The wife and daughter entered Germany in 1945 and have since resided in that country. Upon their application for classification as displaced persons, the wife was given the characterization of the principal applicant because she qualified under the Act of June 25, 1948, and the husband and child were classified as the accompanying spouse and minor child.

The appellants are in possession of quota immigration visas issued on December 8, 1949, by the American consul at Munich, Germany, under the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948. The passport requirements have been waived by the Department of State.

The husband testified that he was arrested on June 7, 1927, in Warsaw, Poland, and was convicted by a duly constituted court in Poland of the crime of premeditated manslaughter. No record of conviction was introduced into evidence and apparently is unavailable. However two publications were introduced into evidence they being "The Case of Boris Kowerda" published July 15, 1927, and a copy of "Tchasowoj La Sentinelle" of June 15, 1937. The husband stated that he was familiar with the contents of these publications, that they related to him and the incidents which resulted in his arrest and conviction. He further stated that the author had access to the official court records.

The record discloses that on June 7, 1927, the husband in a railroad station at Warsaw, Poland, fired six shots at the officially accredited Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. One of the shots fired by the husband took fatal effect and resulted in the death of the Ambassador. What purports to be a copy of the official indictment, states that the act was committed with the intention of taking the life of the Ambassador. The husband was convicted of premeditated manslaughter and sentenced to life imprisonment, which was commuted in 1928 to 10 years of hard labor. He testified that he was released from imprisonment on June 15, 1937.

The record discloses that the husband has testified that he took the life of the Ambassador with premeditation and malice aforethought and that he assumed that the section of law under which he was convicted included the premeditated taking of a life. He testified that his act of assassination was committed in furtherance of his desire to overthrow the existing regime and also because his victim was a close associate of Lenin and one of the chief administrators of the Ural District, infamous for his acts of persecution against the Russian people and a direct participant in the execution of the Czar and his family and a member of the Comintern. He further testified as follows:

solely because he was a member or official

Q. Did you take the life of W— representative of the Soviet Government?

A. Yes; but the other facts I have stated helped me make the decision.

Q. At the time you took the life of W, did you believe in, advise, advocate or teach the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals, or officers generally, of any organized government, because of their official character?

A. I committed this act independently, individually without being connected with anyone else.

On the bases of the foregoing, the board of special inquiry found the husband inadmissible under the act of 1917 as one who has been convicted of and admits the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude, to wit: the taking of the life of another with premeditation and malice aforethought and under the Act of October 16, 1918, as one who believed in the necessity of the unlawful assaulting or killing of a specific individual, official of an organized government because of his official character.

In reference to the ground that he was convicted of and admits the commission before entry of a crime involving moral turpitude, it is noted that the 2d proviso to section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, provides:

That nothing in this act shall exclude, if otherwise admissible, persons convicted, or who admit the commission, or who teach or advocate the commission of an offense purely political.

In order to determine whether or not the husband is entitled to the benefits of this proviso, it must first be ascertained whether he committed an "offense purely political." The 1917 act does not define the clause and the proviso itself gives no indication of what circumstances are necessary to bring an offense within the terms of the clause. There was considerable comment on the floor of the House and on the floor of the Senate concerning the proviso, but the remarks give no clear indication of the legislative intent or the basis upon which a few of the legislators predicated their conclusions that several offenses discussed were or were not political offenses. No court cases have been found interpreting the meaning of the clause.

It appears to be proper, therefore, to consider the construction that has been put upon the meaning of the term "political offenses" appearing in extradition treaties, for which extradition will not be granted. These treaties do not define the term and, except for making provision in some of them that acts against the life of the sovereign or head of a state, or members of his family, shall not be regarded as political offenses, give no indication of its meaning. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1376, citing 2 Stephen's Criminal Law 70, states that, "as a designation of a class of crimes usually excepted from extradition treaties," the term political offenses "denotes crimes which are incidental to and form a part of political disturbances; but it might also be understood to include offenses consisting in an attack upon the political order of

things established in the country where committed, and even to include offenses committed to obtain any political object."

The Stephen's definition was considered in the Castioni case (1 Q. B. 149, 1891), in which extradition was sought on a charge of murder and was refused. The deceased was a member of the State Council of a canton in Switzerland. He was shot to death by the accused, who was one of an armed crowd that broke into the municipal palace. The crowd occupied the palace and a provisional government was set up, which was dispersed by the armed intervention of the Federal government. During the habeas corpus proceedings, one of the witnesses stated that the death was a misfortune, not necessary to the uprising, and some question was raised regarding whether Castioni was motivated by revenge. It had been suggested by Mr. J. S. Mill that "political offense" might be defined as any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political commotion. Reference had also been made to the Stephen's definition, which is quoted in the Court's comments below, suggesting that criminals were not to be surrendered up for extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of a political disturbance. Judge Denman stated:

I do not think it necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put into language in the shape of an exhaustive definition exactly the whole state of things, or every state of things which might bring a particular case within the description of an offense of a political character. I wish, however, to express an opinion as to one matter upon which I entertain a very strong opinion. That is, that if the description given by Mr. John Stuart Mill were to be construed in the sense that it really means any act which takes place in the course of a political rising without reference to the object and intention of it, and other circumstances connected with it, I should say that it was a wrong definition and one which could not be legally applied to the words used in the acts of Parliament.

Sir Charles Russell suggested that "in the course of" was to be read with the following words, “or in furtherance of," and that “in furtherance of" is equivalent to “in the course of." I cannot quite think that this was the intention of the speaker, or is the natural meaning of the expression; but I entirely concur with the observation of the Solicitor General that in the other sense of the words, if they are not to be construed as merely equivalent expressions, it would be a wrong definition. I think that in order to bring the case within the words of the act and to exclude extradition for such an act as murder, which is one of the extradition offenses, it must at least be shown that the act is done in furtherance of, done with the intention of assistance, as a sort of overt act in the course of acting in a political matter, a political rising, or a disturbance between two parties in the state as to which is to have the government in its hands, before it can be brought within the meaning of the words used in the act ***. Then it is reduced to the question of whether, upon the depositions sent over and upon the depositions before the magistrate and upon the fresh facts, if there be any, which are brought before us on the affidavits, we think that this was an act done, not only in the course of a political rising, but as part of a political rising. Here I must say at once that I assent entirely to the observation that we cannot decide that question merely by considering

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whether the act done at the moment at which it was done was a wise act in the sense of being an act which the man who did it would have been wise in doing with the view of promoting the cause in which he was engaged. I do not think it would be at all consistent with the real meaning of the words of the statute if we were to attempt so to limit it ***. The question really is, whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political character with a political object, and as part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking part ***. I have carefully followed the discussion as to the facts of the case, and if it were necessary I could go through them all one by one, and point out, I think, that, looking at the way in which the evidence was given, and at the evidence itself, there is nothing in my judgment to displace the view which I take of the case, that at the moment at which Castioni fired the shot the reasonable presumption is, not that it is a matter of absolute certainty (we cannot be absolutely certain about anything as to men's motives, but the reasonable assumption is that he, at the moment knowing nothing about Rossi, as far as we know, fired that shot-that he fired it thinking it would advance, and that it was an act which was in furtherance of, and then intended it to be in furtherance of, the very object which the rising had taken place in order to promote, and to get rid of the Government, who, he might, until he had absolutely got into the place, have supposed were resisting the entrance of the people to take that place.

In the same case, Judge Hawkins also took occasion to point out that he would not regard as a political offense a murder committed during a political rising by a person who was motivated by a desire for private revenge or for the purpose of doing injury to another. As to what constitutes a political offense he stated:

I have thought over this matter very much indeed and I have thought whether any definition can be given of the political character of the crime-I mean to say, in language which is satisfactory. I have found none at all and I can imagine for myself, none so satisfactory and, to my mind, so complete as that which I find in a work which I now have before me and the language of which, for the purpose of my present judgment, I entirely adopt, and that is the expression of my brother Stephen in his History of the Criminal Law of England "The expression in the Extradition Act ought (unless some better interpretation of it can be suggested) to be interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition crimes, if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political disturbances."

Judge Stephen also sitting in the same case cautioned against giving too wide a meaning to his definition and stated that, having given his view upon the interpretation to be placed on the act, he had nothing to add to it.

According to the Castioni case (supra), therefore, a political offense is an offense incidental to and forming a part of a political disturbance. "Accepting the court's definition [in the Castioni case] as embodying the general view entertained on the subject as to what constituted political crime, we find that two conditions must concur to bring the act, otherwise criminal, within the exemption. These conditions are:

(a) The existence of political revolt or disturbance; (b) the fact that the act in question was incident to and formed a part of such disturbance." (Coudert, Proceedings American Society of International Law, 1909 p. 134).

In a later case (In re Meunier, 2 Q. B. 415 (1894)), extradition was granted of an anarchist who had blown up a barracks. The court in that case stated:

It appears to me that, in order to constitute an offense of a political character, there must be two or more parties in the state, each seeking to impose the government of their own choice on the other, and that, if the offense is committed by one side or the other in pursuance of that object, it is a political offense, otherwise not. In the present case there are not two parties in the state, each seeking to impose the government of their own choice on the other; for the party with whom the accused is identified by the evidence, and by his own voluntary statement, namely, the party of anarchy, is the enemy of all governments. Their efforts are directed primarily against the general body of citizens. They may, secondarily and incidentally, commit offenses against some particular government; but anarchist offenses are mainly directed against private citizens * * *. I am of the opinion that the crime charged was not a political offense within the meaning of the Extradition Act.

With reference to the Meunier case (supra), Deere commented:

The rise of terroristic crimes in recent years, however, has met the disapproval of the United States as well as of Great Britain, but there is no United States case corresponding to the Meunier case in Great Britain * * *. In denying a political character to the offense, Justice Gave said: "In order to constitute an offense of a political character, there must be two or more parties in the state, each seeking to impose the government of their own choice on the other, and *** if the offense is committed by one side or the other in pursuance of that object, it is a political offense, otherwise not." Obviously, this definition was directed against anarchists and although it has been criticized as unduly restrictive, there was apparently no intention to supplant or modify the Castioni case, in which the formula was certainly broad enough to cover any relative political offense.

The definitions appearing in the Castioni case were considered in the case of the Salvadoran refugees, 62 Fed. 964 (D. C. N. D. Calif., 1894) and 62 Fed. 972. See also 29 American Law Review 1). Extradition was sought in these cases (a) for the hanging of four persons, who allegedly had not given their assistance in defending the government against a revolt; (b) for the particularly brutal killing of a fifth person, alleged to be a spy; (c) for the robbery of a bank, the proceeds of which were allegedly to be used to pay soldiers of the defending forces; (d) for the shooting of a sixth person, a military officer of the defending forces, who had allegedly gone over to the attacking forces. The offenses were committed during the existence of a state of siege in the country and the progress of actual hostilities between the contending forces, wherein the persons sought to be extradited were seeking to maintain the authority of the then existing