United States Policy Toward the Former Yugoslavia: Hearings Held June 7, 1995, July 11, 1995, October 17, 18, 1995, November 2, 8, 15, 30, 1995, December 6, 1995, and September 25, 1995U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997 - 566 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
ABM Treaty action administration agree allies American troops arms control attack Balkans ballistic missile defense BATEMAN believe Bosnia Bosnian Serbs capability Chairman coalition combat command commitment committee conflict Congress Croatia Croats Dayton Dayton Agreement DELLUMS deploy deployment effort embargo enforce Europe European fact going ground troops Gulf gulf war hearing ICBM IFOR important intelligence interest involved Iran Iraq Iraqi issue Kuwait launch leadership look ment missile threats mission Muslims national missile defense national security NATO negotiations nuclear operation participate parties peace agreement peacekeeping PERLE political President problem question region response risk role rules of engagement Russian Saddam Hussein Sarajevo Secretary PERRY Serbia Shalikashvili situation SLOCOMBE Somalia Soviet statement strategic talking Thank theater things tion U.S. forces understand United Nations UNPROFOR
Popular passages
Page 22 - Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
Page 39 - It seemed likely that if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible.
Page 260 - The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature,
Page 144 - Making the change from a short or medium range missile-that may pose a threat to US troops located abroad-to a long range ICBM capable of threatening our citizens at home, is a major technological leap. The key judgments of the estimate I noted above are as follows: * First, the Intelligence Community judges that in the next 15 years no country other than the major declared nuclear powers will develop a ballistic missile that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.
Page 404 - ... associated with this operation, the risks to the United States of allowing this war to continue and perhaps spread are even greater. It is this "iron logic" that drives the decision that we should, at this time, commit ground troops to the NATO IFOR.
Page 111 - We believe that the United States, as the leader of the free world, has the responsibility to work for solutions that are morally correct and consistent with international law.
Page 81 - In these circumstances, the conclusion that the probability is quite low for the emergence of new ballistic missile threats to the United States for at least 15 years can be sustained only if these plausible but unpredictable developments, such as the transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or considered of negligible consequence.
Page 272 - Clausewitz insisted that, the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.
Page 315 - The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 pm, in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Page 481 - the supremacy of the civil over military authority." In time of peace he raises, trains, supervises and deploys the forces that Congress is willing to maintain. With the aid of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the...