under the act. When this amendment was made the purpose of the bill was "to permit the racially inadmissible spouses of United States citizen members of the Armed Forces, if otherwise admissible to enter the United States under Public Law 271, the so-called Brides Act," and further under general information regarding the bill appears the following statement: "It was felt that this discrimination should be eliminated and the present bill was introduced to amend Public Law 271, which incidentally, is a temporary law and will expire on December 28, 1948, to give the same privilege to the spouse of servicemen who are ineligible for admission because of their race as is extended to those who are racially admissible." 10

The act of December 28, 1945, of course, expired 3 years later. Thereafter, it was discovered that there were still a number of spouses, and children principally in Japan, who could not enter the United States because of racial restrictions in our laws. Public Law 717, approved August 19, 1950, came into being. House Report 2768, which repeats in substance Senate Report 1878, concerning Public Law 717, gives the purpose behind the prior laws; namely, the act of December 28, 1945 (Public Law 271) and the act of July 22, 1947 (Public Law 213) which covered both the racially admissible and inadmissible alien spouses and children of citizen members of the United States Armed Forces. The caption of the report merely states the purpose of the bill was to permit the admission of alien spouses and minor children of citizen members of the United States Armed Forces. No mention is made therein as to racial inadmissibility. The act itself, of course, covered that class, otherwise no good purpose would have been served by the bill.

The title of a statute plays an important part not only in the legislative expression but also in the construction or interpretation of laws. In many States the title is required by constitutional provision and hence may be a part of the statute. Hence, the title of an act may become of assistance where congressional intent is doubtful.“

In MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 300, the court used this language: There is no limitation of place; there is no limitation of effect, the martial relation having been constituted and continuing. * * * The act is therefore explicit and circumstantial. It would transcend judicial power to insert limitations or conditions upon disputable considerations of reasons which impelled the law, or of conditions to which it might be conjectured it was addressed and intended to accommodate.

Whatever was said in the debates on the bill or in the reports concerning it, preceding its enactment, or during its enactment, must give way to its language, or, rather, all the reasons that induced its enactment and all of its purposes must be offered to be satisfied and expressed by its words, and it makes no

'U. S. Code, Cong. Service, 1947, p. 2-383. 10 Ibid, p. 2-384.

"Crawford, Statutory Construction, p. 124; U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. (U. S.)

610.

difference that in discussion some may have been given more prominence than others, seemed more urgent and insistent than others, presented the mischief intended to be remedied more conspicuously than others.

And in Church of the Holy Trinity v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457, involving the question of who were alien laborers within the meaning of the alien contract labor laws, the court, in part, used the following language:

The title of the act, "To Prohibit the Importation of Foreigners and Aliens under Contract to Perform Labor," refers to the work of the manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional man, and indicates an exclusion from its penal provisions of all contracts for the employment of ministers, rectors, and pastors.

*** Among other things which may be considered in determining the intent of the legislature is the title of the act. We do not mean that it may be used to add or take from the body of the statute (Hadden v. Barney, 72 U. S. 3 Wall. 107 (8:518) but it may help to interpret its meaning.

In the case of U. S. v. Fisher, 6 U. S., 2 Cranch, 358, * Justice Marshall said:

Chief

* Where the intent is plain nothing is left to construction. Where the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seized everything from which aid can be derived; and in such cases the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of consideration!

If our prior position is reaffirmed we would have this result:

1. Only those racially inadmissible could benefit by Public Law 717.

2. Those not racially inadmissible would nevertheless be covered by section 4 (a), Immigration Act of 1924, covering the legislative grant of nonquota status, including Chinese wives of spouses covered by said Public Law 717. Chinese children would not because section 2, act of December 17, 1943 12 (which repealed the Chinese Exclusion Laws), as amended August 9, 1946, did not include them.

Now, Public Law 271, of course, was designed to aid families of servicemen who were not racially inadmissible, and to correct the discrimination said act was amended by the act of July 22, 1947, so as to cover the racially inadmissible spouses and children of United States citizen servicemen. These acts, of course, expired. Because the problem still remained somewhat, Public Law 717 was approved August 19, 1950. To restrict its application as contended, would revive the discrimination, only this time in the inverse order. It may be urged that as to those racially admissible, they are covered by section 4 (a), Immigration Act of 1924. But this would not be true with respect to Chinese children of United States citizen servicemen, and thus to that extent the discrimination would remain. We think Congress intended no such result. A statute must be construed

12 Nor alien husbands married to United States citizens after 1948, since they are specially granted a preference quota status under the 1924 Immigration Act.

for the most good.13 An interesting point with respect to the nonquota grant is that both in Public Law 271 (act of December 28, 1945), and Public Law 213 (act of July 22, 1947, which amended the act of December 28, 1945, so as to remove the racial restriction) Congress specially provided a grant of nonquota status to them irrespective of the general grant provided in the 1924 Immigration Act. See section 233, title 8, U. S. C. A. Another point is that with respect to Public Law 271, "To expedite the admission to the United States of alien spouses and minor children of citizen members of the United States Armed Forces," the report of the Senate committee and the Report of the House committee (Nos. 850 and 1320, 79th Cong., 1st session) on H. R. 4857, each state that the sole objective of the bill was to do what is stated in the title.

Public Law 717 clearly covers all those who meet the basic requirement, whether or not racially inadmissible. It is special legislation not restricted by general provisions. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to say that Congress should have passed two bills, one for the racially inadmissible and another for the racially admissible. When Public Law 271 was in existence Congress merely amended same to apply to the racially inadmissible. Since both expired and the problem which induced those acts again arose, Congress merely passed a bill to avoid the discrimination which initially existed and which it removed by amendment. To say Congress has again discriminated is to avoid the clear meaning of the act. We cannot attribute such a meaning to Congress in respect to Public Law 717, which, incidentally, is clearly remedial in nature. When it becomes necessary to justify an exclusion not clearly indicated by the act, by laborious and circuitous reasoning, then resort to statutory construction to support such labor should be avoided. Aside from statutory interpretation, we think the language of Public Law 717 is clear. It seems that the logic employed to carve out an exception, rather than the act, is ambiguous and strained.

Upon reconsideration, we feel that any previous holdings to the contrary should be overruled. Accordingly, the appeal herein will be sustained.

Order: It is ordered that the appeal be sustained.

BEFORE THE ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL

(July 26, 1951)

The decision and order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dated May 14, 1951, are hereby approved.

13 Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30.

IN THE MATTER OF W- L————— K———▬▬▬

In EXCLUSION Proceedings

A-7190930

Decided by Board May 18, 1951

Place of deportation-Exclusion proceedings-Section 18 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended-Applicability of section 20 of that act, as amended by the Internal Security Act of 1950.

Section 20 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended by section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 relates to expulsion proceedings, whereas section 18 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended relates to exclusion proceedings.

EXCLUDED BY BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY:

Act of 1924-No immigration visa.

Executive Order 8766-No passport.

Act of 1917-Convicted of crime involving moral turpitude-Perjury. Act of 1917-Admits commission of crime involving moral turpitude-Perjury.

BEFORE THE BOARD

Discussion: This case is before us on motion to reconsider our order of July 27, 1949, wherein we dismissed the appellant's appeal from an order affirming his exclusion on the above stated grounds at the port of San Francisco, Calif. Counsel also urges a reopening of the proceedings in light of section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 which amends section 20 of the Immigration Act of 1917. Pending consideration of the question presented we directed a stay of the appellant's deportation. Oral argument on the motion was granted and counsel was heard.

The respondent, a native and citizen of China, arrived at the port of San Francisco, Calif., on June 14, 1948. He applied for admission as a native-born citizen of the United States. Upon examination he admitted alienage and following a hearing before a board of special inquiry on April 21, 1949, he was excluded on the above-stated grounds. His return to China, the country whence he came, is now imminent.

Counsel raises the point that the amendment to section 20 of the 1917 act (supra), which provides in part "No alien shall be deported

under any of the provisions of this act to any country in which the Attorney General shall find that such alien would be subjected to physical persecution" requires a finding by the Attorney General that the respondent would not be subject to physical persecution before he can be returned to China under the order of exclusion. Accordingly, he moves for a reopening of the proceedings for the introduction of additional evidence relative to the fate, it is alleged, awaits the appellant if he is returned to Communist controlled China.

The issue presented is whether that portion of the amended statute quoted above relates to a case which has arisen in exclusion proceedings as opposed to deportation proceedings. We agree with the Acting Assistant Commissioner of the Enforcement Division that section 18 of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, requires the return of aliens excluded from admission to the United States to the country whence they came with certain exceptions not applicable here.

A reading of the two sections under discussion clearly indicates that section 18 (supra) relates to "aliens brought to this country in violation of law" whereas, section 20, as amended in 1950 (supra), by its very terms relates to "deportation proceedings" *** "of any alien taken into custody under warrant of the Attorney General” * * * "instituted *** after the entry of the alien." Since the appellant's inadmissibility has been established in exclusion proceedings and there is no showing of record that section 18 of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, cannot be applied in such proceedings, we cannot ignore its provisions as this would amount to judicial legislation which should be avoided.

Order: It is ordered that the motion be and the same is hereby denied.