FEB. 20, 1835.] Amendment of the Constitution. [SENATE. the executive will beforehand upon matters specially confided to the legislative department, and entirely with in the sphere of legislative action, and, anticipating an approaching meeting of Congress, publish to the world an executive manifesto, declaring the final opinions of the Executive upon the great questions of currency, commerce, peace and war, so as effectually to preclude all legislative inquiry, and to leave to Congress merely the privilege of recording the executive decrees. What,jects, in the first twenty-two years of the Government. then, becomes of the balance of power? Where, then, is the legislative power? Will you not have then the very accumulation of power, legislative, executive, and judicial, in the same hands, which Mr. Madison describes as the very definition of tyranny? Where will you then find a corrective for executive abuses? What power shall arrest executive usurpation? Will a solitary voice in the legislative halls avail you any thing? No, sir; the suggestions of patriotism, wisdom, and experience, imbodied in the most eloquent language, would be disregarded by the representatives of a dominant party, elected through executive influence. But suppose, against all probability, you should find that majority; what hope will remain, with the executive veto staring us in the face? Can any one suppose that two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature will ever be found to concur in the enactment of a law which the President is known to disapprove? Any bill involving great principles has been rarely, if ever, known to pass through Congress but by bare majorities, even where the sentiments of the Executive were unknown. Has an instance yet occurred of the enactment of any law, which the President had returned with his objections? Let this veto power be exerted in all its extent, and the legislative power vested in Congress by the constitution is no more. Restrict the President in whatever other way you please, still from that moment he becomes absolute in his actions, a monarch, a dictator, a despot. Yes, sir, from that moment the revolution is achieved, and the people are slaves. Will such a power be suffered longer to remain to the Executive unrestricted, a power which a King of England has so long refrained from exercising that it may be said to be obsolete? What has been its operation here? It has changed the whole course of the legislation of the country. The veto power, applied to the bill appropriating the proceeds of the public lands, gratified the new States. The same power, arresting a system of internal improve ments, pleases the South. The seizure and transfer of the public deposites, by a stretch of executive power, is highly acceptable to another important section of the country. Thus the exercise of this power secures to the Executive friends enough in each of those sections of the country to ensure him a majority, whilst perhaps neither would entirely be satisfied with what so much pleased the other. In conclusion, Mr. President, let us look into the manner in which this power to negative legislative acts has heretofore been exercised, and what we may expect from its overwhelming effects, if it shall be left unrestrained. At the commencement of the Government, we shall find it directed to objects of little interest, and of less importance; for a number of years it was used to correct the effects of hasty or inadvertent legislation; it performed the office for which it was designed, and confined its operation to cases where the constitution was alleged to have been violated by the enactment of the bill; as time rolls on, it outstrips in its pretensions all that the early enemies of a strong executive had predicted. It is confined no longer to alleged violations of the constitution, or to enactments supposed to impinge executive authority; it has invaded the field of general legislation. It assumes the power to decide, originally and finally, on questions of finance, of commerce, of currency; in a Sir, when these examples are before us, in the very infancy of our Government, what may we not apprehend from the accumulating encroachment of future years? More danger is always to be apprehended from the illegal exercise of power than from the quantum granted. The dictatorial power, when legally conferred and legally exercised, proved no detriment to the liberties of Rome. But when Cæsar passed the Rubicon with a victorious army, in open and successful defiance of positive law, the will of one man became superior to the law, and the Republic was changed to an imperial throne. The reason is obvious: when power, however great, is conferred by law, checks and limitations may be interposed to render it innoxious; but when power can successfully transcend a constitutional or legal restraint, even in a matter apparently unimportant, who will be able to interpose a check to the successful progress of usurpation, when the enslavement of the people may be the consequence, and a crown the prize? Mr. President, the Executive has, in every age and in every country, been the bane of liberty. It is that power in the State which possesses an activity which never slumbers. Its never-ceasing tendency is to increase the sphere of its own action, and to swell the SENATE.] Branches of the Mint--Executive Patronage. number of its votaries. The dignities and emoluments which it commands are addressed to the strongest passions that can sway the human breast. Its operations are unseen, its movements unfelt, its impulses unknown, until we behold their effects upon the freedom of a country, and find its liberties writhing beneath their influence, and expiring in the agonies of death. The deadly potion which they administer will be often presented with a winning smile. So long as confined within its legitimate sphere, the executive power contains within itself an impelling force, which scarcely any free government is able to resist; but, if it once successfully enters upon legislative action, the people are undone. Mr. President, in my humble judgment, the presidential negative upon legislative proceedings, as now practised and abused, is entirely inconsistent with republican freedom. The people must curtail it, or prepare for subjugation. All history proves that power is never sated; usurpation never stops. If the public will is not respected and obeyed by the Chief Magistrate of the land, when expressed by representatives coming fresh from the people, that Magistrate will soon be supe. rior to the constitution and the law. Soon, did I say? He has them, through the agency of the veto power, already under his foot. Mr. CLAY then, after briefly complimenting the mover of the proposition for the correctness of his views and the ability with which he had presented them, for which the whole country owed him its thanks, stated that the proposition was one which ought to be adopted, only after the most deliberate examination. He regretted that the lateness of the period of the session would, in all probability, prevent the measure from receiving that deliberate consideration at this session. It would not, at any rate, be proper to continue the discussion of the resolution to-day. He would, therefore, move to lay it on the table, promising to call it up again, if any favorable opportunity should occur for acting upon it. The resolution was then laid on the table. BRANCHES OF THE MINT. Mr. WAGGAMAN moved to take up the bill for the establishment of branches of the mint in New Orleans, Auraria, and in North Carolina, and Georgia; which was ordered. Mr. WAGGAMAN then spoke in support of the bill, and urged its necessity from a consideration of the great importations of gold and silver into New Orleans, and the great expense and risk incurred by sending on all the bullion from the South to be coined at Philadelphia. Mr. TALLMADGE proposed an amendment, having for its object the establishment of a branch of the mint at New York also. Mr. WAGGAMAN felt a regret that he must object to the amendment as an appendage to the present bill: New York was within six hours' easy travel to Philadel phia, and bullion could be coined free of expense to them, whereas it cost to the owners in New Orleans two and a half per cent. [FEB. 20, 1835. great body of the people; he wanted the country to be saved from the rag system; he wanted a sound and solid currency to be established instead of paper, whether from local or any other banks; he was anxious to see the currency brought back to that solid condition in which it was when the States surrendered up the right of coining to the federal Government; next session he would not oppose a motion for the benefit of other places, but at present the lateness of the session, and the immediate necessity of the places mentioned in the bill, made it desirable not to embarrass its progress by the introducof other places, not under circumstances of equal pressure; he therefore should vote against the amendment. Mr. TALLMADGE then withdrew his amendment. Mr. WAGGAMAN proceeded to propose amendments, filling up the blanks of the bill; `which were severally adopted. An amendment proposed by Mr. KING, of Alabama, was adopted; to the effect that the salaries of the officers | should not commence till the necessary buildings were built. The question upon the adoption of the bill was about to be put, when Mr. CLAY rose and proposed to lay the bill upon the table, and that it should be printed with the amendments. He was (he said) disposed to feel favorably towards the bill, considering the friendly quarter from which it came; but he felt a desire to know more about the matter, to know the amount of expenditure to which it would lead; not a syllable of this information had been given, and he wished to have an opportunity of examining into the subject. Mr. CALHOUN hoped the honorable member would withdraw his motion; as to the amount of expenditure, it would be less than the present loss occasioned by the distant location of the mint in Philadelphia. Mr. PORTER concurred in the wish that Mr. CLAY would withdraw his motion; if he should press it, the loss of the bill would be the consequence. Mr. CLAY said if we are to discuss the measure, let us now go into it. Here is a bill creating an expendi ture of half a million annually, and in perpetuity, and he wished to look into it; it was possible that a great importation of bullion into New Orleans for one or even two consecutive years, might cease altogether afterwards, and then the country would continue to be saddled with this expenditure; for, as long as a grain of gold dust was to be picked up, these establishments and all of their expenditures would be propped up. He was, therefore, determined not to withdraw his motion, unless it were to go into the immediate discussion of the bill. Mr. WAGGAMAN then assented to the motion, on an understanding that to-morrow he would again call up the bill. EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE. The Senate proceeded to consider the bil to repeal the first and second sections of the act to limit the term of office of certain officers therein named. The question being on the passage of the bill, Mr. CALHOUN hoped the amendment would not Mr. POINDEXTER said that, since this subject had be pressed at present: when the proper time should been under the consideration of the Senate, he had felt come, he would be glad to vote for having branches at. anxious to express his opinions upon its principles. It New York, Boston, Norfolk, Charleston, and other ne- opened before us the whole theory of our Government. cessary and central places. One reason for pressing But from respect to the Senate, and a belief that it had now for their immediate establishment, as by the bill, been amply discussed to enable the people to understand was, that the whole amount of the expenses which their it, he would not take up the time of the Senate by enestablishment would cause, was more than counterbalan-tering far into the discussion. He had wished, in par ced by the expenses which the distance of Philadelphia occasioned. Mr. BENTON spoke in the same sense; he wished to see a hard metallic currency in the hands of the people; he wanted it to be made to run in that channel, viz: the ticular, to examine the doctrine of implied powers. He denied the whole theory altogether. The executive powers of the President were derived from legislative enactments. There was no such thing as implied powers in any branch of the Government. Where power was given, it was expressly declared and specified in the constitution. There was another point he wished have discussed: that was, the power of impeachment. But he would forbear. [SENATE. reasoning on political subjects, the conclusion at which I have arrived cannot be resisted. I would entreat gentlemen who are opposed to me, said Mr. C., to pause and reflect, and to point out, if possible, the slightest Mr. CALHOUN said the question involved in the flaw in the argument, or to find a peg on which to hang third section of the bill, whether the power to dismiss a doubt. Can they deny that all powers under the conan officer of the Government can be controlled or regu-stitution are either powers specifically granted, or powlated by Congress, or is under the exclusive and unlimited control of the President, is no ordinary question, which may be decided either way, without materially affecting the character and practical operation of the Government. It is, on the contrary, a great and fundamental question, on the decision of which will materially depend the fact, whether this Government shall prove to be what those who framed it supposed it wasa free, popular, and republican Government—or a monarchy in disguise. This important question, said Mr. C., has been very fully and ably discussed by those who have preceded me on the side I intend to advocate. It is not my intention to repeat their arguments, nor to enforce them by additional illustration. I propose to confine myself to a single point of view, but that point I hold to be decisive of the question. ers necessary and proper to carry such into execution. Can it be said that there are inherent powers comprehended in neither of these classes, and existing by a sort of divine right in the Government? The Senator from New York [Mr. WRIGHT] attempted to establish some such position, but the moment that my colleague touched it with the spear of truth, he [Mr. W.] shrunk from the deformity of his own conception. Or can it be asserted that there are powers derived from obligations higher than the constitution itself? The very intimation of such a source of power hurled from office the predecessor of the present incumbent. But if it cannot be denied that all the powers under the constitution are comprised under one or the other of these classes, and if it is acknowledged, as it is on all sides, that the power of dismissal is not specifically granted by the constitution, it follows, by irresistible and a necessary consequence, that the power belongs not to the Executive, but to Congress, to be regulated and controlled at its pleasure. I would be gratified, said Mr. C., that any one who entertains an opposite opinion would attempt to refute this argument, and to point out wherein it is defective; and such perfect confidence do I feel in its soundness, that I will yield the floor to any Senator who may rise and say that he is prepared to refute it. [Here Mr. TALLMADGE, from New York, rose and said that he was not satisfied with the argument, and would attempt to show its error. Mr. C. sat down, for the purpose of giving him an opportunity; when Mr. T. began a formal speech on the subject generally, without attempting to meet Mr. C's argament, when the latter rose and said that Mr. T. had mistaken him; that he did not yield the floor for the purpose of enabling Mr. T. to make a speech, but to enable him to refute the argument which Mr. C. had advanced; and that, if Mr. T. was not prepared to do so, he (Mr. C.) would proceed in the discussion.] If the power to dismiss is possessed by the Executive, he must hold it in one of two modes: either by an express grant of the power by the constitution, or as a power necessary and proper to execute some power expressly granted by that instrument. All the powers under the constitution may be classed under one or the other of these heads; there is no intermediate class. The first question then is, has the President the power in question by any express grant of the constitution? He who affirms that he has, is bound to show it. That instrument is in the hands of every member; the portion containing the delegation of power to the President is short. It is comprised in a few sentences. I ask the Senators to open the constitution, to examine it, and to find, if they can, any authority given to the President to dismiss a public officer. None such can be found; the constitution has been carefully examined, and no one pretends to have found such a grant. Well, then, as there is none such, if it exists at all, it must exist as a power necessary and proper to execute some granted power; but if it exists in that character, it belongs to Congress, and not to the Executive. I venture not the assertion Mr. CALHOUN proceeded, and said: The argument on hastily; I speak on the authority of the constitution which I have relied has been alluded to by the Senator itself; the express and unequivocal authority which can- from Tennessee [Mr. WHITE] and my friend from Kennot be denied nor contradicted. Hear what that sacred tucky who sits before me, [Mr. BIBB;] and the Senator instrument says: "Congress shall have power to make from Tennessee, [Mr. GRUNDY,] whom I am sorry not all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying to see in his place, attempted a reply. He objected to into execution the foregoing powers," (those granted to the argument, on the ground that the construction put Congress itself,) "and all other powers vested by this upon the clause of the constitution which has been quoconstitution in the Government of the United States, or ted would divest the President of a power expressly in any department or office thereof." Mark the fulness granted him by the constitution. I must, said Mr. C., of the expression. Congress shall have power to make express my amazement that one so clear sighted, and all laws, not only to carry into effect the powers ex- so capable of appreciating the just force of an argupressly delegated to itself, but those delegated to the ment, would give such an answer. Were the power of Government, or any department or office thereof; and dismissal a granted power, the argument would be of course comprehends the power to pass laws ne- sound; but, as it is not, to contend that the construction cessary and proper to carry into effect the pow- would divest him of the power, is an assumption without ers expressly granted to the executive department. It the slightest foundation to sustain it. It is his construcfollows, of course, to whatever express grant of power tion, in fact, which divests Congress of an expressly to the Executive the power of dismissal may be sup- granted power, and not ours which divests the Presiposed to attach, whether to that of seeing the law faith- dent. By his he would take from Congress the authofully executed, or to the still more comprehensive grant, rity, expressly granted, of passing all laws necessary as contended for by some, vesting executive powers in and proper to carry into effect the granted powers, unthe President, the mere fact that it is a power appurte-der the pretext that the exercise of such a power, on nant to another power, and necessary to carry it into effect, transfers it, by the provisions of the constitution cited, from the Executive to Congress, and places it under the control of Congress, to be regulated in the manner which it may judge best. If there be truth and the part of Congress, would divest the Executive of a power nowhere granted in the constitution. I feel, said Mr. C., that I must appear to repeat unnecessarily what of itself is so clear and simple as to require no illustration; but I know the obstinacy of party feeling and preconceived opinions, and with what difficulty they yield to the clearest demonstration. Nothing can overthrow them but repeated blows. Such, said Mr. C., are the arguments by which I have been forced to conclude that the power of dismissing is not lodged in the President, but is subject to be controlled and regulated by Congress. I say forced, be cause I have been compelled to the conclusion, in spite of my previous impression. Relying upon the early decision of the question, and the long acquiescence in that decision, I had concluded, without examination, that the decision had not been disturbed, because it rested upon principles too clear and strong to admit of doubt. I remained passively under this impression until it became necessary, during the last session, to examine the question, when I took up the discussion of '98, with the expectation of having my previous impression confirmed. The result was different. I was struck, on reading the debate, with the superiority of the argument of those who contended that the power was not vested by the constitution in the Executive. To me they appear to be far more statesmanlike than the opposite arguments, and partake much more of the spirit of prophecy. After reading this debate, I turned to the constitution, which I read with care in reference to the subject discussed, when for the first time I was struck with the full force of the clause which I have quoted, and which, in my opinion, for ever settles the controversy. I will now, said Mr. C., proceed to consider what will be the effect on the operation of the system under the construction which I have given. In the first place, it would put down all discretionary power, and convert the Government into what the framers intended it should be-a Government of laws, and not of discretion. If the construction be established, no officer, from the President to the constable, and from the Chief Justice to the lowest judicial officer, could exercise any power but what is expressly granted by the constitution, or by some act of Congress; and thus that which, in a free State, is most odious and dangerous of all things the discretionary powers of those who are charged with the execution of the laws--will be effectually suppressed, and the dominion of the laws be fully /established. I would, in the next place, unite, harmonize, and blend into one whole, all the powers of the Government, and prevent that perpetual and dangerous conflict which would necessarily exist between the departments of this Government under the opposite construction. Permit each department to judge of the extent of its own powers, and to assume the right to exercise all powers which it may deem necessary and proper to execute the powers granted to it, and who does not see that, in fact, the Government would consist of three independent, separate, and conflicting departments, without any common point of union, instead of one united authority controlling the whole? Nor would it be difficult to see in what this contest between conflicting departments would terminate. The executive must prevail over the other \ departments. Without its concurrence the action of the other departments are impotent; neither the decrees of the court nor the act of Congress can be executed but through the executive authority; and if the President be permitted to assume whatever power he may deem to be appurtenant to his granted powers, and to decide according to his will and pleasure, and on his own responsibility, whether the decision of the court or the acts of Congress are or are not consistent with the rights which he may arrogate to himself, it is impossible not to see that the authority of the legislative and judicial departments would be under his control. Nor is it difficult to see that, if he may add the power of dismis [FEB. 20, 1835. sal to that of appointment, and thus assert unlimited control over all who hold office, he would find but little difficulty in maintaining himself in the most extravagant assumption of power. We are not without experience on this subject. To what but to the false and dangerous doctrine against which I am contending, and into which the present Chief Magistrate has fallen, are we to attribute the frequent conflicts between the executive and the other departments of the Government, and which so strongly illustrates the truth of what I have stated. Under the opposite and true view of our system all these dangerous jars and conflicts would cease. It unites the whole into one, and the legislative becomes, as it ought to be, the centre of the system; the stomach and the brain, into which all is taken, digested, and assimilated, and by which the action of the whole is regulated by a common intelligence; and this without destroying the distinct and independent functions of the parts. Each is left in possession of the powers expressly granted by the constitution, and which may be executed without the aid of the legislative department, and in the exercise of which there is no possibility of coming into conflict with the other departments; while all discretionary power necessary to execute those granted, and in the exercise of which the separate departments would necessarily come into conflict, are by a wise and beautiful provision of the constitution transferred to Congress, to be exer cised solely according to its discretion, and thus avoiding, as far as the departments of the Government are concerned, the possibility of collision between the parts. By a provision no less wise this union of power in Congress is so regulated as to prevent the legislative from absorbing the other departments of the Government. To guard the Executive against encroachments of Congress, the President is raised from his mere ministerial functions to a participation in the enactment of laws. By a provision in the constitution, his approval is required to the acts of Congress; and his veto, given him as a shield to protect him against the encroachments of the legislative department, can arrest the acts of Congress, unless passed by two-thirds of both Houses. And here let me say that I cannot concur in the resolution offered by my friend from Maryland, [Mr. KENT,] which proposes to divest the Executive of his veto. I hold it to be indispensable; mainly on the ground that the constitution has vested in Congress the high discretionary power under consideration, which, but for the veto, however necessary for the harmony and unity of the Government, might prove destructive to the independ ence of the President. He must, indeed, be a most feeble and incompetent Chief Magistrate, if, aided by the veto, he would not have sufficient influence to protect his necessary powers against the encroachments of Congress. Nor is the Judiciary left without ample protection against the encroachments of Congress. The independent tenure by which the judges hold their office, and the right of the court to pronounce when a case comes before them upon the constitutionality of the acts of Congress, as far at least as the other departments are concerned, affords to the Judiciary an ample protection. Thus all the departments are united in one, so as to constitute a single Government, instead of three distinct, separate, and conflicting departments, without impairing their separate and distinct functions, while, at the same time, the peace and harmony of the whole are preserved. There remains, said Mr. C., to be noticed another consequence not less important. The construction for which I contend strikes at the root of that dangerous control which the President would have over all who hold office, if the power of appointing and removal, without limitation or restriction, were united in him. Let us not be deceived by names. The power in ques tion is too great for a Chief Magistrate of a free State. FEB. 20, 1835.] Executive Patronage. [SENATE. Now is the time to arrest this fatal tendency. Much will depend on the vote on the measure which is now before you. Should it receive the sanction of this body and the other branch of the Legislature, and the principle be once established that the power of dismissal is subject to be regulated by the action of Congress, and not, as is contended, under the sole control of the Exe of our system may yet be arrested. The discretionary and despotic power which the President has assumed to exercise over all in the public employment would be subject to the control of law; and public officers, instead of considering themselves as the mere agents of the executive department, and liable to be dismissed at his will and pleasure, without regard to conduct, would be placed under the protection of the law. tor. It is in its nature an imperial power, and, if he be permitted to exercise it, his authority must become as absolute as that of the Autocrat of all the Russias. To give him the power to dismiss, at his will and pleasure, without limitation or control, is to give him an absolute and unlimited control over the subsistence of almost all who hold office under Government. Let him have the power, and the sixty thousand who now hold employ-cutive, the danger which now menaces the destruction ment under Government would become dependent upon him for the means of existence. Of that vast multitude, I may venture to assert that there are very few whose subsistence does not more or less depend upon their public employment. Who does not see that a power so unlimited and despotic over this great and powerful corps must tend to corrupt and debase those who compose it, and to convert them into the supple and willing instruments of him who wields it? And here let me remark, said Mr. C., that I have been unfairly represented in reference to this point. I have been charged to assert that the whole body of office-holders are corrupt, debased, and subservient; with what views, those who made this charge can best explain. I have made no such assertion, nor could it with truth be made. I know that there are many virtuous and high-minded citizens who hold public office; but it is not, therefore, the less true that the tendency of the power of dismissal is such as I have attributed to it; and that, if the power be left unqualified, and the practice be continued as it has of late, the result must be the complete corruption and debasement of those in public employ. What, Mr. C. asked, has been that powerful cause that has wrought that wonderful change which history teaches us has occurred at different periods in the character of nations? What has bowed down that high, generous, and chival rous feeling; that independent and proud spirit which characterized all free States in rising from the barbarous to the civilized condition; and which finally converted them into base sycophants and flatterers' Under the operation of what cause did the proud and stubborn conquerors of the world, the haughty Romans, sink down to that low and servile debasement which followed the decay of the Republic? What but the mighty cause which I am considering; the power which one man exercised over the fortunes and subsistence, the honor and the standing, of all those in office, or who aspired to public employment? Man is naturally proud and independent, and if he loses these noble qualities in the progress of civilization, it is because, by the concentration of power, he who controls the Government becomes deified in the eyes of those who live, or expect to live, by its bounty. Instead of resting their hopes on a kind Providence and their own honest exertions, all who aspire are taught to believe that the most certain road to honor and fortune is servility and flattery. We already experience its corroding operation. With the growth of executive patronage, and the control which the Executive has established over those in office by the exercise of this tremendous power, we witness among ourselves the progress of this base and servile spirit, which already presents so striking a contrast between the former and present character of our people. It is in vain to attempt to deny the charge. I have marked its progress in a thousand instances within the last few years. I have seen the spirit of independent men, holding public employ, sink under the dread of this fearful power, too honest and too firm to become the instruments or flatterers of power, yet too prudent, with all the consequences before them, to whisper disapprobation of what in their hearts they condemned. Let the present state of things continue; let it be understood that none are to acquire the public honors or to retain them but by flattery and base compliance, and in a few generations the American character will become utterly corrupt and debased. The But it is objected by the Senator from Tennessee, [Mr. GRUNDY,] that the construction for which I contend would destroy the power of the President, and arrest the action of the Government. I must be permitted to express my surprise, said Mr. C., that such an objection should come from that experienced and sagacious SenaHe seems entirely to forget that the President not only possesses executive powers, but also legislative; and that he is not only a Chief Magistrate, but also a part of the law-making power. Does he not recollect that the President has his veto; and that no law can be passed which would improperly diminish the authority which ought to belong to him as Chief Magistrate without his consent, unless passed against his veto by two-thirds of both Houses? an event which, it is believed, has not occurred since the commencement of the Government, and the occurrence of which is highly improbable. How, then, can it be asserted that the construction for which I contend would destroy the just authority of the President? Let it be established, and what would follow? Every proposition to regulate and control the power of dismissal would become a question of expediency, and would be liable to be assailed by all who might suppose that it would impair improperly the power of the Chief Magistrate. And seconded as they would be by the veto, if necessary, there could be but little danger that restriction too rigid would be imposed on his authority. Senator from Tennessee also objects that the measure would be impracticable, and asks, with an air of triumph, what would the Senate do if the reasons of the President should be unsatisfactory? I do not, said Mr. C., agree with those who think that the Senate can or ought to continue to reject the nominations of the President in such cases, until the officer who has been dismissed shall be restored. I believe that course to be impracticable, and that in such a struggle the resistance of the Senate would be finally overcome. My hope is, that the fact itself that the President must assign reasons for removals would of itself go far to check the abuses which now exist. I cannot think that any President would assign to the Senate, as a reason for removal, that the officer removed was opposed to him on party grounds. Such is the deceptive character of the human heart, that it is reconciled to do many things under plausible covering which it would not openly avow. But suppose there should be a President who would act upon the principle of removing on a mere difference of opinion, without any other fault in the officer, and who would be bold enough to avow such a reason, Congress would not be at a loss for a remedy, on the principles for which I contend. A law might be passed that would reach the case; it might be declared that the removal by the President, if his reasons should not prove satisfactory, should act merely as a suspension to the termination of the next ensuing session, unless filled by the advice and consent of the Senate. The Senator from Tennessee has conjured up a state of |