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A similar difficulty with such estimates is that they do not include potential nonlinearities in the relationships between greenhouse gas concentrations and temperature, between temperature and economic damages, or in the various other complicated relationships governing interactions between greenhouse gas emissions, the climate, and the economy. Current estimates of damages do not, and cannot, accurately reflect the value of reducing the unknown risk of large-scale and potentially irreversible discrete events with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Two such possibilities serve as illustrations. Warming of Northern tundra may release huge amounts of methane from the permafrost, thereby leading to accelerated warming. We do not know at what point, if any, such potentially unstable activity would be triggered. Second, evidence from climate models suggests that some types of climate change may lead to changes in ocean currents, including weakening of the Gulf Stream that warms Western Europe. Scientific evidence suggests that abrupt seawater temperature shifts have occurred over periods as short as decades.

To what extent are we willing to take such chances with our planet? There is a strong argument for the Kyoto Protocol as a form of planet insurance. But what numerical weight should one assign to these catastrophic risks? In other words, what is the value of the insurance policy? Although it is difficult for an economist, or anyone, to know, reductions in the risk of such catastrophic outcomes must be considered in addition to the costs and benefits that can be reasonably quantified. Since human beings are typically averse to risk, such catastrophic risks are especially important in evaluating whether the benefits of a particular climate control policy justify the costs. One must have at least some sympathy with those who criticize economists on the grounds that the effects of climate change are extremely difficult to quantify in a single monetary number.

III. Addressing Global Climate Change in an Efficient Manner

The costs of unabated climate change may thus be difficult to quantify, but they are nonetheless real and provide the motivation for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In taking action to reduce those emissions, economic analysis suggests that two elements are absolutely essential:

The effort must be global, to address the global externality inherent in the nature of the problem.

The effort must be flexible and market-based, to ensure that we achieve our objectives in the most efficient manner possible.

Need for Global Action

Climate change is a global problem requiring a global solution. As I mentioned earlier, no single country has an incentive to reduce emissions sufficiently to protect the global environment against climate change. Each has an economic incentive to "free ride" on the efforts of others. Even if the United States sharply reduced its emissions unilaterally without an international agreement limiting emissions abroad, greenhouse gas emissions from all other countries would continue to grow, and the risks posed by climate change would not be significantly reduced. It is important to emphasize that emissions of different gases anyplace in the world have very similar effects on global climate.

The threat of disruptive climate change has led to coordinated international efforts to reduce the risks of global warming by reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. A landmark international agreement to address global warming was the Framework Convention on Climate Change signed during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This convention established an objective of limiting greenhouse gas concentrations and called upon industrial countries to return their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. Since then, it has become clear that the United States and many other participating countries will not meet this voluntary goal; quite the contrary, emission levels have continued to rise not fall among both developed and developing countries.

To address the lack of progress among many industrialized countries toward meeting the Rio objective, the United States and approximately 160 other nations agreed in negotiations held in Kyoto, Japan, last December, to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol, which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, would place binding limits on each industrial country's combined emissions of the six principal categories of greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane, sulfur hexafluoride, perfluorocarbons, and hydrofluorocarbons. These limits apply to the 38 so-called Annex I countries, which are the industrialized countries, defined to include Russia, Ukraine, and most Eastern European countries.

Under the Kyoto Protocol, each industrial country's baseline is its 1990 emissions of CO2, methane, and N2O and its choice of 1990 or 1995 levels of the other three categories of gases. The United States agreed to a target of 7 percent below this baseline by the period between 2008 and 2012. Given the changes in the definition of the baseline for the three long-lived chemical compounds (HFCs, PFCs and SF6) from 1990 to 1995 combined with a change in the way sinks are accounted for in the baseline, the actual reduction required in the U.S. is no more than 2-3% more than the President originally proposed as the U.S. negotiating position. The targets for the European Union and Japan are 8 percent and 6 percent below 1990 levels, respectively. Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, and Ukraine all have limits somewhat less ambitious when phrased as cuts relative to their 1990 levels. In sum, over the period from 2008 to 2012, the industrial countries are expected to reduce their average emissions of greenhouse gases to about 5 percent below their 1990 levels.

The President has made clear that he will not submit the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate without meaningful participation from key developing countries (who are not included in Annex I).

There are several reasons why meaningful participation from developing countries is essential. First, developing countries are projected to contribute a majority of world emissions around 2030 under a continuation of business-as-usual. Without the participation of developing economies, efforts by the industrialized countries to limit emissions will therefore not provide adequate protection from climate change.

Second, developing country participation is crucial because it would permit relatively low-cost emissions reductions to be internationally recognized as a substitute for more expensive emissions reductions that might otherwise be achieved domestically by U.S. companies and those in other industrialized countries. Since greenhouse gas emissions have the same basic impact on the climate regardless of where they occur, emission reductions in developing countries have the same environmental benefit as reductions in the U.S. But these reductions are much less costly than reductions in the U.S. or in other developed nations, because of the very inefficient and carbon-intensive uses of energy in these countries today. It thus makes sense, from both an environmental and an economic perspective, to incorporate emissions reductions in developing countries into the international system.

Third, principles of basic fairness suggest all countries should do their part, depending, in part, on their ability to contribute to the solution. Thus even poor countries should participate, although the lack of resources in such countries may limit the extent of their participation.

Some have expressed fears that the Kyoto Protocol might adversely affect the competitive position of American industry. Evaluating how the Kyoto Protocol could affect competitiveness of a few specific manufacturing industries -- especially those that are especially energy-intensive, such as aluminum and chemicals -- is complex. The answer depends, in part, on the impact of the agreement on energy prices, which we will shortly address. In general it is difficult to undergo a structural change in the economy without having the effect of expanding some sectors and contracting others. But to provide some perspective on this issue, consider the following facts. First, on average, energy constitutes only 2.2 percent of total costs to U.S. industry. Second, energy prices already vary significantly across countries. According to the 1997 Statistical Abstract, for example, in 1996 premium gasoline cost $1.28 per gallon in the United States -- but only 8 cents per gallon in Venezuela. Similarly, gas prices were $3.71 per gallon in Switzerland and $4.41 per gallon in France. Electricity prices also vary significantly: in the U.S., for industry, they were 5 cents per kilowatt hour in 1995, a fraction of prices in Switzerland of 13 cents per kilowatt hour. Yet U.S. industry is not moving en masse to Venezuela, nor is Swiss industry moving to the United States. Third, roughly two-thirds of all emissions are not in manufacturing at all, but in transportation and buildings, sectors which, by their very nature, are severely limited in their ability to relocate to other countries. We therefore believe we need developing country participation because the problem is global and costeffective solutions are essential, than to avoid adverse effects on competitiveness.

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Flexibility and Market Mechanisms

A global solution is thus critical to the global problem of climate change. Globalizing the solution is not, however, enough by itself. We must also ensure that our reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions are attained in the most efficient manner possible. The nature of the climate change problem suggests three basic methods to lower costs of achieving given levels of environmental protection. They can be characterized in terms of three categories of flexibility: (1) "when" flexibility; (2) "what" flexibility; and (3) "where" flexibility, which may be the most important of all. Such methods have long been championed by economists interested in increasing the efficiency of protection. Indeed, over 2,500 economists from academia, industry, and government alike urged such approaches in a letter they signed last year advocating action on climate change:

"Economic studies have found that there are many potential policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions for which the total benefits outweigh the total costs...The most efficient approach to slowing climate change is through market-based policies."

1. "When flexibility" (timing)

First is "when flexibility" or timing. Since climate change is a long-term problem, the exact timing of emissions reductions is, within some range, not of primary importance. Thus the freedom to delay or accelerate reductions within an agreed upon time frame -- while ensuring credibility of emissions reductions -- lowers costs.

As a result of U.S. leadership, the Kyoto Protocol incorporates this principle of "when flexibility" in four ways:

First, the initial emissions reductions are less severe, and the period over which they occur ends much later than what had been proposed by many other countries. By adopting a gradual and credible path of reductions in the early years, we can greatly reduce costs such as those from prematurely scrapping coal-fired electricity plants, while attaining the same ultimate environmental goals.

Second, under the Kyoto Protocol, the emissions target is not specified in terms of a specific year, but rather in terms of an average over a five-year period (2008-2012). Averaging over five years, instead of requiring countries to meet a specific target each year, can lower costs, especially given an uncertain future. The averaging can smooth out the effects of short-term events such as fluctuations in the business cycle and energy demand, or hard winters and hot summers that would increase energy use and emissions.

Third, there is allowance for "banking" emission reductions within the 2008-2012 commitment period, for use in a subsequent commitment period [although the emission targets of the subsequent periods have not yet been specified].

Fourth, CDM credits achieved between 2000 and 2008 may be banked until 2008 to 2012.

2. "What flexibility" (gases and sinks)

The second type of flexibility is "what flexibility", along two dimensions. The first is the inclusion in the agreement of all six greenhouse gases. Emissions of different kinds of gases, not just carbon dioxide, contribute to the greenhouse effect. Since the IPCC has developed conversion factors for all greenhouse gases by estimating their global warming potentials, reductions in emissions of one gas can be used to substitute for increases in emissions of another by an amount that has equivalent environmental effects. Again at U.S. urging, all six gases are included, while Japan and the EU had insisted until the end on covering only three. Thus the U.S. succeeded in having the Kyoto Protocol stipulate that countries with binding targets are to reduce their total greenhouse gas emissions by certain percentages, but does not require specific reductions for specific gases. Since a molecule of sulfur hexafluoride is 23,900 times more potent over 100 years than a molecule of CO2, it may be cheaper to achieve the same environmental benefit by eliminating one molecular unit of SF, than nearly 24,000 units of CO2.

Some initial analysis indicates that a strategy of reducing non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions by a greater percent than CO2 emissions could lower emissions permit prices by as much as 10 percent. Thus allowing countries flexibility in what gases they reduce -- essentially trading emissions reductions across gases can help lower significantly the costs of meeting

their targets.

The second source of "what flexibility" is the treatment of sinks, i.e., land use activities that promote the removal of carbon from the atmosphere through the growth of plants. At the urging of the U.S. delegation, sinks can be used to offset emissions targets. Promoting such sinks through afforestation and reforestation may reduce atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at much lower costs than reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.

3. "Where flexibility" (international)

The third type of flexibility, and perhaps the most important, is "where flexibility" (international). As I have already emphasized, emissions have the same environmental consequences regardless of where in the world they occur. Therefore, the least-cost approach to controlling climate change is to reduce emissions wherever such reductions are cheapest. The Kyoto Protocol, because of U.S. insistence and persistence, includes three important cost-saving provisions of this nature.

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