. о 4. Sci 2 [COMMITTEE PRINT] APOLLO AND APOLLO APPLICATIONS STAFF STUDY FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NASA OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS NINETIETH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION Serial M LAW LIBRARY DEC 1968 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Astronautics 89-149 O U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1968 CHARLES F. DUCANDER, Executive Director and Chief Counsel FRANK R. HAMMILL, Jr., Counsel JOSEPH M. FELTON, Counsel ELIZABETH S. KERNAN, Scientific Research Assistant DENIS C. QUIGLEY, Publications Clerk SUBCOMMITTEE ON NASA OVERSIGHT JOSEPH E. KARTH, Minnesota RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana (II) |