Information is power. The Administration's goal is to continue advances in reconnaissance and information technology to support military operations. A Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle flies above the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in a simulated Navy aerial reconnaissance flight. op commercial applications for advanced military technologies as a way to lower costs. For example, several years ago the Defense Department pursued microwave monolithic integrated circuit (MIMIC) technology advanced gallium arsenide semiconductors - as a strictly military development, but the high cost prohibited widespread use of the devices. Defense now encourages MIMIC contractors to pursue commercial applications in uses such as collision avoidance systems for automobiles, satellite communications, and air traffic control signal processing. By leveraging commercial production, the payoff to defense is better radar and other systems at a lower cost. The Department of Defense is pursuing a third dual-use theme - commercial insertion through programs such as the new Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative and the Commercial Technology Insertion Program to accelerate the use of specific dual-use technologies into weapon systems. For example, civilian contractors are working with Defense Department staff to develop a process for inserting non-military parts into the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System. The broader goal is to develop a corps of "smart buyers" in the military who have a detailed knowledge of relevant commercial technologies and an understanding of commercial markets and buying practices. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS. A third approach through which the Administration is increasing the performance and reducing the costs of new defense technologies is technology demonstrations. The Administration has developed several mechanisms for moving innovative concepts and superior technology from the development laboratory to the field faster and at lower cost than traditional mechanisms. •Advanced Technology Demonstrations. Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) seek to demonstrate the maturity and potential of advanced technologies for enhanced military operational capability or cost effectiveness. Examples include Rapid Terrain Visualization a multi-year effort to integrate technologies for rapid, high resolution digital terrain data generation, dissemination, and display, and integration with intelligence data for battlefield visualization; the Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector to detect metallic and nonmetallic mines at tactical speeds; Integrated Biodetection to fabricate, demonstrate, and integrate point and standoff biodetection technologies into an integrated battlefield detection system; and many others, all designed to directly support the Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. •Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) are designed to transfer technology rapidly from the developers to the users. They are user-oriented and represent an integrated effort to assemble MOVING TECHNOLOGIES TO THE FIELD MORE EFFICIENTLY The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program is the Administration's approach to capturing and harnessing innovation for military use rapidly and at reduced cost. ACTDs are designed to foster an alliance directly between the technologists and the operational users, eliminating barriers that can crop up between the two. Representatives of the forces, including the Joint Staff, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, play a direct role in the selection and management of the ACTDs. ACTDs are focused on four principal objectives: (1) to gain an operator's understanding and evaluation of the military utility of new technology applications before committing to acquisition; (2) to develop corresponding concepts of operation and doctrine that make the best use of the new capability; (3) to provide residual operational capability to the forces; and (4) to facilitate a more informed acquisition decision. The intent of the ACTD process is to provide the user with a mechanism to interact very early in development. Such participation enables rapid and cost-effective evaluation and, if warranted, introduction of new capabilities to operational forces. Examples include the Counterproliferation-Counterforce ACTD which develops weapon employment tactics, damage assessment, and collateral effects tools and integrates them to provide the warfighter a rapid, lethal targeting methodology against chemical and biological weapons production and storage facilities with minimal collateral effects; and the Joint Combat Identification ACTD which will demonstrate a joint, integrated air-to-ground and ground-to-ground combat identification capability to increase combat effectiveness and reduce the potential for fratricide. Other examples of ACTDs include unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missile defense, mine countermeasures, advanced joint planning, and synthetic theater of war. Additional demonstrations are planned for combat identification, airbase/port biological defense, miniature air launched decoy, semi-automated imagery processing, and others. and demonstrate a significant, new, or improved military capability that is based on mature advanced technologies. As with the ATDs, all of the ACTDs directly support the Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. •Joint Warfighting Experiments. Joint Warfighting Experiments are conducted as part of joint warfighting exercises. A Joint Warfighting Experiment is a snapshot in time when prototypes and technologies from ACTDs, ATDs, and technology-base and advanced-development programs are integrated to permit the warfighter to judge their potential and gain insight into future advanced joint warfighting concepts. COUNTERING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Throughout the Cold War, the United States faced, in the Soviet Union, an adversary armed with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. During that period, the ability of each side to absorb an attack by these weapons and still be capable of responding with a devastating counterattack ensured that neither superpow er used these frightful weapons against the other. Today, the United States and Russia are working together to reduce and dismantle the arsenals they built up during the Cold War. However, we face a continuing challenge as these types of advanced weaponry threaten to spread to other states and nonstate actors around the world. At least 20 countries have or may be developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups have become increasingly capable, often employing lethal, wide-ranging, and sophisticated operating methods and technical expertise. Rogue regimes are seeking to acquire these weapons for blackmail, or as an inexpensive counter to the United States' overwhelming conventional military superiority. Regional rivals may use them against each other in pursuit of a decisive edge in combat, or in anticipation of a feared preemptive strike. In short, those who succeed in acquiring these weapons in the post-Cold War world may not be subject to the restraints against their use that characterized the U.S.-Soviet tensions of the Cold War. The Administration is pursuing a broad range of efforts to reduce existing military threats and stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. These efforts include new agreements, enhanced cooperation, improved safeguards, and new technologies for monitoring and verification. The COOPERATION TO CONTROL FISSILE MATERIALS Security for plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) - essential ingredients of nuclear weapons - is improving in the former Soviet Union as a result of ongoing cooperation between Russian and American scientists. With enough of either of these materials in hand, many nations and even some terrorist groups could potentially make a crude nuclear weapon. A soda-can sized block of plutonium weighing only a few kilograms is potentially enough for a nuclear bomb. Thus, nothing is more vital to United States security than ensuring that these materials do not fall into the wrong hands. Unfortunately, in the turmoil that has followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, controls over nuclear materials in some of the states of the former Soviet Union have weakened considerably. Already, there have been several seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable materials stolen from former Soviet nuclear sites. To address this urgent security threat, the United States is working closely with the states of the former Soviet Union to install modern systems that account for and safeguard nuclear materials that could be used in weapons. These systems are the products of U.S.-funded R&D over the past 30 years. They form the basis for a comprehensive plan under which, assuming continued Russian cooperation and Congressional funding, all of the plutonium and HEU in the former Soviet Union will be safeguarded by modern security and accounting systems by the end of the year 2002. At some sites, the process is well under way. At the Sosny Research Center near Minsk, for example, fuel rods containing HEU- easy enough to handle and walk away with are used to support reactor operations. The research under way is largely for nuclear power-related activities. After the Chernobyl accident and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, civilian research activities at Sosny were significantly curtailed, leaving the facility without military-style security. Until recently, there were no electronic monitors at the gate to detect material being carried out the door - and there was no accurate accounting of how many fuel rods there were, so no one could be sure if any were missing. Today at this site, security for the materials is greatly improved. All doors and windows into buildings containing weapons grade nuclear materials have been sealed or alarmed. The front entry doors to these buildings are now accessible only through turnstiles equipped with electronically activated locking mechanisms. In addition, these buildings now have entry control systems that use secure card systems, personal identification numbers, and administrative controls. If an intruder or unauthorized person attempts to enter restricted areas through a fence, gate or door, an alarm will be triggered and transmitted to the central alarm station. In short, today it would be impossible to steal these controlled materials without detection and response. Throughout the former Soviet Union, U.S. scientists have been working closely with their counterparts to make similar security improvements elsewhere. Over the last two years, this effort has grown from protecting kilograms of nuclear material at a few isolated sites to protecting tens of tons at dozens of sites. New regulations and monitoring procedures are also being established, and the former Soviet states are themselves beginning to produce the needed equipment. U.S. and former Soviet scientists are applying the best technologies from each country to solve security problems that affect us all. This effort has received strong bipartisan support. In fact, in 1996, Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici - a Democrat and two Republicans sponsored legislation in this area that won unanimous Senate approval. The new law significantly increases funding for these programs and supports related efforts to stop nuclear smuggling, end plutonium production, eliminate stockpiles of material at risk, and improve our domestic preparedness to deal with the threat of mass-destruction terrorism. These programs show how early investment in prevention, applying the tools of science and technology, can benefit U.S. security and head off much larger costs and risks in the future. LJ result from enhancing the security of nuclear material in the states of the for- enhancements in October 1996. United States is expanding its cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union to dismantle at an accelerated pace the massive arsenals left from the Cold War, to ensure that weapons and weapons. materials are secure and accounted for, to ensure the scientifically sound disposition of these materials, and to employ former weapons scientists in needed civilian research. Through cooperation we have also secured agreements from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to send all the nuclear weapons on their soil to Russia where they can be safely controlled and dismantled. We have also achieved an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and have successfully negotiated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Science and technology are fundamental to successful arms control treaty verification and nonproliferation. The Administration's strategy for investing in science and technology to support our nonproliferation and arms control policies focuses on three critical elements: strengthening the technical knowhow to conduct effective arms restraint; continually improving detection, monitoring, and verification capabilities; and promoting science and technology cooperation to advance arms reduction and nonproliferation goals. Organizational and personal relationships that have been created through science and technology collaborations also provide an extensive basis that can contribute to arms reduction and nonproliferation. The international scientific community, with its strong ties across many borders, can contribute to an assessment of approaches and can itself act to defuse problem situations. For example, throughout the Cold War, Western scientists and scholars worked with their Soviet counterparts to advance scientific discovery and to build a basis for cooperation in arms reduction and nonproliferation. At times, the lines of communication between scientists were the only lines open when political difficulties constrained formal diplomatic channels. Expanding these professional scientific ties in the post-Soviet era has sustained the Russian scientific community and laid the groundwork for unprecedented cooperation in support of our common nonproliferation goals. The Administration will continue to seek cooperation with the states of the former Soviet Union to ensure that nuclear materials are safe and secure, that the production of weapons plutonium is shut down, and that stockpiles of nuclear materials are reduced. As President Clinton has stated, the United States will work with Russia to pursue further arms reduction including the possibility of direct controls. on nuclear warheads and nuclear materials. DEFENDING AGAINST TERRORISM The tragedy of terrorism has come closer and closer to home. The United States had long been insulated from large-scale acts of terrorism until the terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassy and on U.S. forces in Lebanon in 1983, and the downing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988, killed hundreds of Americans. With the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 - intended to kill thousands — massive acts of terrorism came to our shores. The chemical attack against Tokyo subway riders in 1995 raised the prospect that weapons far more devastating than conventional explosives were entering terrorist arsenals. Measures to prevent, minimize, and recover from acts of terrorism whether via conventional, unconventional, or information attack-are essential, and must be undertaken at all levels, from the local to the international. The Clinton Administration is bringing the full weight of the Federal government to bear against this threat, with science and technology playing a critical role. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, chaired by the Vice President, has highlighted the role advanced technology can play in making flying safer by deploying state-of-the-art explosive detection and other technologies at our nation's airports. Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies are bolstering their tools to uncover and forestall attacks before they can be carried out, and to identify and successfully prosecute those planning or conducting them. A full range of diplomatic and military options is available to respond to states or nonstate groups that aid terrorist attacks on the United States. Countermeasures against new types of weapons are being readied, including developing and deploying means for managing the consequences of a chemical or biological attack — detecting the presence of chemical and biological agents, protecting public safety personnel, treating victims who have been exposed to such agents, and decontaminating affected environments afterwards. Measures to protect our armed forces overseas against such attacks can bolster our ability to respond to terrorist attacks at home. For example, the recently created Marine Corps' Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, the only U.S. force currently capable of performing large-scale consequence management activities in a chemical/biological contaminated environment, can be rapidly deployed at foreign or U.S. locations. We will also counter threats, whether by computerbased attack or more conventional means, from those who would attack our critical infrastructure the telecom COUNTERTERRORIST TECHNOLOGIES To meet the growing challenge of terrorist threats, the Administration is drawing on science and technology resources across the Federal government. Individual agencies develop counterterrorism technologies in pursuit of their respective missions, and an interagency body - the Technical Support Working Group identifies needs, seeks common approaches, and coordinates the development of new technologies to counter terrorism. As new terrorist threats develop, new countermeasures must be developed as well. This explosive ordnance disposal suit, developed jointly by the interagency Technical Support Working Group and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, protects against hazardous chemical or biological agents as well as blast effects. Significant accomplishments have been made within the past two years: •Advanced bomb-detection technologies are being test- ⚫A Nuclear Material Detection System to detect •The first of several working enzymes for use in a A Mechanical Car Bomb Extractor, an all-terrain robotic system integrating a robust cutting system and video camera, allows law enforcement personnel to gain access remotely to a suspect vehicle and ascertain its contents. This system is commercially available and is used by the FBI. Additional projects under way include research and development of countermeasures to disable large vehicle (van, panel truck, or tractor-trailer) bombs; chemical detection and protective equipment for police, fire, and rescue personnel, and improved forensic tools for DNA and fingerprint recovery. The U.S. government is also cooperating with other nations in counterterrorist technology development to enhance the research efforts of both the United States and participating nations. Terrorism is a common enemy that can be defeated using shared resources and expertise. |