in that case having been the operation of a house of ill-fame for prostitution. An examination of the constitutional and statutory provisions of the State of Ohio failed to disclose any provisions in the city charter defining the violation of a city ordinance as not being a crime; the provisions of the municipal ordinance of Massillon when compared with the provisions of the State statute disclosed that the prohibitions contained in the ordinances clearly came within the scope of a State statute dealing with substantially the same subject matter. It was concluded in that case that an offense created by a municipal ordinance must be regarded as a crime, if it constituted a crime under the general law of the State. Research has failed to disclose any statutory law or any court decisions defining the violation of an ordinance of a city in the State of Washington as not being a crime. Nor does a perusal of the charter of the city of Seattle (presented to the voters for ratification at the election held on March 12, 1946, and adopted) disclose any provision defining the violation of a city ordinance as not being a crime. Under the enabling acts relating to cities of the first class, to which class Seattle belongs, the city of Seattle has the power to "make regulations necessary for the preservation of public morality, health, peace, and good order within its limits and to provide for the arrest, trial, and punishment of all persons charged with the violating of any of the ordinances of said city but punishment shall in no case exceed the punishment provided by the laws of this State for misdemeanors." Section 8966, volume X, Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington, Annotated (1931); Brennan v. Seattle (151 Wash. 665, 668 (1929)). Section 14, article IV of the charter of the city of Seattle provides that "the city council shall have power by ordinance and not otherwise *** to make all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with the laws of the State." Therefore it appears that the ordinance involved in the instant case is a proper exercise of the police power invested in the city of Seattle. It is not in conflict with the laws of the State of Washington, the offense of practicing prostitution being a violation of the State law, as set forth in section 2688, volume IV, Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington, Annotated (1931) mentioned above. Section 2253, Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington provides that "a crime is an act or omission forbidden by law and punishable upon conviction *** imprisonment, fine, or other penal discipline." It is therefore concluded that this case comes within the doctrine enunciated in the Matter of R- (supra), as distinguished from the cases in the Matter of D- and Matter of C—— (supra). Since the city ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power of the city of Seattle and the act committed by appellant was forbidden by law and punishable upon conviction by imprisonment, fine, or both, it must be concluded that the violation of the city ordinance involved is a felony or other crime or misdemeanor within the contemplation of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917. Consequently appellant was convicted of a felony or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and she was properly found to be excludable on the criminal ground shown above. The record does not establish that she is entitled to any discretionary relief. The action of the Board of special inquiry should therefore be affirmed. Order: It is ordered that the excluding decision of the board of special inquiry be affirmed. Editor's note.-Similarly, a violation in 1949 of sec. 41.05 of Ordinance No. 77000 of the Los Angeles, Calif., code relating to prostitution-Offering held to be a crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude within the meaning of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended. Matter of G A-6990751, C. O., December 20, 1951. Likewise, a violation in 1950 of ordinance 2686 (new series), sec. 1 of the city of San Diego, Calif., relating in part to the commission of an indecent act as well as prostitution held to be a crime or other misdemeanor within the meaning of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended. However, under facts in case, which involved the commission of an indecent act, the offense was found not to involve moral turpitude. Matter of T- C- A-6703077, C. O. February 26, 1952. IN THE MATTER OF A- E▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ In EXCLUSION Proceedings A-7445502 Decided by Board June 14, 1951 Marriage Validity of religious marriage in Mexico-Recognition of commonlaw marriage in State of Texas-Legitimation of child in Texas, by marriage with recognition by the father. (1) A religious marriage ceremony in Mexico did not result in a valid marriage regardless of parties' intention that it be such. (2) A valid common-law marriage was perfected in Texas in 1941 by the parties in this case under sections 17, 18, 20, and 28, Texas Jurisprudence (pp. 714720). (3) Under Texas law, marriage with recognition by the father, are the requirements for legitimation. EXCLUDED BY BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY: Act of 1918-Executive Order 8766-No passport. BEFORE THE BOARD Discussion: This case is before us on appeal from an order of the Assistant Commissioner dated July 19, 1950, affirming a majority opinion of a Board of Special Inquiry finding the subject of this record to be an alien, and excluding him from admission to the United States on the above-stated charges. The dissenting member of the Board of Special Inquiry found the subject to be a citizen of the United States. The subject applied for admission to the United States at Brownsville, Tex., on April 7, 1950. He stated he wished to enter this country and work. At that time, he testified he was 23 years of age, single, a laborer, white, and that he was born at Durango, Mexico, on February 27, 1927. He stated that his father was a native and citizen of Mexico and that his mother was a citizen of the United States. Regarding the issue of appellant's citizenship, appellant's father testified that in 1922 or 1923 he entered the United States, and thereafter fell in love with appellant's mother; that he and appellant's mother left this country for Mexico; and that they lived together as man and wife in Mexico without being married. After the couple had lived in Mexico for 3 or 4 years, the Holy Fathers came to the Rancho la Negra, where appellant's parents were residing, and baptized children who had not been baptized and married couples who were living together and who had not been married. The father stated that he and the appellant's mother were married at this time as were other couples. No marriage papers were given appellant's parents; nor was any record made at the church of the marriage. The father stated that the appellant was born in Mexico on August 22, 1927. Several other children were born in Mexico of the union; and later two children were born in the United States. Appellant's father testified that he believed the marriage ceremony by the Holy Fathers united him and his wife into a valid, binding marriage. However, the two were married by civil ceremony in San Benito, Tex., on November 13, 1949. The marriage took place to aid in adjusting the father's immigration status. The family has lived in the United States since 1941. The testimony of the appellant's mother was in substantial agreement with that of the father. Appellant's mother has satisfactorily established that she is a United States citizen. The appellant made no direct claim to United States citizenship. The civil marriage in the United States between appellant's parents took place after he had attained his majority. The majority of the board of special inquiry is of the opinion that the appellant is a native and citizen of Mexico, that he did not gain United States citizenship through his mother because the mother and father were legally married in their own beliefs in Mexico, that the only reason the parents were married by civil ceremony in the United States was because the father believed such marriage would help him in legalizing residence under 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended. The chairman of the board of special inquiry, who dissented, was of the opinion that the appellant is a United States citizen, having acquired such as the illegitimate son of a United States citizen woman. The chairman argues that common-law marriages are not recognized in Mexico;1 that they were not when the appellant was born; and that belief of a valid marriage did not in fact constitute a marriage. The Assistant Commissioner has concluded that the appellant is an alien. In his opinion it is stated that in determining the validity 'The Mexican law relative to the validity of marriages is stated in the Mexican Constitution of February 5, 1857, as amended by the act of September 25, 1873 (a similar provision being contained in par. 3, art. 130, of the Mexican Constitution of 1917), which reads as follows: "Marriage is a civil contract, Marriage and any other acts of a person's civil status are in the exclusive competence of the officials and authorities of the civil government in the terms provided by the laws, and they shall have the force and validity that the same attributes to them." of religious marriages in Mexico such marriages are held to be valid in certain cases and invalid in others, the determination being based solely on facts and evidence of record. In support of this position, the following cases are cited: Matter of T———, AA-4033 (December 14, 1945); Matter of F—, 55837/836 (September 19, 1933); Matter of de V, 56028/60 (February 9, 1940); Matter of V- A-3085307 (56032/907) (April 25, 1944); Matter of R de I——, -, A-6518794; Matter of S-, A-6248084 and A-6248085 (September 2, 1947); Matter of P- 2270-C-3771176 (September 6, 1933); and Matter of W- —, 1502-2733 (August 18, 1948). Most of those are not precedent decisions and their use in support of the Service's position has little value. Matter of de V——, 56028/60, decided February 9, 1940, by the then Board of Review, and Matter of V—, A-3085307 (56032/907), decided April 25, 1944, by the Board of Immigration Appeals, concerning the validity of religious marriages in Mexico, are pertinent to the instant proceedings and will be discussed briefly. In the Matter of de V (supra), it was held that marriage of a female alien only by religious ceremony in Mexico did not divest her of United States citizenship acquired at birth. This appears to be at variance with the decision in the Matter of V——. That case related to a woman who was married in Mexico on March 17, 1904, by a religious ceremony to a native and citizen of Mexico. The husband was naturalized in Colorado on September 28, 1920, and in his naturalization record stated that he was not married and had no children, whereas actually he was married and had two minor children. In April 1925 the respondent joined her husband in Colorado, a State in which common-law marriage is recognized, and resided there for about a year when she moved to New Mexico. In that case, which involved deportation proceedings, the respondent's wife was found to have acquired United States citizenship under section 1994, Revised Statutes, by reason of her husband's naturalization on September 28, 1920. Proceedings were canceled, alienage not having been established. We think the latter case can be distinguished from the former. In the latter there was a religious ceremony in Mexico, which was followed by cohabitation in a State which recognized common-law marriages. We think it important to note that full consideration was given to all circumstances in the case and it was concluded that on the record alienage was not established. It is our conclusion that the appellant is legitimate and that he is an alien. However, such conclusion is not based on the reasons advanced by the Service. There was no valid marriage in Mexico entered into between the appellant's parents. That they intended their religious marriage as such is clear from the record. They entered Texas in 1941 while appellant was a minor. Texas recognizes common |