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be registered in Japan after the departure of the United States citizen spouse; and that the registration of a marriage under the procedure mentioned in that instruction was merely a legalization of the ceremonial marriage and was not a proxy marriage within the purview of section 28 (n) of the Immigration Act of 1924. Such marriages are valid as of the effective date of the registration. The decision in Matter of S-, 4, I. & N. Dec. 622, C. O. April 1, 1952, is to the same effect.

Section 28 (n) provides that the term "wife" does not include a wife by reason of a proxy or picture marriage. The purported marriage in the instant case does not appear to be even a proxy marriage but it clearly comes within the type of marriages which Congress was endeavoring to exclude from the category of marriages which would be valid for immigration purposes. In the instant case the only evidence relied upon is the certificate of the consular officer on March 7, 1952 (alleged to be the date of the marriage), at which time the petitioner was in the United States and the beneficiary was in Japan. Clearly, the procedure relied upon is effective only where there was a ceremonial marriage during a time when both parties were in Japan and the only defect in the proceeding was that the marriage had not been registered under the laws of Japan. Here we have only a registration of a purported marriage which in fact did not exist. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary is his lawful wife. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

Order: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

IN THE MATTER OF P

IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

A-2221498

Decided by Board July 30, 1952

Deportability: Former naturalized person whose last entry as citizen-Immigration visa; doctrine of relation back invoked in case of former naturalized citizen who had not been a legal resident prior to naturalization.

(1) Alien, who at time of last entry, had the status of a naturalized citizen but whose naturalization was later canceled for fraud and who prior to his naturalization had not been a legal resident of the United States is deportable on the charge of no immigration visa, case being distinguishable from Matter of C—, A-5982828, 3, I. & N. Dec. 275, in which case the alien had been a legal resident prior to his naturalization. Cf. Matter of P—, A-4068102, 4, I. & N. Dec. 373). CHARGES:

Warrant: Act of 1924-No immigration visa.

Act of 1917-Admits crime prior to entry-Procuring naturalization through fraud.

BEFORE THE BOARD

Discussion: The case comes forward on appeal from the order dated November 28, 1951, of the Assistant Commissioner ordering the respondent deported on the charges stated in the warrant of arrest. The record relates to a native and citizen of Italy, 57 years old, male, who last entered the United States at the port of New York on May 26, 1947, ex-S. S. Sobieski and was admitted as a citizen. The facts of the case are fully set forth in the decision of the Assistant Commissioner. Counsel at oral argument took issue with the finding of deportability predicated upon the last entry of the respondent on May 26, 1947, alleging that the respondent is not subject to deportation on the basis of the 1947 entry when he was admitted as a citizen, but if deportable, is deportable on the basis of a previous entry on September 4, 1936, when he was admitted as an alien in possession of a reentry permit.

Counsel relies upon Matter of C——————, 3, I. & N. Dec. 275, to support his possession. He concedes that there is a factual difference in the two cases, in that in the cited case the respondent had been a legal resident prior to his naturalization which was later canceled for

fraud, whereas in the instant case the respondent had surrendered his legal residence when he left the United States in 1921, and had reentered as a stowaway in 1930.

We find the factual difference of the two cases to be decisive of the question of deportability in the instant case. In Matter of C— C(supra), the respondent had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence in 1923, was naturalized in 1930, reentered in 1931 as a citizen, and his naturalization was canceled for actual fraud in 1944: It is to be noted however that he was a lawfully admitted permanent resident and at the time of his last entry in 1931 was returning to an unrelinquished lawful residence in the United States. In the instant case, the respondent at the time of his last entry, although admitted as a citizen, was not returning to a lawful residence, but was returning to an illegal residence in the United States, which he had entered as a stowaway in 1930. Under such circumstances, the respondent will not be held to be entitled to the fruits of his fraudulent naturalization. We accordingly find the ground of deportability to be sustained.

There remains for consideration the various forms of discretionary relief requested by counsel. Inasmuch as we find the ground of deportability sustained, suspension of deportation is not available since one of the grounds of deportability is comprehended in section 19 (d) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended. Although the respondent has long residence in the United States, he has no family ties here, his wife and three children being citizens and residents of Italy. In the absence of family ties, consideration of 7th proviso relief is not warranted. The request for stay of deportation to permit application for a pardon of the criminal offense would seem to be premature at this time as much as no petition for pardon has actually been filed and authority exists in the Service to stay deportation in the event such action is warranted.

Order: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

Editor's note.-Facts in instant case were as follows: Respondent had been lawfully admitted for permanent residence in 1920, left this country in 1922 and returned unlawfully in 1930. He thereafter left the United States in 1935 and reentered on September 4, 1936, in possession of a reentry permit obtained fraudulently by misrepresenting the periods of his residence in the United States. He was naturalized as a United States citizen in 1945, left the United States in 1946 and last entered on May 26, 1947, as a citizen. On January 12, 1949, the order admitting him to citizenship was vacated and his certificate of citizenship canceled, the action being based on fraudulent statements as to the periods of his residence in the United States in his petition for naturalization.

260397-54- -46

IN THE MATTER OF M- P———————

In DEPORTATION Proceedings

A-6044438

Decided by Board July 31, 1952

Suspension of Deportation, economic detriment-Section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended-Exercise of discretion.

(1) The exercise of the discretionary power to grant suspension of deportation pursuant to section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, is not warranted in the case of an alien, a native and citizen of Mexico, who has history of prior immigration violations, despite the fact that he has a citizen spouse and two dependent citizen children.

CHARGES:

Warrant: Act of 1924-No immigration visa.

Act of 1917-Entered at other than a designated port.
Act of 1918-No passport.

BEFORE THE BOARD

Discussion: This case is before us on exceptions taken to the order of the hearing officer denying the respondent's application for suspension of deportation and granting voluntary departure and permission to reapply for admission after deportation, with the further order that if the alien does not depart in accordance with the foregoing he be deported upon the warrant charges.

The respondent is a 34-year-old married male, a native and citizen. of Mexico who last entered the United States on or about April 15, 1948, by wading the river near Brownsville, Tex. There is no issue on deportability.

With regard to the matter of discretionary relief, we feel that the relief that has been accorded to the alien by the order of the hearing officer is the maximum relief that should be granted to him. Although he has a citizen spouse and two dependent citizen children, he has a history of immigration violations, including 3 deportations, 2 voluntary departures, and 4 convictions for immigration violations.

Order: It is ordered that the appeal from the decision of the hearing officer be and the same is hereby dismissed.

IN THE MATTER OF C F—

In DEPORTATION Proceedings

A-8065701

Decided by Board August 1, 1952

Suspension of deportation, 7 years' residence-Section 19 (c) (2) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended-Exercise of discretion.

(1) The exercise of the discretionary power to grant suspension of deportation pursuant to section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, is not warranted in the case of a single alien who barely meets residence requirements, has no close relatives in the United States, has no one in the United States dependent upon him for support and as a seaman had deserted an allied vessel in time of war.

CHARGES:

Warrant: Act of 1924-No immigration visa.

Lodged: Act of 1924-Remained longer-Seaman.

BEFORE THE BOARD

Discussion: This case comes to us on appeal from an order of the Acting Assistant Commissioner entered on March 19, 1952, denying the respondent's application for suspension of deportation and ordering his deportation on the charge stated in the warrant of arrest. The appeal is directed to the denial of the application for suspension of deportation.

The respondent, a 40-year-old single male, a native and citizen of China, of the Chinese race, last entered the United States as a seaman at the port of New York on June 14, 1944, and deserted his ship. At the time of entry it was his intention to seek work in the United States. He was not in possession of an immigration visa. We find him deportable on the charge stated in the warrant of arrest.

The respondent has no close relatives in the United States. He is employed as an assistant cook and earns $60 a week. His assets consist of about $285 in bank savings. He has presented affidavits from three persons attesting to his good moral character and to their acquaintanceship with him since 1944. Counsel urges that the respondent is eligible for suspension of deportation and that we grant him such relief.

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