of such complaint admits the agency and the promise, and does not
raise the question whether parol evidence is admissible to prove that
such note was executed by the defendants through their agent. Tarver
v. Garlington, 628.

5. PERSONS EXECUTING A CONTRACT OF SALE AS APPARENT PRINCIPALS will
not be permitted to show by parol evidence that they were acting as
agents of another, when sued on a warranty implied by such contract.
Bulwinkle v. Cramer, 645.

6. AGENT CANNOT BIND PRINCIPAL BY ANY ADMISSION MADE AFTER TER-
MINATION OF AGENCY. - Authority of the clerk of a steamboat to make
purchases for the boat, and to state accounts, necessarily terminates
when his connection with the boat is severed, and after that time he
cannot bind the owners by his written admission of the correctness of
an account; and to obtain any information he may possess as to its cor-
rectness, he must be called and examined as a witness. Gunter v. Stu-
art, 21.

7. EITHER AGENT OR PRINCIPAL MAY SUE UPON CONTRACT not under seal
made by the agent in his own name for an undisclosed principal; and
parol evidence is admissible to show that the principal is the real con-
tracting party. Deitz v. Insurance Co., 909.

8. PAROL Evidence can Never be Ådmitted for the Purpose of Exon-
ERATING AN AGENT who has entered into a written contract as principal,
even though he should propose to show, if allowed, that he disclosed his
agency and mentioned the name of his principal at the time the contract
was executed. Bulwinkle v. Cramer, 645.

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9. FOREIGN CORPORATION-WHETHER HAS AGENT IN COUNTY, QUESTION FOR
JURY. - Where in a suit against a foreign corporation the petition al-
leges that such corporation has an agent in the county, and the defendant
denies that it has such agent, and pleads in abatement to the jurisdiction
of the court, if the testimony upon the question of agency is conflicting,
the question of agency or not should be left to the jury, and it is error
to withdraw it from them. Bradstreet Company v. Gill, 768.

10. AGENCY OR NOT IS QUESTION OF LAW to be determined by the relations of
the parties as they in fact exist under their agreements or acts. If rela-
tions exist between them which constitute an agency, it will be an
agency, whether they understood it to be so or not. Their private inten-
tion will not affect it. Id.

11. CONTRACTS-DAMAGES RECOVERABLE ON REVOCATION OF. Where an
agent has a contract with his principal to sell certain lands, to be dis-
posed of within a time limited, and he is to receive as compensation for
his services only a share of the profits arising from the proceeds of the
sale, and in performance of such contract he renders services for several
months, expending time and money, and the principal then revokes the
contract without any reason or excuse, and refuses to permit him to fur-
ther perform, the agent is entitled to recover such compensation in dam-
ages as would be equal in amount to his share of the profits which would
have resulted had the lands been sold by him. Durkee v. Gunn, 300.
12. EXECUTION OF POWER OF ATTORNEY. IT IS NOT REQUIRED that
power of attorney shall be executed in the presence of the officer before
whom it is acknowledged, nor is it material that he should know that
the signature was written by the grantor. If the grantor acknowledges
before the officer the due execution of the instrument, he thereby recog.
nizes and adopts the signature as his own. Munger v. Baldridge, 273.

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13. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF POWER OF ATTORNEY. - IT IS SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS OF STATUTE as to the acknowledg.
ment to power of attorney, where the officer certifies that at a certain
time"
came Julia P. Munger, who is personally known to me to be the
identical person whose name is affixed to the foregoing instrument of
writing as grantor, and duly acknowledges that she executed the same,
and for the purposes therein set forth." Id.

14. POWER OF ATTORNEY TO CONVEY LANDS NEED NOT DESCRIBE IN DE-
TAIL the lands authorized to be conveyed, and a power granted by
wife to husband "to execute and acknowledge, sign, seal, and deliver
any deed or deeds for the conveyance or assurance of all my right, title,
and interest in and to any lands and tenements the title to which is in
the said D. S. Munger, and in which I have any interest as being the
wife of him, said D. S. Munger," is sufficient to authorize the convey.
ance of her interest in any lands then owned by D. S. Munger within the
county where the power of attorney was recorded. Id.
15. THAT AN AGENT WHO MADE A SALE OF REAL ESTATE WAS NOT AU-
THORIZED IN WRITING to do so is immaterial, if it was made in the
presence of the principals at the request of one of them, and the money
paid is at the same time handed to the other, and the purchaser takes
possession under his contract, and makes valuable improvements with
the knowledge of the principals, who instructed such agent to make out
a contract of sale, and the latter, pursuant to such instruction, exe-
cuted such contract. Karns v. Olney, 101.

16. CONTRACT TO ADVERTISE AND SELL REAL ESTATE, CONSTRUCTION OF.
-A written contract entered into between a real estate agent and
the owner of land, the former agreeing to advertise and sell the land,
but to receive no compensation for his services excepting a share in the
surplus or profits arising from the proceeds of the sale, is a contract of
agency, and not of partnership. Durkee v. Gunn, 300.

See BANKS AND Banking, 3; ESTOPPEL, 5; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8, 9; IN.
SURANCE, 1-4; PLEADING, 6.

ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

See MORTGAGES, 4.

ANIMALS.

HUNTING RIGHTS. EVERY PERSON HAS AN EQUAL RIGHT of taking, for

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his own use, all creatures fit for food that are wild by nature, so long as
he does no injury to another's rights; but as every person has the right
of exclusive dominion as to the lawful use of land owned by him, no
other can hunt or sport upon his land but by his consent. He has the
exclusive right of hunting and sporting upon his own land, whether it be
upland or covered with water. Sterling v. Jackson, 405.

APPEAL AND ERROR.

1. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS IN RECORD CANNOT BE CORRECTED IN SUPREME
COURT AFTER CAUSE IS SUBMITTED. — If, by any undue practice, the
signature of the trial judge is procured to a bill of exceptions which he
did not understand, and did not intend to sign, the trial court may,
upon motion, even after adjournment for the term, and after the per-
fecting of an appeal to the supreme court, strike it from the record; and

if the amendment be made after the transcript has been filed in the
supreme court, the record may be corrected in the latter court by a
suggestion of its diminution and a motion for a certiorari; but it cannot
be corrected in the supreme court in the first instance, especially after
the cause has been submitted. East Line etc. R'y Co. v. Culberson, 805.
2. RESPONDENT SHOULD NOTIFY APPELLANT of any additional grounds upon
which he intends to rely in support of the judgment below. Ex parte
Dickinson, 749.

3. INSTRUCTIONS. - Exception taken to a detached portion of a charge to the
jury cannot be sustained when the charge, taken together and considered
as a whole, is consistent and proper. State v. Turner, 706.

4. IT IS ERROR TO PERMIT COUNSEL, IN ARGUING BEFORE JURY, TO
STATE and comment upon facts not in evidence, against the objection
of the opposite party, and the error is not corrected by an instruction to
the jury to disregard all statements of counsel not supported by evi-
dence, unless it is found as a fact that the error was harmless, and that
the legal right to a fair trial was not infringed. Cross v. Grant, 607.
5. ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION WHICH MISSTATES LAW IS NOT CURED by
giving another instruction which correctly states it, because the court
cannot say which instruction the jury will follow. McCleneghan v.
Omaha etc. R. R. Co., 508.

6. SUPREME COURT WILL NOT REVERSE a judgment upon grounds not
taken in the court below, nor in the exceptions, unless for want of
jurisdiction, but such court will affirm a judgment upon other grounds
than those upon which it was based in the lower court. Chapman v.
City Council, 681.

7. EVIDENCE. - ERROR IN PERMITTING INCOMPETENT TESTIMONY TO GO TO
JURY is cured, where the defendants go upon the stand as witnesses on
their own behalf, and there give substantially the same evidence as
that erroneously admitted in the first instance. State v. Furney, 262.
8. EVIDENCE-DEPOSITIONS. IT IS NOT ERROR TO PERMIT DEPOSITION TO
BE READ IN EVIDENCE, though taken in the same city where the trial
was had, and only one day before the trial, and without any showing
being made that the oral testimony of the witness could not be procured,
where no objection was urged against it for these reasons, and the rea-
sons given for the objection that was urged against the deposition were
insufficient. Missouri P. R'y Co. v. Neiswanger, 304.

9. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUROR not Ground fOR NEW TRIAL WHEN. — Å
new trial will not be granted on the ground of a juror's disqualification
for a matter that is a principal cause of challenge, which existed before
he was elected and sworn, but which was unknown to the party until
after the trial, and which could not have been discovered by the exer-
cise of ordinary diligence, unless it appears, from the whole case, that the
party suffered injustice from the fact that such juror served upon the
trial of the case. Beck v. Thompson, 870.

10. DEFECT IN CHARGE TO JURY IS NOT GROUND FOR REVERSAL of the judg-
ment, where the defect is not called to the attention of the court by an
instruction supplying it. Weaver v. Nugent, 792.

11. RULING UPON ISSUES WITHDRAWN FROM JURY. —A ruling upon a matter
which was withdrawn from the jury in the charge is not ground for re-
versal of the judgment. Id.

12. REFUSAL TO TAKE INDICTMENT FROM JURY, NOT ERROR WHEN. - Where,
on the trial of a prisoner jointly indicted with two others, the indict-

ment, with an indorsement thereon of a verdict of a jury finding one
of them guilty, is shown to the jury, and taken by them to the jury.
room, it is not error for the court to refuse to send to the jury-room
and take the indictment from the jury while they are deliberating. State
▼. Shores, 875.

13. REASONS Given By JudgE FOR REFUSING NEW TRIAL. —If the refusal
of a motion for a new trial be correct, the fact that the judge gave an
erroneous reason for such refusal will not be a ground for reversing the
judgment. Galveston v. Hemmis, 828.

See AGENCY, 9; HOMESTEAD, 1; LIS PENDENS; PLEADING, 7, 8, 10; PROCESS,
4, 5; TRIAL, 3, 8, 14.

ARREST.

1

1. WARRANT OF ARREST-SUFFICIENCY or. A warrant issued upon an
original complaint on information and belief, but reciting that, upon
examination under oath, it appeared to the justice that the offense had
been committed, and that there was just cause to suspect the accused to
be guilty thereof, is valid and legal, as the complaint presumptively
shows a legal and proper ground for the issuance of the warrant. Has-
kins v. Ralston, 376.

2 WARRANT OF ARREST - SUFFICIENCY OF. —A warrant charging defendant
with uttering and publishing as true a certain false, forged, and coun
terfeited note for the payment of money on a certain date, and describ
ing the note, defendant well knowing at the time that said note was
false, forged, and counterfeited, sufficiently describes the offense of for-
gery without averring an intent to defraud. Id.

See EXTRADITION, 1, 2.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

See DAMAGES, 4.

ASSIGNMENTS.

NOTICE - LIABILITY OF DRAWEE. - An order on a fund operates as an
assignment of so much of the fund due the drawer; but where the
drawee pays the whole fund to the drawer, without actual personal
notice of the assignment, such drawee is not liable to the assignee.
In such case, notice to the husband of the drawee is not notice to her.
Harvin v. Galluchat, 671.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

THE SOUTH CAROLINA ACT RELATING TO ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE BENEFIT
OF CREDITORS applies as well to assignments made outside the state as
to those made within it. Ex parte Dickinson, 749.

See CONFLICT or Laws, 1, 2; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 8, 9.

ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT.

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1. NON-RESIDENT. A citizen of another state has the same rights as a
citizen of this state, under the attachment law of South Carolina
Ex parte Dickinson, 749.

2 JUSTICE'S WRIT OF ATTACHMENT does not operate as a summons; and
service of it personally, without service on property, and service of an

inventory as required by statute, is insufficient to give jurisdiction over
defendant under the Michigan statute: Howell's Stats., secs. 6839, 6840.
Langtry v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 352.

3. JURISDICTION CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY THE MERE LEVY OF AN ATTACHMENT,
sufficient to authorize the court to determine the question of indebted.
ness, and to condemn the attached property to pay the same.

Though
an attachment is levied, jurisdiction is not acquired until service of
summons. Great West Min. Co. v. Woodmas etc. Min. Co., 204.

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4 GARNISHMENT - EVIDENCE. After service of summons to show cause, a
garnishee defendant may make further and supplemental disclosure, and
give in evidence matters of hearsay touching his liability to the princi-
pal defendant. Drake v. Lake Shore etc. R'y Co., 382.
5. GARNISHMENT IN ONE STATE OF DEBT EXEMPT IN ANOTHER. —Garnishment
proceedings cannot be instituted in one state to evade the exemption
laws of a sister state, and thus deprive a laborer of the benefit of the
laws of the latter state to protect his wages from seizure, when he resides
in that state, has not been personally in the state where suit is institu-
ted, nor has any property in that jurisdiction. Id.

6. GARNISHMENT IN ONE STATE OF DEBTS EXEMPT IN ANOTHER. —A creditor
who is a citizen of one state cannot, by assigning his claim to a citizen of
another state, use the courts of that state to collect a debt against a citi-
zen of the former state whose person or property is not within the juris-
diction where suit is brought, and whose wages, sought to be reached
and confiscated by garnishment, are exempt from seizure by the law of
his state. Id.

7. GARNISHMENt in One State of DEBT EXEMPT IN ANOTHER. — The wages
of an employee, exempt from attachment by the law of the state of his
residence, where his contract for services is made and performed, and
where his wages are payable, and the debt contracted, are not subject to
garnishment in another state, where he has not subjected himself to the
jurisdiction of the court save by the disclosure of the garnishee. Id.
See CHATTEL MORTGAGES; CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1; CORPORATIONS, 11; M▲-
LICIOUS PROSECUTION, 7-14; REPLEVIN, 2.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

1. VALIDITY OF Contract for SERVICES OF ATTORNEY. — Attorneys at law
may be employed to defend persons charged with crime, where the alleged
offenses are charged to have been committed prior to the employment,
and their services may also be engaged for future transactions, where no
wrong is intended or contemplated. But a contract entered into by at-
torneys at law to defend persons for criminal offenses, which were in con-
templation of all the parties to be committed in the future, is against
public policy, and void, and compensation for services actually performed
under such contract cannot be recovered. Bowman v. Phillips, 292.
2. CONTRACT BY ATTORNEYS TO DEFEND FUTURE VIOLATIONS OF PROHIBI.
Tory Liquor LAW IS VOID.—The plaintiffs, attorneys at law, entered
into a contract with the defendants, who were engaged in the illegal sal●
of intoxicating liquors, whereby the plaintiffs agreed, for one year, for
the monthly compensation of eighty dollars, payable on the first day
of each month, to defend all cases brought against the defendants for
violations of the prohibitory liquor laws. Services were actually per-
formed by the plaintiffs under this contract, but they were paid for the