Reporter's Statement of the Case 8. Reference (a) informed the Bureau that the necessity for furnishing longer piles to obtain the necessary bearing power would result in a surplus of 42-foot piles which had been furnished at the site for the work by the contractor. The reference recommended that the contractor be reimbursed for the cost of these piles, which would be taken over by the Yard. The Bureau, in reference (c), disapproved this recommendation. 9. The contractor has requested reconsideration of this decision, and has presented to the Board pertinent facts, cost data, and arguments for reconsideration of the Bureau's decision with request that these be forwarded to the Bureau. The contractor believed that the Bureau's disapproval in reference (c) related particularly to the taking over of the piles by the Yard, and that it did not actually cover the disapproval of the reimbursement of the contractor for the actual expense sustained by him on account of the surplus 42 ft. piles. 10. The Board, after examining this information, finds that the contractor has suffered a financial loss which can be attributed to the Government's action in requiring longer lengths of piles. The Board feels that the contractor's arguments are worthy of presentation to the Bureau and accordingly submits the following supplementary report of the Bureau's consideration. 11. The contract did not require the driving of test piles and such driving would have been impossible before the work was started, because of the presence of a crib pier which was removed as part of this same contract to make way for the reconstructed pier. With such information as was at hand, and in order to avoid delay in the contract, the contractor ordered approximately one-half the piles required for the work in 42to 47-foot lengths, which were the lengths necessary to attain the specified depths of 35 and 40 feet. When the driving of piles was actively under way, however, as stated in paragraph 2 above, it became evident that longer piles would be necessary, and the officer in charge accordingly approved the purchase of 47- to 52-foot piles to complete the pile shipment. 12. On account of substituting these longer piles for the 42-foot piles which were too short to be used, a surplus of 258 42-foot piles resulted. Subsequent to the dates of reference (a) and (b), the contractor was able to sell these piles on a private contract, so that the final disposition did not involve the taking over of the piles by the Government, but did involve an actual loss Reporter's Statement of the Case to the contractor estimated to be $1,646.80. The follow- Total cost.. Less credit for 258 42-foot piles @ 14c per foot---- Net loss-‒‒‒ 258.00 397.00 425.00 25.00 $3, 163. 84 1, 517. 04 $1,646. 80 13. The contractor has asked that he be reimbursed by the Government in this amount, which includes no allowances for overhead expenses, profit, or bond. 14. The Board believes that the expense sustained by the contractor because of these surplus piles is a cost chargeable to the furnishing and driving of longer piles and that, if the loss is not allowed as a separate item, it should be applied to the unit price estimated for overlength of piles driven. 15. The Board accordingly estimates the adjustment in payment which should be made because of the necessity of furnishing and driving longer piles and a greater number of piles at $3,013.45, which amount should be increased to $4,660.25 if favorable reconsideration is given to payment for surplus piles. 8. Thereafter and on the 18th day of February, 1932, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks approved an increase in the contract price for the extra length of piles of $3,013.45, but refused to make any finding on plaintiff's claim for $1,646.80 for loss growing out of the purchase and disposition of 258 42-foot piles obtained, but not used, for the contract work, on the ground that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the contracting officer. 9. Plaintiff sustained an actual loss of $1,646.80 in ordering the piles and plaintiff's act in ordering the piles was reasonable and calculated to prevent delay in plaintiff's performance of the contract. Opinion of the Court The plaintiff has made no assignment of its claim or any part thereof and has always borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States and has not aided, abetted, or given encouragement in any way to rebellion against her. 10. The plaintiff withdraws Paragraph IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII of the petition with prejudice to any further action or proceeding as to the cause of action therein purported to be alleged and plaintiff amends Paragraph XIV of the petition so that the prayer for judgment shall ask only for the sum of $1,646.80. The court decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. WHALEY, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the court: The facts in this case have been stipulated between the parties. No brief has been filed by the defendant. It will be seen from the facts that the plaintiff was required to furnish longer piles than provided for in the specifications which were a part of the contract and that Article 3 of the contract provided for an adjustment of price, should a change be made in the contract. The plaintiff was ordered by the defendant to purchase piles of longer length which occasioned an additional cost of $1,646.80. The Board of Changes appointed by and under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, as provided in the contract, considered the additional cost occasioned by the change in the contract and specifications and arrived at the amount above stated as reasonable and just. The plaintiff, having complied with all the conditions of the contract as changed, is entitled to recover the amount occasioned by the extra cost in the sum fixed by the Board. See Moran Brothers Company v. United States, 61 C. Cls. 73; Levering & Garrigues Company v. United States, 71 C. Cls. 739, 757; and Griffiths v. United States, 77 C. Cls. 542, 556. Judgment is entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,646.80. It is so ordered. WILLIAMS, Judge; LITTLETON, Judge; and GREEN, Judge, concur. WHITAKER, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case. 167536-40- -3 Reporter's Statement of the Case GEORGE D. MANSFIELD AND THE GEORGE C. MANSFIELD COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 43248. Decided May 1, 1939] On the Proofs Jurisdiction under special act.-Under the special jurisdictional act of August 19, 1935, it is held that Congress recognized the right of plaintiffs to relief and jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court to determine the claim on its merits and enter judgment for the amount of actual damages, if any. Food Control Act.-The actions and orders of the Enforcement Division of the Food Administration in requiring the plaintiffs to sell immediately cheese held in storage for curing, it is held were beyond the provisions and intent of the Food Control Act. Same. The regulatory provisions of section 6 of the Food Control Act were intended to be applied reasonably, and in accordance with trade practices. Same.-Seizure, forced sale or criminal prosecution was not authorized in the absence of facts to establish a wilful hoarding of food products. The Reporter's statement of the case: Mr. Walter D. Corrigan, Sr., and Mr. W. L. Gold for the plaintiffs. Mr. J. Robert Anderson, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Sam E. Whitaker, for the defendant. Plaintiffs instituted this suit under a special act approved August 19, 1935, and asked judgment for a total of $266,442.64 as the loss, including profit, alleged to have been sustained by reason of the actions and orders of the Enforcement Division of the Federal Food Administration in January 1918 compelling plaintiffs to sell immediately 3,672,661 pounds of cheese theretofore purchased in May, June, and early July, 1917, and stating that if said orders to sell were not strictly complied with the cheese would be seized and sold at plaintiffs' expense and that criminal prosecution would be instituted. Plaintiffs allege (1) that in view of the facts and circumstances surrounding the cheese transactions, to which the Reporter's Statement of the Case Food Administration did not give proper consideration and interpretation, the actions and orders of the Enforcement Division of the Food Administration were wrongful, arbitrary, and contrary to the provisions and intent of sections 4 and 6 of the Food Control Act approved August 10, 1917; and (2) that the special act under which the suit was instituted, and under which the claim is to be adjudicated, when interpreted in the light of the record before the Congress and the reports of the committees on claims of the Senate and the House of Representatives, recognizes and admits the right of plaintiffs to relief by way of compensation for the actual loss sustained by reason of the actions of the Food Administration, Division of Enforcement, and confers jurisdiction upon this court to hear, consider, and determine the merits of the claim for loss, and to enter judgment for the amount of such actual loss as may be found due. On behalf of the defendant it is insisted, as was urged by counsel for the former Food Administration, Enforcement Division, before the Congressional Committees during the time the special act was under consideration, that plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief for the reasons (1) that the actions and orders in January 1918 of the Enforcement Division of the Food Administration were strictly in accordance with section 6 of the Food Control Act, which made it unlawful for any person to willfully hoard any necessaries; and (2) that the claim for compensation for loss is without merit for the reason that no actual loss was sustained. The court, having made the foregoing introductory statement, entered special findings of fact as follows: 1. Plaintiffs filed their petition herein pursuant to the provisions of a special act approved August 19, 1935, which reads as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the George C. Mansfield Company and George D. Mansfield, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, are hereby authorized to bring suit against the United States to recover damages for any loss or losses which |