rected the negotiations toward, first, defining emissions limitations objectives for Annex 1 nations in the post-2000 period; and, second, advancing implementation of commitments by developing nations. In Berlin, as today, it was our belief that the final consensus reflects our belief that this is a global problem, requiring global solutions. All countries must work together to do more to guard against harmful climate changes. While the Berlin agreement specifies that there will be no new commitments for developing country parties, it calls for advancing the implementation of the existing treaty commitment, agreed to by developing countries, and allows for negotiations on new commitments to begin as soon as work under the Berlin Mandate is complete.

Under the existing treaty, developing countries are required to adopt policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We are working now to develop specific proposals for advancing implementation of these existing commitments by the developing countries.

Over the past year, the United States has been engaged at home and abroad in serious analysis of the successes and failures of the current Convention structure in preparation for the negotiations that have been underway since Berlin. Based on these extensive efforts, the United States articulated in Geneva a proposed structure for next steps that we think should form the basis for negotiations over the next 16 months.

We call this a framework. It has yet to be fleshed out with specific numbers. And we have work to do to further develop several issues associated with this approach. In the months ahead, our ongoing analysis and assessment will allow us to more precisely articulate the specific contents that the United States could support. Before discussing the elements of our proposal, let me touch on the underlying rationale for the approach we recommended in Geneva. The new U.S. approach is based most fundamentally on the desire to ensure that the negotiations focus on outcomes that are real and achievable. We believe that sound policies, pursued in the near term, will allow us to avoid the prospect of truly draconian and economically disruptive policies in the future. The old adage, so appropriate to much of public policy, applies here: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. The cost of action in the medium term is less than the cost of action in the long term.

Second, our approach was formulated on the premise that prospective solutions must be flexible and cost effective. We do not view favorably a cookie cutter approach to the actions nations might take. And we certainly will not accept proposals that are of fered for competitive advantage, not environmental progress.

And, third, our approach is based on the belief that the agreement being negotiated should lay the foundation for continuing progress by all nations in the future. The United States is immovable in its belief that international cooperation on this challenge remains critical to any effective response, and that all nations, developed and developing, will have to become more ambitious in contributing to the solution to this challenge as we move forward.

Based on these principles-environmental protection, economic prosperity, flexibility, fairness, and comprehensiveness-the United States recommended in Geneva that future negotiations focus on

an agreement that sets a realistic, verifiable and binding mediumterm emissions target. We believe that the medium-term target must be met through maximum flexibility in the selection of implementation measures, including the use of measures such as reliable joint implementation and trading mechanisms.

We think that the current treaty needs to be strengthened through consideration of certain long-term objectives. Our view is that it will be necessary to continue working toward a longer-term concentration goal-for example, over the next 50 to 100 years-as set out in the Convention's objective, recognizing that scientific understanding and technology will improve over time. Working toward such a goal would better establish the long-term global nature of the problem.

Taken together, we believe that the U.S. recommendations relating to binding medium-term targets and a longer-term concentration goal will help ensure that the international community focuses on more sensible emissions reduction goals, knowing that the goal must be met, and on the need for all nations to contribute to the solution over the long term.

In addition, these two ideas are critical prerequisites to enabling important and cost-effective joint implementation and international emissions trading opportunities, which we believe are essential. Finally, in response to consultations with key stakeholders, these efforts are intended to make it clear over the long term where we are going and, therefore, to help guide corporate planning and investments.

Having defined in broad terms the basic components, or framework, of an agreement that we could support, as outlined in Geneva, let me briefly touch on what we did not say and what we will not support.

First and foremost, we have not come to any conclusions about a specific target or set a timetable for emissions reduction. We have established a comprehensive interagency process, led by the Commerce Department, to undertake the necessary economic analysis that will be required to determine an approach that the United States believes is realistic and achievable. We believe strongly that this analysis and assessment is a necessary prerequisite to identifying a target that is realistic, achievable and consistent with the national interest and national prosperity.

Second, we did not in any way repudiate the growing number of successful voluntary programs that U.S. industry has launched to reduce emissions. Voluntary programs have played a central role in the administration's climate change action plan, have helped us to reduce emissions significantly, simultaneously saving millions of dollars in avoided energy costs, and are really largely an outgrowth of the 1992 energy bill passed by this committee.

At Geneva, we rejected certain proposals for targets that had been proposed by other countries or groups of countries. We also rejected in Geneva proposals by some nations that the negotiations move toward consideration of some ambitious mandatory internationally coordinated policies and measures. We believe that significant differences in national circumstances suggest that few, if any, individual measures are likely to be applicable to all countries.

The framework proposed by the United States won remarkable support in Geneva. Based on our presentation, we were able to obtain broad acceptance for the U.S. framework in the ministerial declaration that was issued at the meeting's end-a testament not only to the soundness of our proposals, but also to the expectations the international community has for leadership from the United States of America in this most important and difficult task.

Our job in the months ahead is to search for agreement on next steps that will produce results that are consistent with our environmental and economic aspirations.

This leads me, Mr. Chairman, to the final area that I want to touch upon, the ambitious calendar that exists for the next year and a half, and the need for extensive public discussion and consultation on these matters in the months ahead. The administration's plan for engaging the public, industry and nongovernmental experts included a major workshop on analysis and assessment, where presentations were made by more than 50 experts from inside and outside of the government about technical issues associated with our emissions trends and capability to reduce emissions in the next century.

We have also engaged in a broad series of round-table discussions with industry and nongovernmental organizations to scope out common ground and identify key issues. In June, the State Department hosted a major conference on the market opportunities that are emerging as nations begin to tackle the challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

There are a range of technologies and business interests that American firms are superbly positioned to take advantage of as nations all over the world seek to enhance efficiency and deploy new technology in service of economic and environmental goals. To advance our preliminary work and follow up on the framework outlined in Geneva, the administration has established an unprecedented and comprehensive interagency process, under the direction of the Commerce Department, and including DOE, EPA, the Council of Economic Advisors, and all other appropriate agencies and administration representatives.

When the process is completed, this team will have created an analytic toolbox, capable of assessing the economic effects of a broad range of climate change policy, in terms of growth, employment, sectoral and industry competitiveness, and other issues. In addition, as preparation for the negotiations ahead, we are considering approaches to a number of elements of the framework we proposed in Geneva, such as options for advancing the commitments of developing countries, and similar issues that will be discussed in the months ahead.

As always, Mr. Chairman, we will work closely with the Congress, industry and the public at large. We have already begun some of this work, through these hearings and in a wide variety of meetings over the past several months. Together, I believe that we can ensure that the United States plays a lead role in fashioning an agreement next year that is comprehensive, flexible, fair, and certain. In this way, we hope to outline an agreement that will help prepare our country and the world environmentally and economically for the 21st century.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I would ask unanimous consent that the full text of my statement be included in full in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wirth follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to rejoin your company this morning to describe the Clinton Administration's efforts to address the far-reaching challenge of global climate change. As you know, the parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed upon and ratified by the Senate in 1992, recently held the second major meeting-or Conference of the Parties-in Geneva. As requested in your letter of invitation, I would like to discuss the rationale for the position articulated by the United States in Geneva and to answer any questions that members of the Committee have.

The United States had four primary objectives for the Geneva meeting; 1) we wanted to put our shoulder behind the outstanding and unparalleled science that has been developed by the world's best scientists through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; 2) we wanted to shift the negotiations toward strategies that will achieve environmental results in an economically sensible manner-so we rejected unrealistic proposals by some countries, and proposed that future commitments be realistic, verifiable and binding; 3) we wanted to ensure that national and international flexibility were preserved, allowing for the use of the most innovative and cost-effective mechanisms here and abroad, such as joint implementation and international emissions trading; and 4) we wanted to make sure that all nations, including developing nations, are involved in these negotiations and next steps that will be reached through them.

I want to begin, Mr. Chairman, with the issue of science—for it is scientific research, and broad consensus among the world's leading experts, that form the foundation for our concern and proposed strategies on this issue. As you know, this Committee has a long history of engagement with scientific experts involved in this issue-and I remember well a long series of hearings between 1987 and 1992 that I had the privilege of working on from your side of the dais during my term in the Senate, under the leadership of then Chairman Johnston.

One of the most memorable of those hearings occurred right here in this room in June of 1988. You will recall that that was the day that a brave and pioneering NASA scientist named Jim Hansen-a leading authority on climate change-told this Committee and the world that he believed that the scientific evidence was ever more apparent that global climatic changes were occurring outside the range of natural variability and that he believed global warming was underway. That was a bold assertion at that time and there were few scientists at that time who were willing to go as far as Dr. Hansen.

Almost a decade later, Mr. Chairman, a great deal of scientific progress has been made. At the behest of the Bush Administration, the international community set about to establish an inclusive international scientific body to answer questions about global climate change. Accordingly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established as a partnership of the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Program. Over the past five years, the IPCC has emerged as the world's preeminent scientific and technical body concerned with the threat of global climate change. The IPCC involves more than 2,000 scientists from more than 100 countries and uses recognized standards of peer-review in its scientific method.

In December of last year, the IPCC finalized its Second Assessment Report-representing the most recent, authoritative and comprehensive scientific analysis we have available to us on this issue. The second assessment was the result of years of effort, extensive peer review and exhaustive analysis and consultation. The most important of the IPCC's scientific findings are as follows:

• The chemical composition of the atmosphere is being altered by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.

• The continued buildup of these gases will enhance the natural greenhouse effect and cause the global climate to change.

• Based on these facts and additional underlying science, the second assessment reported that "the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate."

This last finding represents the first time that a consensus has emerged among leading climate scientists that the world's changing climatic conditions are more than the natural variability of weather. In short, the IPCC's results have further underscored the compelling nature of scientific understanding of this issue.

Nonetheless, uncertainty remains. The scientific community cannot yet tell us precisely how much, when or at what rate the Earth's climate will respond to greenhouse gas buildup. However, making the best possible estimate based on what is known about the complex climate system, the scientific community believes that current emissions trends (resulting over the next several decades in the effective doubling from Preindustrial concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere) will lead to global temperatures which, on average, are 2 to 6.5 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than today, increasing at a rate greater than any known for the past 10,000 years.

Based on these estimates, the best scientific evidence indicates that human-induced climate change, if allowed to continue unabated, could have profound consequences for the economy and the quality of life of future generations:

Human health is at risk from projected increases in the spread of diseases like malaria, yellow fever and cholera;

Food security is threatened in certain regions of the world;

Water resources are expected to be increasingly stressed, with substantial economic, social and environmental costs in regions that are already water-limited, and perhaps even political costs where there is already conflict over limited resources;

Coastal areas-where a large percentage of the global population lives-are at risk from sea level rise.

In our opinion, the IPCC has clearly demonstrated to policymakers that further action must be taken to address this challenge. We are not swayed by and strongly object to recent allegations about the integrity of the IPCC's conclusions. These allegations were raised not by the scientists involved in the IPCC, not by participating governments, but rather by naysayers and special interests bent on belittling, attacking and obfuscating climate change science. It is our strong belief that the IPCC's finding meet the highest standards of scientific integrity. This is the best science we have and it is the responsibility of policy makers to consider the panel's findings and respond with corresponding thoughtfulness.

Unhappily, while the established international scientific process is working well, the international policy process has not been as successful. While an important first step, there are a number of shortcomings in the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Perhaps most important, the current Convention structure has not achieved its primary aims; few nations in either the developed or developing world have been fully successful in meeting their objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. We have to do better.

Last year, at the first Conference of the Parties in Berlin, treaty participants agreed to launch a new round of negotiations aimed at defining steps that would be taken after the year 2000. The so-called "Berlin Mandate" defined the broad terms by which next steps under the Convention would be negotiated. The Berlin Mandate directed the negotiations toward: 1) defining emissions limitations objectives for Annex I nations in the post-2000 period; and 2) advancing implementation of commitments by developing nations.

In Berlin, as today, it was our belief that the final consensus reflects our belief that this is a global problem requiring global solutions: all countries must work together to do more to guard against harmful climate changes. While the Berlin agreement specifies that there will be no new commitments for developing country Parties, it calls for advancing the implementation of the existing treaty commitments agreed to by developing countries and allows for negotiations on new commitments to begin as soon as work under the Berlin agreement is complete. Under the existing treaty, developing countries are required to adopt policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We are working now to develop specific proposals for advancing implementation of these existing commitments by the developing countries.

Over the past year, the United States has been engaged at home and abroad in serious analysis of the successes and failures of the current Convention structure in preparation for the negotiations that have been underway since Berlin. Based on these extensive efforts, the United States articulated in Geneva a proposed structure for next steps that we think should form the basis for negotiations over the next 16 months. We call this a "framework"; it has yet to be fleshed out with specific numbers and we have work to do to further develop several issues associated with this approach. In the months ahead, our ongoing analysis and assessment will allow