Intellectual Property Rights in the Global EconomyInstitute for International Economics, 2000 - 266 pages Over the past 15 years, intellectual property rights (IPRs)-patents, copyrights, and trademarks-have moved from an arcane area of legal analysis and a policy backwater to the forefront of global economic policymaking. In the 1990s dozens of countries unilaterally strengthened their laws and regulations in this area, and many others are poised to do likewise. At the multilateral level, the successful conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in the World Trade Organization elevates the protection and enforcement of IPRs to the level of solemn international commitment. The new global IPR system comes with both benefits and costs. Stronger IPRs protection should increase incentives for innovation and raise returns to international technology transfer. However, it also could raise the costs of acquiring new technology and products, shifting the global terms of trade in favor of technology producers and against technology consumers. In this context, the new regime raises international economic policy questions that evoke impassioned and exaggerated claims from both advocates and opponents of IPRs, particularly concerning sensitive issues such as patent protection of pharmaceuticals and biotechnological inventions, and copyright protection for internet transactions. In the first comprehensive economic assessment of the effects of stronger international IPRs, Keith E. Maskus examines these competing claims through an analysis of the economic effects of extended international protection and partial harmonization of IPRs. He presents findings on the potential effects of stronger global IPRs, including likely impacts on foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and pricing under enhanced market power. The results bear directly on several important policy questions, including the construction of complementary initiatives on market liberalization and competition rules, and Maskus discusses whether priority attention should be devoted to them in the upcoming next round of global trade talks. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 40
Page 8
... questions that arise . Having given qualitative and quantitative answers to the previous questions , I apply those results to the following problems : What will be the balance of global benefits and costs from the TRIPS agreement ? If ...
... questions that arise . Having given qualitative and quantitative answers to the previous questions , I apply those results to the following problems : What will be the balance of global benefits and costs from the TRIPS agreement ? If ...
Page 42
... question is whether patents are necessary to stimulate investment in invention and commercialization . Competitive ... questions . In the United States , information about new products and processes becomes available to a firm's ...
... question is whether patents are necessary to stimulate investment in invention and commercialization . Competitive ... questions . In the United States , information about new products and processes becomes available to a firm's ...
Page 215
... question of whether regulating parallel imports is beneficial or harmful is ultimately an empirical question that depends on circumstances . There is not much . systematic evidence to inform the discussion , not least because data on ...
... question of whether regulating parallel imports is beneficial or harmful is ultimately an empirical question that depends on circumstances . There is not much . systematic evidence to inform the discussion , not least because data on ...
Contents
A Road Map for the TRIPS Ahead | 15 |
Globalization and the Economics of Intellectual | 27 |
Intellectual Property Rights and Economic | 143 |
Copyright | |
3 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
benefits biotechnology Brazil capital chapter China competition policy compulsory licenses considerable consumers copying costs coun developing countries developing economies discussed domestic drugs dynamic effects electronic enforcement European Union evidence example exports firms foreign Fred Bergsten Gary Clyde Hufbauer genetic growth imitation impacts implementation income increase India industrial infringement innovation intellectual property protection Intellectual Property Rights international economic investment IPRS protection ISBN issues Japan John Williamson levels limited market power Maskus Mexico MNEs NAFTA negotiations parallel imports parallel trade patent applications patent laws patent protection patent rights percent pharmaceutical piracy plant varieties potential price discrimination problems programs raise reform regimes regulation requires result reverse engineering rise sectors significant South Korea standards strength of IPRs strengthening stronger IPRs stronger patents Table technical technology transfer tion trade secrets trademarks TRIPS agreement United variable Watal weak IPRs WIPO World