immigration laws specifically in force and effect at that time, and is not subject to any amendatory or additional immigration laws. We believe this argument does violence to the plain meaning of the wording of section 8 (a) of the Philippine Independence Act which provides "For the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1917, the Immigration Act of 1924 (except sec. 13 (c)), this section, and all other laws of the United States relating to immigration, exclusion, and expulsion of aliens, citizens of the Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered as if they were aliens." The italic has been supplied in order to emphasize the obvious and potent purpose of making citizens of the Philippine Islands subject to all immigration, exclusion, and expulsion laws, just as any other alien. We find no room in the construction of this sentence for any doubt as to the meaning of these words, and we conclude that the plain intendment is that all immigration, exclusion, and expulsion laws, then in effect or thereafter promulgated, should apply to citizens of the Philippine Islands. We have examined the case of Varletta v. Barber, 98 F. Supp. 177 (N. D. Calif. 1951,) and find it does not stand for the proposition advanced by counsel.

Counsel's third point is that the respondent has never entered the United States within the meaning of the immigration laws and therefore "at the time of entering or at any time thereafter" has never been a member of any deportable class. Cases cited by counsel do not support this contention, but the argument advanced is either a misunderstanding or a distortion of the principles laid down in the cited cases. These cases involve aliens who were regarded as never having made an "entry" because they had been stopped at the border and excluded (although later they may have been paroled into the United States), or whose departure from the United States was unintentional and involuntary, or was caused by fortuitous circumstances beyond the control of the alien and therefore no "entry" resulted. In the instant case it is manifest that the respondent entered voluntarily with the intention of remaining here for permanent residence on April 29, 1926, when he arrived in the United States from the Philippine Islands. It is clear that this voluntary entry into the United States from a foreign place constituted an "entry" as the term is used in the immigration laws, (U. S. ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289, U. S. 422, 77 L. Ed. 1298.)

Counsel also seeks to sustain this argument by reference to the case of Del Guercio v. Gabot, 161 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 9, 1947). We considered the effect of the Gabot case in three decisions, (Matter of 0, 3, I. & N. Dec. 155, A-5553948 (1948); Matter of C- 3 I. & N. Dec. 184, A-5885722 (1948); Motter of S——— L—————; 3, I. & N. Dec. 396, A-5438638 (1949)). Illustrative of the reasoning in those cases is the following language which we used in Matter of O (supra).

the act of October 16, 1918, as amended. We have previously stated our position that the respondent was, in fact, an alien at the time of his membership in the Communist Party during the period of February 1938 to December 1939. Even if we were to adopt counsel's suggestion that at best the respondent did not become an alien until the treaty of 1946, we disagree with the position taken by counsel. Judicial precedent to support this view may be found in the case of U. S. ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 521, 94 L. Ed. 307 (1950). This case involved a person who, while a naturalized citizen was convicted of conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917; whose citizenship was thereafter revoked in a denaturalization proceeding; and whose deportation was sought thereafter under the Act of May 10, 1920 (8 U. S. C. 157). The finding of undesirable resident under the deportation statute was based upon the relator's conviction of conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917. The majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Burton held in pertinent part as follows:

A simpler and equally complete solution lies in the view that the act does not require that the offenders reached by it must have had the status of aliens at the time they were convicted. As the act does not state that necessity, it is applicable to all offenders, including those denaturalized before or after their convictions as well as those who never have been naturalized. The convictions of the relators for designated offenses are important conditions precedent to their being found to be undesirable residents. Their status as aliens is a necessary further condition of their deportability. When both conditions are met and, after hearing the Attorney General finds them to be undesirable residents of the United States, the act is satisfied.

By analogy, the language of the Court is appropriate to this case. Here, there has been established membership in the proscribed organization, the Communist Party of the United States, which is a condition precedent to the finding that he is a member of the deportable class of aliens enumerated in section 1 (2) (C) (i), as amended. His present status as an alien is a necessary further condition of his deportability. Since both conditions have been met, the requirements of the act are satisfied. It may be noted in passing that counsel's reference to the case of Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22 (1939), is not pertinent inasmuch as the amendatory act of June 28, 1940, to the act. of October 16, 1918, was for the very purpose of overcoming the deficiency in the previous act pointed out in Kessler v. Strecker. (H. Rept. 994, 76th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6; S. Rept. 1154, 76th Cong, 1st sess., p. 5). The amendments contained in the Internal Security Act of 1950 made no change in this portion of the language of the amendatory act of June 28, 1940.

Under the second point in his brief counsel included the argument that even if the respondent were to be regarded as if he were an alien under the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, he is subject to the

immigration laws specifically in force and effect at that time, and is not subject to any amendatory or additional immigration laws. We believe this argument does violence to the plain meaning of the wording of section 8 (a) of the Philippine Independence Act which provides "For the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1917, the Immigration Act of 1924 (except sec. 13 (c)), this section, and all other laws of the United States relating to immigration, exclusion, and expulsion of aliens, citizens of the Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered as if they were aliens." The italic has been supplied in order to emphasize the obvious and potent purpose of making citizens of the Philippine Islands subject to all immigration, exclusion, and expulsion laws, just as any other alien. We find no room in the construction of this sentence for any doubt as to the meaning of these words, and we conclude that the plain intendment is that all immigration, exclusion, and expulsion laws, then in effect or thereafter promulgated, should apply to citizens of the Philippine Islands. We have examined the case of Varletta v. Barber, 98 F. Supp. 177 (N. D. Calif. 1951,) and find it does not stand for the proposition advanced by counsel.

Counsel's third point is that the respondent has never entered the United States within the meaning of the immigration laws and therefore "at the time of entering or at any time thereafter" has never been a member of any deportable class. Cases cited by counsel do not support this contention, but the argument advanced is either a misunderstanding or a distortion of the principles laid down in the cited cases. These cases involve aliens who were regarded as never having made an "entry" because they had been stopped at the border and excluded (although later they may have been paroled into the United States), or whose departure from the United States was unintentional and involuntary, or was caused by fortuitous circumstances beyond the control of the alien and therefore no "entry" resulted. In the instant case it is manifest that the respondent entered voluntarily with the intention of remaining here for permanent residence on April 29, 1926, when he arrived in the United States from the Philippine Islands. It is clear that this voluntary entry into the United States from a foreign place constituted an "entry" as the term is used in the immigration laws, (U. S. ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289, U. S. 422, 77 L. Ed. 1298.)

3

Counsel also seeks to sustain this argument by reference to the case of Del Guercio v. Gabot, 161 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 9, 1947). We considered the effect of the Gabot case in three decisions, (Matter of 0, 3, I. & N. Dec. 155, A-5553948 (1948); Matter of CI. & N. Dec. 184, A-5885722 (1948); Motter of S— L—; 3, I. & N. Dec. 396, A-5438638 (1949)). Illustrative of the reasoning in those cases is the following language which we used in Matter of O(supra).

The Gabot case involved a charge of "sentenced to a year or more for a crime committed within 5 years after entry." The facts were that Gabot, a Filipino, crossed the border from Mexico to the United States on March 20, 1934, and was convicted on January 28, 1935, of murder committed on October 11, 1934. The court, in reviewing the deportation proceedings, found that he was not an alien when he crossed the border and, therefore, there was not an "entry" within the contemplation of the immigration laws. The charge there under consideration made the entry an integral factor in that the entry must have occurred within 5 years of the commission of the offense.

Such is not the case in respect to the charges placed against the present respondent. It is true that the language of the statute respecting the first charge, viz, inmate, contains the words "after such alien shall have entered the United States," but the time of entry is immaterial, hence use of the words last quoted is of no importance; and to hold that because he crossed into the United States at a time when he was not an alien (Toyota v. U. S., 268 U. S. 401, 1934) forever relieves him from liability for deportation notwithstanding his commission of proscribed acts does violence to the plain language of the Philippine Independence Act. * *

*

We find that the act of October 16, 1918, as amended, under which deportation of the respondent is sought, presents the same factors which resulted in the above distinction and differentiation of the holding in the Gabot case, inasmuch as in this statute the time of entry is likewise immaterial and is not an integral factor of the deportability charge, since the statute is equally applicable to any alien who at any time shall be or shall have been a member of the proscribed classes enumerated in section 1 (2) of the act of October 16, 1918, as amended.

The contentions urged by counsel in the fourth point of his brief we believe are substantially the same as those previously raised by counsel under his second point in which he urged the applicability of the case of Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22 (1939). We shall not restate the views we have already expressed, but shall merely point out that the requirement of present membership in the prior Act of October 16, 1918, which was laid down in Kessler v. Strecker was removed by the subsequent amendatory enactment of June 28, 1940 (54 Stat. 673), and was continued in the act of September 23, 1950, the Internal Security Act (8 U. S. C. 137).

After a full and careful consideration of all the evidence of the case, including the arguments and exceptions raised by counsel, we conclude that the alien is subject to deportation as found by the Assistant Commissioner. We shall accordingly dismiss the appeal. Order: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

1600-93510

In STATUS DETERMINATION Proceedings

1600-93510

Decided by Central Office December 11, 1951

Filipino-Citizenship-Acquisition-Section 201 (e) of the Nationality Act of

1940.

(1) Until July 4, 1946, the date on which the independence of the Philippine Islands was recognized, the Philippine Islands were outlying possessions of the United States within the meaning of section 201 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended.

(2) A child born in the Philippine Islands in 1942 of a native Filipino father and of a native Filipino mother, the latter having acquired United States citizenship under section 1993 of the Revised Statutes, is deemed to have acquired United States citizenship at birth pursuant to the provisions of section 201 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended.

BEFORE THE CENTRAL OFFICE

Discussion: The above-named subject claims that he acquired citizenship of the United States at birth in the Philippine Islands through his mother, E- C S - S. The District Director at Los Angeles, Calif., has denied the subject's application for a certificate of citizenship on the ground that the subject's mother did not reside in the United States prior to the subject's birth and therefore she could not meet the residence requirements of section 201 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940. The subject's mother has appealed from said denial order.

The question presented is whether the subject acquired United States citizenship under section 201 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, or under any other applicable provision of law.

The record shows that the subject was born in the Philippines on April 28, 1942. His father, F— D · D— S——, a native and subject of the Philippines, is deceased. His mother, E- CS, who was born in the Philippines on July 15, 1915, acquired United States citizenship under section 1993, Revised Statutes, by reason of the birth of her father, T—— A▬▬▬▬ C—, in New York. The subject's parents were married in Manila, Philippines, on June 29, 1941, and the subject's mother resided continuously in the Philippines from the time

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