Opinion by DAVIES, Ch.J. dist Episcopal Church of Fort Edward," is a religious corporation, duly incorporated, and was such on the first of May, 1829, and then had, and ever since has had and still has, lawful title to the real estate described in the complaint in this action, as owner of said real estate in fee, and was entitled to the possession of the said real estate at the time of the commencement of this action, and still is entitled to the possession of the same. That neither of the other Plaintiffs has a right to recover the same in this action. That the conveyance by Bennet, Eddy, and Bancroft to Lee, under the order of the Court, on the 19th of March, 1853, is insufficient to pass the legal title of said real estate to said Lee. That the equitable title to said real estate is in said Lee, by reason of said proceedings for the sale of the same, and the payment of the purchase-money by him, and he is entitled to a conveyance thereof, in due form, by said Methodist corporation. But the legal title now remains in the said Plaintiff, the Methodist Episcopal Church. That the Defendant has no right, title, or interest, legal or equitable, in the said real estate, or the building thereon, under or by virtue of the deed from Walter Rogers and wife to Christopher Van Deuzen and others, aforesaid (dated 28th April, 1829), or otherwise. That the Defendant entered into the possession of said premises wrongfully and unlawfully, and unjustly withholds the possession thereof from the said Plaintiff, "The Methodist Episcopal Church." That the bell referred to in the answer in this action is the property of the said Plaintiff, "The Methodist Episcopal Church;" and the Defendants have no right, title, or interest therein. That said bell was rightfully removed to the new church, and retained and used therein by said Plaintiff. That the Defendant is not entitled to the relief, or any part thereof, demanded in the answer, or any relief against the said Plaintiffs, or either of them, in this action. That the said Plaintiff, "The Methodist Episcopal Church of Fort Edward," is entitled to judgment in this action against the said Defendant; that the said Defendant be adjudged to surrender the possession of the said real estate to the said Plaintiff; and that the said Plaintiff recover of the said Defendant the costs and disbursements of the Opinion by DAVIES, Ch.J. said Plaintiff herein; that the complaint be dismissed as to the three plaintiffs, Van Deuzen, Bancroft, and Lee, with costs and disbursements to the Defendant against them, to be adjusted and inserted in the judgment roll. Judgment was entered accordingly, and on appeal to the General Term the same was affirmed, and the Defendants now appeal to this Court. The appeal brings up for review the correctness of the judgment rendered in favor of the Plaintiff, "The Methodist Episcopal Church of Fort Edward," against the Defendants. We are not embarrassed by the question discussed in the opinions of the learned judges of the Fourth District when this case was first before them upon the report of a referee, before whom the same had been tried. That referee reported as a fact, that "The Methodist Episcopal Church of Fort Edward" was never incorporated, and never had a legal existence. The Supreme Court held that the evidence did not authorize the referee to find this fact; and that Court reversed the judgment of the referee, and ordered a new trial. Upon the second trial the facts were found by the Court as already detailed. We have now the fact found that said church, in or about the year 1828, was duly incorporated, pursuant to the statute of the State of New York in such case made and provided. The Methodist Episcopal Church at Fort Edward was, therefore, a legal corporation, and being such, the grant of the land in dispute, made on the 28th day of April, 1829, by Walter Rogers and his wife, to the then trustees of the said church, for its use, vested the title of the land in that corporation. 1 Rev. Stat. 727, § 47, declares that every person, who, by virtue of any grant, assignment, or devise, now is or, hereafter shall be entitled to the actual possession of lands, and the receipt of the rents and profits thereof, shall be deemed to have a legal estate therein, of the same quality and duration, and subject to the same conditions, as his beneficial interest. In Welch v. Allen (21 Wend. 147), the Supreme Court held that in that case, the trust being merely nominal in 1830, when Opinion by DAVIES, Ch.J. the Revised Statutes went into operation, it became executed in the cestui que trust, by virtue of the forty-seventh section of the article on uses and trusts (already quoted), and, consequently, the Plaintiff held the legal title, and was entitled to maintain that action. The head-note to this case is, "Where a trust of lands is wholly nominal, the trust becomes executed by the statute in the cestui que trust, who may maintain ejectment for the recovery of the lands in his own name, without a previous conveyance from the trustee." To the same effect is the case of Nicoll v. Walworth (4 Denio, 385). Upon the facts found by the referee the Methodist Church corporation have never parted with the legal title to the lands in dispute, so vested in them, and that corporation is, therefore, the proper party to maintain this action. These views are decisive of this case, and lead to an affirmance of the judgment of the Supreme Court. All concur. JOEL TIFFANY, State Reporter. Statement of the Case. MARY RING AND CHARLES H. RICHARDSON, RESPONDENTS, v. DANIEL STEELE AND ELIJAH SMITH, APPELLANTS. Real Estate-Deed not recorded-Consideration not paid-Subsequent Grantee. A deed of real estate is not rendered invalid from the fact that the considerations are not paid at the time of its execution and delivery. A subsequent grantee of land, purchasing with knowledge of a prior conveyance, is not a bond fide purchaser, even though the prior deed be not entered of record. The action was for the APPEAL from the Supreme Court. recovery of an undivided half of four acres of land in the town of Java. The cause was tried at the Wyoming circuit, before Mr. Justice Marvin. Each of the parties claimed under Joseph Steele, the previous owner of the premises. It appeared on the trial that on the 16th of February, 1852, the latter conveyed an undivided half of four acres to the Plaintiffs, in consideration of $250, the payment of which was acknowledged in the deed, though no payment was made in fact. On the 18th of March following, Steele and his wife executed a conveyance of the entire premises to the Defendant, Daniel Steele, in consideration of $250, the payment of which was acknowledged in the deed; the amount actually paid at the time being $50. When this deed was executed, that given to the Plaintiff had not been recorded, but the Defendant, Daniel Steele, who was the father of the grantor, purchased with notice of the prior conveyance. The deed to the Plaintiffs was recorded on the 27th of March, 1852, three days after the registry of the deed to Daniel Steele. The latter, on the 15th of March, 1858, conveyed the premises to the Defendant, Smith, in consideration of $250, the receipt of which was acknowledged on the face of the deed. The Judge held that the mere recital by Joseph Steele, in the conveyance to his father, of the payment of the consideration, was not proof that the latter was a purchaser for value, as against the Opinion by PORTER, J. prior grantee; but the fact was established by other evidence, which was met by proof of actual notice of the previous deed. The Defendants offered to prove that the Defendant Smith purchased from the Defendant Steele, without notice of the deed to the Plaintiffs, except such notice as the law implied from the registry of that conveyance. The evidence was rejected. Exceptions were taken to these rulings, and also to the refusal of the Court to hold, as matter of law, that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover. The jury found for the Plaintiffs, and the judgment entered upon the verdict was affirmed at General Term in the Eighth Judicial District. The Defendants appealed to this Court. Win. H. Greene for Appellants. L. W. Thayer for Respondents. PORTER, J.-The effect of the deed to Ring and Richardson was to invest them with title to an undivided half of the premises. By accepting the grant they became liable for the agreed price, and the validity of the transfer was not affected by the non-payment at the time of the purchase-money (Barnum v. Childs, 1 Sandf. S. C. R. 58; Meriam v. Harsen, 2 Barbour Ch. R. 232). The subsequent conveyance of the premises by the grantor to his father was a fraud upon the rights of previous grantees. Through their neglect to put on record the evidence of their title, and the superior vigilance of the Defendant Steele, the deed of the latter would have acquired priority if he had bought without notice of the antecedent grant (1 R. S. 756, § 1). He paid a valuable consideration, but as he did so with knowledge of the previous conveyance, he was not a purchaser in good faith, and cannot claim the protection of the recording act. The Defendant Smith occupies no better position. He is chargeable with constructive notice of the deed under which the Plaintiffs claim, as it was recorded before he made his purchase (Van Rensselaer v. Clark, 17 Wend. 25; Jackson v. Post, 15 id. 588). It is unnecessary to consider the question whether a merc recital, by one who has previously parted with his title, that he |