in which rulings of the Attorney General, action by this Board, decisions by the Commissioner and decisions in naturalization cases held that a favorable finding was not unwarranted despite the relationship within the statutory period. Reference to Matter of 0— (supra), and the cases discussed therein reveals several consistent factors which we deem important. We find no evidence in any of them that the relationship under consideration had its inception in lust. The cohabitation took the form of a long-term, faithful relationship between two persons who considered themselves as husband and wife. No third person appears to have been injured and no family appears to have been broken up. The public was not offended since it was evident that they were considered by their friends and neighbors as upright, reputable persons. The question for us to decide, therefore, is whether the facts of the case at bar come within the pattern outlined above. The respondent has been married since 1914. As stated above, his wife and four children reside in Egypt. He has not seen his family for 25 years. He has supported them by sending $100 every 2 to 212 months. He testified on July 27, 1947, "I want to go back to Egypt to my wife and children ***. I want to depart voluntarily * * * I don't want to be deported." He was questioned on August 11, 1949, as to whether he intended to bring his wife and family to the United States if granted the privilege of remaining permanently, and he replied in the affirmative. He testified on February 6, 1950, as follows: "I want to legalize myself so I can take a trip to see my wife and my children whom I have not seen for 25 years. I cannot make this trip without the proper papers." The facts concerning his relationship with the woman not his wife are briefly these. He originally came in contact with the woman as a neighbor in the apartment where he lived. He helped her during an illness through the solicitation of the janitor. During the early part of 1947 the respondent and the woman moved into the same apartment in another building. He testified on this occasion as follows: Q. Are you answering the questions put to you on this occasion through sense of embarrassment and therefore concealing the true facts? A. If I had anything to do with her once in a while, I paid for it. Q. Do you wish to change your testimony concerning the period of your residence with Mrs. N—— and the question of your sleeping with her? A. I slept with her occasionally for approximately the past 4 years, not 7 years. What I said is true that the only time we lived in the same apartment together was when we moved to 321 West 40th Street. Q. During the period in which you claim that you shared the same apartment with her, did you sleep with her regularly? A. Yes. The respondent now maintains (February 6, 1950), that although he and Mrs. N resided together in the same apartment for 13 months, the relationship was not that of man and wife. His testimony in this regard is as follows: Q. During the time you lived in the same apartment with Mrs. N— you had sexual relations with her. Isn't that so? A. Yes. Q. At frequent intervals? A. No; not frequent. Q. About how often? A. Two or three times a month. Q. During the entire year of 1947? A. Yes. Q. Did those relations continue after you moved to another address? Q. Did the relations with her begin before you occupied the same apartment with Mrs. N-? A. Yes; when we had separate apartments in the same house. Q. When did you first begin having sexual relations with Mrs. N- A. Yes. Q. Did you ever hold her out as your wife? A. No. Q. Did you ever support her? A. No. * for about Q. And you are aware too, are you not, that she claims to have lived with you as husband and wife for about 7 years? A. I know she said that, but it is not true. She used to work for me, and then we fired her from the place just before the inspector went around for the interviews. So, she was just being spiteful. I did not live with her as husband and wife, and I did not know her for 7 years. I used to go to bed with her but it only lasted for about 4 years. We have always been of the opinion that adultery should not be considered lightly in the case of an alien seeking discretionary relief. However, in the cases referred to in Matter of O— (supra), the existing marriage had already failed and deportation would not benefit the lawful spouse, wherever she may be. The respondent's removal would not cause extreme hardship to the woman with whom he lived because that relationship had long since terminated. Here the relationship, by the respondent's own admission, had its inception in lust. The cohabitation did not take the form of a long-term, faithful relationship. Certainly the respondent, by his own admission, did not consider the relationship as one of man and wife. We have here a married man who acknowledges the continued existence of his marriage while separated from his wife. He is desirous of adjusting his immigration status in order to reside physically with her. Nevertheless, he blandly admits casual and promiscuous adultery. We do not think such conduct conforms to the generally accepted moral conventions current at this or any other time. Counsel is of the opinion that this case falls within the doctrine of recent cases 2 decided by certain of our circuit courts of appeals wherein the issue concerned the good moral character of applicants for citizenship. This Board, of course, is not bound to construe section 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917 on the basis of court decisions involving section 307 (a) of the Nationality Act of 1940. Nevertheless, we believe that such decisions should be given great weight. We note in those cases cited by counsel in which there is an opinion; namely, the Murra and Schmidt cases, that there are factual differences which distinguish them from the case at bar. The petitioner for citizenship in the Schmidt case was unmarried. He admitted occasional intimacies with "single and unmarried women" during the statutory period. The court pointed out that the relationships were "casual, concupiscent, and promiscuous, but not adulterous." The petitioner in the Murra case lived with his second wife for 4 or 5 weeks prior to their marriage. The court in approving the petition said, among other things, "*** whatever may be thought of petitioner's transgression against the moral code, he did all within his power to rectify the wrong by making the woman his lawful wife and he has subsequently, so far as the record discloses, lived in the approved manner as husband and wife." The respondent herein is neither unmarried nor did he attempt to rectify his transgression in an approved manner. The cases referred to above clearly indicate that there might be extenuating circumstances under which a single lapse from marital fidelity should be not deemed to outweigh an alien's general habits of conforming to the common standards of morality. But here we find no extenuating circumstances for the respondent's lapses. By his own admission they were casual, concupiscent, promiscuous, and adulterous. The appeal will be dismissed. Order: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed. 2 Schmidt v. U. S., 177 F. (2d) 450; U. S. v. Manfredi, 168 F. (2d) 752; U. S. v. Palombella, 168 F. (2d) 903; Application of Murra, 178 F. (2d) 670; Petition of Burke, 185 F. (2d) 678. IN THE MATTER OF H In STATUS DETERMINATION Proceedings A-7428823 Decided by Central Office September 17, 1951 Citizenship-Acquisition by birth in United States-Expatriation-Voting in a political election in a foreign state (Germany)-Section 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940-Voluntary nature of Act-Evidence. The subject, a native born citizen of the United States, resided in Germany from 1939 until 1950 and voted in the election for the Bundestag held at Bremen, Germany (British Zone), on August 14, 1949. She was deemed to have expatriated herself by such voting under the provisions of sec. 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, since the evidence showed such act was voluntary on her part and was not an act that her situation required her to do. BEFORE THE CENTRAL OFFICE Discussion: The subject was born in the United States at New York, N. Y., on October 15, 1906, and acquired United States citizenship by reason of her birth in this country, as provided for in the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution. The evidence obtained concerning her possible expatriation relates to the period from 1939 until 1950, when the subject resided in Germany. The facts in the case are fully stated in a copy of a memorandum dated February 26, 1951, of the American consulate, Bremen, Germany, which was received from the Department of State. Therein the following was stated: Mrs. H originally applied to Swiss consular officials representing American interests during 1945 in connection with the determination of her American citizenship status acquired as a result of birth at New York on October 15, 1906. Subsequently, upon reopening of American consular offices in Germany during 1946, she applied at Frankfort and later at this office. Her case was eventually submitted to the Department of State. It was disapproved by the Department on the basis of information which indicated that she had performed employment under the German Government which appeared to fall within the expatriatory provisions of section 401 (d) of the Nationality Act of 1940. Although a certificate of the loss of the nationality of the United States was submitted on this basis and loss of American citizenship confirmed by the Department during 1948, Mrs. H did not give up her efforts to establish, (1) that the position was not open unequivocally only to German nationals and (2) that she was not required to take an oath of allegiance to the German state. It is not unlikely that Mrs. H after repeated attempts which stretched over a period of almost 3 years, conceded the loss and regarded herself as no longer possessing any claim to American citizenship. In a final effort to clarify this case beyond any question of reasonable doubt, it was again presented to the Department accompanied by additional evidence obtained through local official German sources. The Department, in reply contained in its instruction dated January 30, 1950 (File No. Y130–HE), informed this office of its final decision in this case, as follows: "Since it does not appear that the position held by Mrs. H in the Economics Office at Bremen, Germany, was such as to bring her case within the purview of section 401 (d) of the Nationality Act of 1940, since it does not appear that she took an oath of allegiance to Germany in connection with such position, and since evidence has been presented to the Department indicating that Mrs. H——— accepted the position under circumstances amounting to duress, the Department is of the opinion that she cannot be held to have expatriated herself under the provisions of section 401 (d) of the Nationality Act of 1940, or to have expatriated herself under the provisions of section 401 (b) of that act. "Mrs. H's registration as an American citizen for further residence in Germany is disapproved, but, if you are fully satisfied that she has not expatriated herself in any manner, you are authorized to issue a passport to her to enable her to proceed to the United States, upon her application therefor." When the foregoing was brought to the attention of Mrs. H, upon questioning, she admitted that she had voted in the election for the Bundestag, held at Bremen on August 14, 1949. Although this action on her part may have been partly due to her belief that citizenship was irrevocably lost, this office had no alternative, and citizenship was again reported lost, but under section 401 (e) of the Nationality Act, under date of February 20, 1950. Mrs. H also admitted in a Military Government Fragebogen (questionnaire) completed by her on October 30, 1946, that she was a member of the National-Socialist Reichsbund fuer Leibesuebungen (physical exercises), from March 1944 to August 1944, but during such membership held no rank. There is no information available to this office that would indicate nominal membership in this organization would have resulted in the loss of American citizenship. In a letter dated May 9, 1950, the subject stated: I had voted in the summer 1949 in Germany for the new democratic regime as I thought I was German. By then I didn't know for sure if I would get an affidavit of support and it might have been that I had to stay in Germany. So I felt that I had to give my vote to the Democratic Party as they needed the votes in getting ahead of the Communistic Party. In a letter dated August 5, 1950, the subject explained the circumstances of her voting in the German election as follows: After having been expatriated in 1946, I was treated as a German and received a voting card in 1949. Thinking I was a German, I voted for the Christian Democratic Party. The very essence of expatriation is that it be voluntary (Doreau v. Marshall, 170 F. (2d) 721, U. S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 1948). In a case, where a person had been erroneously advised by the Department of State that he had lost his United States nationality and the person concerned had thereafter been inducted into the armed forces of a foreign state (Roumania) and had taken an oath of alle |