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Oral argument on the motion is requested. Such a request for oral argument is addressed to our discretion and in view of the brief submitted, in fact that oral argument was had on the appeal on the issues now presented, we do not believe that oral argument is necessary. The request for oral argument is, therefore, denied.

The respondent, a 45-year-old married male, a native and citizen of Mexico, last entered the United States on or about January 26, 1945, after a temporary visit to Mexico. He was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence on March 29, 1928. For about 6 months during 1938, the respondent was a voluntary member of an organization affiliated with the Communist Party of the United States. The charge that he was a member of the proscribed organization after entry was sustained on the fact of the entry in 1928. To sustain the charge that prior to entry he was a member of a proscribed organization, we made use of the entry in 1945.

Counsel takes objection to our refusal to limit ourselves solely to the respondent's last entry in 1945. If we are confined to the 1945 entry only, the charge that after entry respondent was a member of the Communist Party would fail because there is no evidence of membership in the Communist Party after his entry in 1945. We considered this contention of counsel carefully when it was raised on appeal. We have carefully considered counsel's present representations in this matter. We see no reason to change our position that any entry, and not necessarily the last entry, may be used as the basis for deportation under the act of October 16, 1918, as amended. The reasoning for this position is well expressed in the opinion of the Acting Assistant Commissioner in this case and in Matter of N——, A— 4849583, B. I. A., December 5, 1952.

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It is counsel's further contention that membership prior to entry in 1945 is not a ground for deportation under the law since it had terminated in 1938. A question of this very nature was considered in Matter of D- A-7808001, Int. Dec. 388, September 22, 1952, (4, I. & N. Dec. 745), where it was held that the amendment of June 28, 1940, to the act of October 16, 1918, made deportation mandatory for all aliens who at any time past had been members of proscribed organizations in the United States.

For the reasons stated, the motion for reconsideration will be denied. Order: It is ordered that the motion for reconsideration and request for oral argument be and the same are hereby denied.


In DEPORTATION Proceedings


Decided by Board January 25, 1952

"Crime" involving moral turpitude-Contributing to delinquency of minorSection 702 of California Welfare and Institutions Code of May 25, 1937. The offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in 1950 in violation of Section 702 (k) of the California Welfare and Institutions Code of May 25, 1937, is one involving moral turpitude, it being noted that the immoral acts involved very young children. (See 3, I. & N. Dec. 290.)


Warrant: Act of 1917-Crime within 5 years-Contributing to delinquency of a minor.


Discussion: This case is before us on appeal from a decision of the Acting Assistant Commissioner dated July 5, 1951, directing respondent's deportation.

Respondent, a 64-year-old native and citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the United States for permanent residence at Nogales, Ariz., on September 7, 1920. He has resided here continuously, except for occasional brief visits to Mexico. Respondent's last entry occurred at San Ysidro, Calif., on December 28, 1949, after a visit in Mexico of a few hours. At that time, respondent was admitted as a returning resident upon presentation of a valid resident alien's border crossing card.

On November 14, 1950, an information was filed against respondent, charging respondent with committing lewd and lascivious acts upon the body, members, and private parts of two 8-year-old girls on October 6 and 8, 1950 (sec. 288, California Penal Code).

On February 15, 1951, respondent was convicted on a plea of guilty, of two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor on the basis of the above facts. He was sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment for each offense, with the sentence to run concurrently. We have been advised that the alien was scheduled to be released from confinement on December 16, 1951.

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On March 1, 1951, a warrant of arrest in deportation was issued, charging that respondent is deportable as an alien sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within 5 years of entry (sec. 19 (a), act of 1917).

The crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is defined in section 702 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code of May 25, 1937, and provides as follows:

Any person who commits any act or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to cause or encourage any person under the age of 21 years to come within the provisions of any of the subdivisions of section 700 or which act or omission contributes thereto, or any person who, by any act or omission, or by threats, commands, or persuasion, induces or endeavors to induce any person or ward of the juvenile court under the age of 21 years to fail or refuse to conform to a lawful order of the juvenile court, or to do or to perform any act or to follow any course of conduct or to so live as would cause or manifestly tend to cause any such person to become or to remain a person within the provisions of any of the subdivisions of section 700, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 2 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, or may be released on probation for a period not exceeding 5 years. [Amended by Stats. 1945, ch. 1234, sec. 1.]1

This section is a very broad one and acts which do not involve moral turpitude as well as those involving moral turpitude, are included within its scope; (Matter of VT—, 55857/963 (now A-5963331) (B. I. A., November 17, 1944)). Whether or not the statute is divisible is determined after consideration of section 700, upon which section 702 depends. We have held that section 702 is indeed divisible, particularly with reference to section 702 (k),2 (Matter of T————, A— 4500220 (B. I. A., March 15, 1946); Matter of OA-6303623

(B. I. A., July 12, 1946)).

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It was determined in the O-L-case, in connection with immoral acts involving very young children, as in the instant case, that such a violation of section 702 and section 702 (k) involved moral turpitude. Because of the base and depraved type of offense involved, we now feel that this crime is one involving moral turpitude and


Sec. 700 defines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over persons under 21 years, who fall into the following categories: Those who are found begging, who have no parent or guardian, who are destitute, whose home is an unfit place, who is found wandering, who is a vagrant, who habitually visits a poolroom or saloon, who habitually uses liquor, tobacco, or drugs, who persistently or habitually refuses to obey, who is a habitual truant, who is leading a dissolute or immoral life, who is insane or mentally deficient, who violates any State law, etc.

The jurisdiction of the juvenile court extends to any person under the age of 21 years who comes within any of the following descriptions: Who is leading, or from any cause is in danger of leading, an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life.

affirm our prior determination; (Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 7, 1931)).

In reaching this conclusion, we feel that Pardini v. Shaughnessy,3 which reached the opposite result, is distinguishable. The Pardini case involved an alien who had relations with a 19-year-old girl, hence the court did not generally consider the question of moral turpitude in relation to the type of acts which confront us in the instant case. Presently, we are concerned with respondent's conviction for morally reprehensible acts with small children, which relates to the portion of section 702 (k) making punishable the influencing a minor to commit acts which may result in the very young child leading a "dissolute" or "lewd" life. This consequence is definitely worse than the situation in the Pardini case, which concerned the adult's influencing an older girl of nearly mature judgment in leading an immoral life.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that respondent was convicted within 5 years of entry of a crime involving moral turpitude. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Order: It is hereby ordered that the appeal be dismissed.

'S. D. N. Y., August 2, 1949, reversing Matter of P—, A-4915916 (B. I. A., February 15, 1949) (3, I. & N. Dec. 290).

In Matter of T- (supra), it was held that the words in sec. 702 (k) were disjunctive in character and separable.


In VISA PETITION Proceedings


Decided by Board February 18, 1952

Decided by Acting Attorney General March 18, 1952

Decided by Board March 27, 1952

Marriage Validity of (for immigration purposes)-Applicable law.

(1) The mere fact that a prior marriage in the United States was terminated by the first wife's procurance of a Mexican in absentia divorce while both spouses were residents in the United States, does not bar the application of the generally accepted rule that the validity of a marriage (the second here) is governed by the law of the place of celebration (Germany), and such general rule will be applied in this case.

(2) The decision in Matter of O

(3, I & N. Dec. 33), is expressly overruled

to the extent inconsistent with the decision of the Acting Attorney General in this case.


(February 18, 1952)

This case comes to us on appeal from an order by the Acting Assistant Commissioner, entered January 22, 1952, denying a petition (Form I-133) by Cfor a nonquota status in behalf of his wife H——— M—— P– a native of Germany, whom he married on April 28, 1951.

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The issue is the validity of the marriage. The question arises by reason of his having been married on a previous occasion, which earlier marriage was terminated by a divorce procured in Mexico under the circumstances related below.

He was first married on December 27, 1943. As the parties thereto mutually agreed later that the marriage should be terminated, the hubsand (the petitioner herein), signed a nolo contendere, and the wife, after consulting a lawyer in Los Angeles and receiving his assurance that a Mexican divorce was valid, went to Tijuana, Mexico, and there engaged a lawyer, signed certain papers, paid him his fee, and returned to the United States. She was in Mexico on February 27-28, 1947. Shortly thereafter she received documents evidencing

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