3 FEB. 16, 1835.] Executive Patronage. [SENATE. tends to turn the whole body of public officers into partisans, dependants, favorites, sycophants, and manworshippers. State, should hold his office during good behaviour, I am not aware of any ground on which such a law could be held unconstitutional. A provision of that kind might be unwise, in regard to such officers, but I do not per- Mr. President, without pursuing the discussion further, ceive that it would transcend the power of Congress. I will detain the Senate only while I recapitulate the If the constitution had not prescribed the tenure of opinions which I have expressed; because I am far less judicial office, Congress might have thought it expedient desirous of influencing the judgment of others, than of to give the judges just such a tenure as the constitution making clear the grounds of my own judgment.. has itself provided; that is to say, a right to hold during I think, then, sir, that the power of appointment natugood behaviour; and I am of opinion that such a law rally and necessarily includes the power of removal, would have been perfectly constitutional. It is by law, where no limitation is expressed, nor any tenure but in England, that the judges are made independent of the that at will declared. The power of appointment being removing power of the Crown. I do not think that the conferred on the President and Senate, I think the powconstitution, by giving the power of appointment, or the er of removal went along with it, and should have been power both of appointment and removal, to the Presi- regarded as a part of it, and exercised by the same dent and Senate, intended to impose any restraint on the hands. I think, consequently, that the decision of 1789, Legislature, in regard to its authority of regulating the which implied a power of removal separate from the duties, powers, duration, or responsibility of office. I appointing power, was erroneous. agree that Congress ought not to do any thing which shall essentially impair that right of nomination and appointment of certain officers, such as ministers, judges, &c., which the constitution has vested in the President and Senate. But, while the power of nomination and appointment is left fairly where the constitution has placed it, I think the whole field of regulation is open to legislative discretion. If a law were to pass, declaring that district attorneys, or collectors of customs, should hold their offices four years, unless removed on conviction for misbehaviour, no one could doubt its constitu- I am, therefore, of opinion that it is competent for tional validity; because the Legislature is naturally com- Congress to declare by law, as one qualification of the petent to prescribe the tenure of office. And is a rea- tenure of office, that the incumbent shall remain in sonable check on the power of removal any thing more place till the President shall remove him, for reasons to than a qualification of the tenure of office? Let it be be stated to the Senate. And I am of opinion that this always remembered that the President's removing pow-qualification, mild and gentle as it is, will have some er, as now exercised, is claimed and held under the general clause vesting in him the executive authority. It is implied or inferred from that clause alone. Now, if it is properly derived from that source, since the constitution does not say how it shall be limited, how defined, or how carried into effect, it seems especially proper for Congress, under the general provision of the constitution which gives it authority to pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred on any department, to regulate the subject of removal. And the regulation here required is of the gentlest kind. It only provides that the President shall make his reasons for removal of officers of this description known to the Senate, when he does see fit to remove them. It might, I think, very justly, go farther. It might, and perhaps it ought to, prescribe the form of removal, and the proof of the fact. It might, I think, too, declare that the President should only suspend officers, at pleasure, till the next meeting of the Senate, according to the amendment suggested by the honorable member from Kentucky; and, if the present practice cannot be otherwise checked, this provision, in my opinion, ought hereafter to be adopted. But I am content with the slightest degree of restraint which may be sufficient to arrest the totally unnecessary, unreasonable, and cangerous exercise of the power of removal. I desire only, for the present at least, that, when the President turns ⚫ a man out of office, he should give his reasons for it to the Senate, when he nominates another person to fill the place. Let him give these reasons, and stand on them. If they be fair and honest, he need have no fear in stating them. It is not to invite any trial; it is not to give the removed officer an opportunity of defence; it is not to excite controversy and debate; it is simply that the Senate, and ultimately the public, may know the grounds of removal. I deem this degree of regulation, at least, necessary, unless we are willing to submit all these officers to an absolute and perfectly irresponsible removing power a power which, as recently exercised, But I think the decision of 1789 has been established by practice, and recognised by subsequent laws, as the settled construction of the constitution; and that it is our duty to act upon the case accordingly, for the present, without admitting that Congress may not hereafter, if necessity shall require it, reverse the decision of 1789. I think the Legislature possesses the power of regulating the condition, duration, qualification, and tenure of office, in all cases where the constitution has made no express provision on the subject. effect in arresting the evils which beset the progress of the Government, and seriously threaten its future prosperity. These are the reasons for which I give my support to this bill. When Mr. WEBSTER had concluded, Mr. WRIGHT said he had hoped that some one of the individuals who had been so emphatically called upon by the honorable Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. CLAY,] on a former day, as the leaders of the administration party, would have come forward in the debate then pending, and thus have saved him the trouble of addressing the Senate. But, as no such individual appeared, and as the bill was about to be reported, he felt bound to give his humble voice against it, before it pro ceeded further. He could not, he said, pursue the course which an answer to the argument of the learned Senator, who had just resumed his seat, [Mr. WEBSTER,] would require, nor could he comply with the call and intimation of the Senator from Kentucky, to which he had alluded. His object was to repel an implication which might attend the passage of this bill, and for that purpose to refer to such portions of the report of the committee as appeared to him to relate to the provisions of the bill itself, and the considerations involved in the legislation proposed. He did not intend to notice, upon this occasion, any other parts of the report than those which treated of the patronage of the Executive, growing out of his connexion with, and influence over, persons dependent upon, and receiving their support from, the Government. The bill under consideration was all the legislation proposed by the committee, in reference to this part of the executive patronage; and he must suppose that so much of the report as discussed this point was the legitimate subject of comment in connexion with the bill. Mr. W. said he did not understand the rule of order to be that laid down by the Senator from New Jersey, [Mr. SOUTHARD,] when he addressed the Senate on Friday last. He had understood that honorable gentleman then to state that the report of the committee was not before the Senate, and proper matter for remark, while proceeding upon this bill. He held a different rule. The bill was reported by a select committee of the Senate. It was one of the results to which that committee had arrived, after great labor and deliberation, and they had spread before the Senate a mass of facts, and a long train of reasoning, as the grounds upon which the bill was recommended to the acceptance of the body. Could it, then, be true that these facts and this reasoning, constituting the report of the committee, were not proper subjects for remark when acting upon the bill? He was sure the honorable Senator, upon more mature reflection, would change his opinion, and hold the report fully before the Senate. He believed that any and every part of the report might be properly discussed upon either of the propositions with which the committee had concluded, but he did not choose, himself, to notice more of it now than was pertinent to the matter before him. Mr. W. said he must be permitted to remark, before he proceeded, that he had been wholly unable to feel or discover the necessity for the sombre and alarming picture of danger to our happy form of Government which the committee had thought it their duty to present. He could not feel that the safety or perpetuity of our institutions was peculiarly threatened at the present, more than at any former period of our history. On the contrary, he had supposed he could justly felicitate the Senate and the country upon the fact, which he had expected would have been admitted by all, that our condition was rapidly improving. No man in these seats had forgotten the picture drawn to our imaginations twelve months since; a picture which not only shocked us, but shocked this whole widely-extended country to a degree never before witnessed in the period of his recollection. Then, however, executive patronage was not the danger, but executive usurpation. The sword and the purse of the nation were in one hand, and our liberties were about to be cloven down. The fractured and broken pillars of the constitution were scattered before us, to display the ruin which had been made, and to warn us of the danger which impended. That time and that danger had gone by. A distinct issue was formed and submitted to the sober and intelligent sense of the American people, and their decision had put an end to the agitation. Executive patronage was then a consideration too trifling to have a place in the leading discussions. Some mention of an army of forty thousand office-holders might have been made, but they were incidental and unimportant. Usurpation was the order of the day, and tyranny and despotism were upon us. Mr. W. said he supposed he might congratulate every patriot and lover of his country that this great danger had been passed, and its horrible evils averted, by the single and silent operation of an election; and he had hoped that increased confidence in the safety and durability of our institutions would have followed this gratifying experience. How different was the fact! He now found, in the report of the committee before him, abundant evidence-if the sad imaginings of the committee were facts-that we were much nearer final ruin than at the period to which he had alluded. Now, usurpations by the Executive had ceased to be dangerous, but the great patronage in the hands of the President was fast driving this fine ship of state upon the rocks, and imminently threatening the only free Government in the world with utter and irretrievable ruin. Under this renewed attempt to excite alarm and ap [FEB. 16, 1835. prehension in the minds of the peaceful citizens of the country, he felt it to be his imperative duty to proclaim an entire absence of the threatened dangers. The country was sound, and healthful, and prosperous, and happy, and the patronage of the Executive was not to corrupt its morals, endanger its peace, or destroy its liberties. The mistake of the committee had proceeded from the assumption of premises wholly erroneous, and the consequent deduction of unfounded conclusions. Mr. W. said he would proceed to show this by a partial analysis of their principal fact, and by an exposition of the fallacious conclusions drawn from it. They state that the number of persons dependent upon the Govern ment for support is one hundred thousand and seventynine, and they assume that all such persons are "supple instruments of power." This great number of persons, thus exhibited and thus characterized, was calculated to startle the mind. It had shocked him when he first heard the report read at the Secretary's table. He had heard much said, during the last year, both at home and here, by the opponents of the administration, of the danger to the country from an army of forty thousand office-holders, but his fears had not been excited, and he had never attempted to examine the composition of the corps. When, however, he found the number swelled by the report of the committee to more than one hundred thousand, he felt impelled to inquire who were these hundred thousand men paid by this free Government that they might wield public opinion to its destruction. He had made the inquiry, and to exhibit the results to the Senate and the country, and thus to repel the alarming implication of danger to our institu tions which might otherwise arise from our action upon this bill, was the principal object he had in view upon the present occasion. First, then, he found the whole army, officers, soldiers, waiters, and dependants, included in the list. And are the soldiers of our little army, said Mr. W., to be held up to the country as a body of men wielding its public opinion and directing it to the destruction of our insti tutions? Are they to be pointed at as objects of jealousy and apprehension? Where are they, Mr. President? Almost the whole body of them pushed beyond the line of settlement upon your frontier, and there stationed, the companions of the wild Indian only, to defend your citizens from the tomahawk and scalping knife. Are they, thus located, the body of men who are to bring this happy Government to a speedy termination? No, sir, they will defend it with their lives, but never will endanger it by their influence over public opinion. The officers of the army are also embraced in this class. They, sir, are office-holders, but are they formidable to the country? Are those brave men who bore the arms of the country, during the late war, against the most formidable enemy in the world, and bore them success fully, triumphantly, victoriously, are they to destroy this Government? Are they to be guarded against as "sup ple instruments of power," as "subservient partisans, ready for every service, however base and corrupt?" Mr. President, said Mr. W., they merit not the sentence. Where are they? Shut up in your fortifications and military posts, performing their dull and uninter esting round of official duty, or ordered beyond your frontier and deprived of the benefits of civilized society, to protect their fellow-citizens from rapine and plunder. Thus situated, are they to be held up to us as objects of alarm? Are our jealousies to be directed against them, as the persons likely to work out the full ruin of their country? Sir, the committee have made an egregious mistake as to these brave and patriotic officers. They will not destroy, but defend the Republic. Who has seen them mingling improperly in the political strifes of the day, or attempting unduly to influence public opin ion? Mr. W. said he had never witnessed such an instance of improper conduct in an officer of the army, and he was yet to learn that such instances had been witnessed by others. But another large enumeration of 7 citizens aided to complete this division of the dangerous corps of more than one hundred thousand. All the contractors, workmen, and laborers, upon our public works in the charge of the War Department, such as fortifications, rivers, canals, roads, harbors, and all the other works of a similar description in construction at the expense of the Government, were counted to make up this formidable number of "supple instruments of power." Yes, Mr. President, said Mr. W., the humble carrier of the hod upon one of your batteries, who toils on for his daily allowance of a few shillings, unconscious of his agency, is one of the number of individuals whom the committee suppose material and dangerous agents in the work of ruin to the must free and happy Government upon the earth. Each laborer of this description is held to be a "supple instrument of power," a subservient partisan, "ready for every service, however base and corrupt." Sir, tell this to the great body of the yeomanry of this country, and what will they say of this danger? They will smile at the credulity of the comEmittee, and say they are mistaken in their apprehensions. This closes the first class of the great catalogue, consisting of sixteen thousand seven hundred and twentytwo individuals. | [SENATE. eight thousand eight hundred and thirty-six in number. This class, Mr. W. said, surprised him much more than the former. The departing shades of the revolutionary army were presented to us as about to become the instruments in the destruction of our liberties. Those venerable men, whose earliest, and greatest, and richest efforts had been devoted to the erection of this beautiful and noble temple of civil liberty, were now, for the | pitiful compensation of $8 per month, to become the "supple instruments of power," to use their efforts to overthrow the fabric cemented with their youthful blood, and to draw its mighty ruins down upon their own heads at the last moment of their earthly existence. Would it be believed that this remnant of a noble race had been thus corrupted by such a bounty? No, said Mr. W., they deserve not such a judgment at our hands. But, instruments of the Executive! How? What has the Executive to do with the payment of pensioners? They derive their claims from the acts of Congress, not from the will and pleasure of the Executive; and if they make the proof requisite, the right is perfect. The President can neither place them upon the roll without the proof, nor debar them from it when the proof is made. His only interference with the subject is his approbation of the laws, as he approves other laws passed by Congress. As well, therefore, might all the private claimants, for whose benefit laws have been passed, be hunted from the statute books and added to the list of "supple instruments of power," as these venerable pensioners of the Revolution. | 2d. Mr. W. said he found the whole navy, including the marine corps, and comprehending altogether eight thousand seven hundred and eighty-four individuals. 4th. Mr. W. said he now came to a class of officeHere, again, was a class of men whom he had not holders and "supple instruments of power," not less exbeen taught to consider "supple instruments of pow-traordinary than any of the former. It consisted of all er," "subservient partisans, ready for every service, the deputy postmasters throughout the country, all the however base and corrupt.' Sir, said he, are the gallant | mail contractors, mail carriers, stage drivers, and all tars who bear the flag of our country proudly and tri- others employed in the transportation of the mail of the umphantly upon every sea, and to every corner of the United States. The number was given in the report at globe, the mere ، supple instruments of power?" Are thirty-one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven inthe brave and fearless officers who command them "sub-dividuals. Here was a class of men, with several of whom servient partisans, ready for every service, however base every citizen of the country must be personally acquaintand corrupt Is such the character of the officers of ed. He appealed, then, fearlessly and confidently, to the the American navy, and are they, at this moment, to be people of the country, for the degree of danger to thus characterized to the American people, and to the public liberty to be apprehended from this class of world? Not, said Mr. W., by me. They deserve not dependants upon the public patronage. Who did not the character, in my judgment, and they shall not receive know that the postmasters and mail contractors of the it with my assent. Does any man believe, do the honor- country were of all parties in politics, and of every able committee believe, that, in consequence of the description of sentiment and feeling as to men and measmoderate compensation which these brave and high- ures? Who, in these seats, did not know that the great minded and patriotic citizens receive for the devotion of mass of them were men of respectability, integrity, and their lives to the public service, they are prostituted to faithfulness, and worthy of the trusts confided to them? the executive will, and ready to do his bidding, to the Who, heretofore, had feared the influence of these men injury and destruction of the liberties of their country? upon the public opinion of the electors of the country? Do they believe that no higher and purer motive than Who, until this day, had imagined that the driver of a subserviency to executive power has led them on to the mail coach would injuriously influence the opinions of noble achievements they have accomplished?1f such be the passengers who might chance to ride in his carriage? the opinions of the committee, they do the officers and In this great mass of individuals there might be men unseamen of our gallant navy great injustice. It is against worthy of trust: it would be strange if it were not so; the enemies of their country, not against their country, but did any man ever dream that they were so numerous that they war, and war successfully; and long, long, will as to endanger our Government, or that the merry holder the liberties of our happy Republic be preserved, if they of the reins and whip of the vehicle which transports the are only to meet their destruction from the hands of the mail over our public highways, was a "supple instrument American navy. But, sir, this class is not wholly com- of power," a subservient partisan, "ready for every serposed of the officers, and sailors, and soldiers, attached vice, however base and corrupt, " because his monthly to the navy and marine corps. Every person employed wages were paid to him by a mail contractor? Did any in and about your navy yards and ship yards is included man ever permit himself to believe that the elections of in the enumeration. The humble individual who rolls the States were controlled by such men? No, said Mr. the wheelbarrow and handle the cart, or drives the oxen, W., the idea is mistaken; and the honorable committee at these places, is magnified into a man dangerous to our have yielded themselves to fears which have no foundaliberties, holding a fearful control over public opinion, a tion, and to prophecies of evil which will not be real"supple instrument of power," "ready for any service, however base and corrupt.” Such dangers, said Mr. W., will never destroy this Republic. | ized. He had then disposed of a very large proportion of this fearful array of more than one hundred thousand 3d. The whole roll of revolutionary pensioners, thirty-persons, dependent upon and receiving money from the So far, Mr. W. said, he thought the intelligent citizens of this country would be able to estimate the dangers to be apprehended from this alarming number of Government dependants with great accuracy; to value the benefits to themselves individually, and to the safety of the country and its institutions; to appreciate the tribute of justice rendered to those who had first broken the yoke of despotism, and given us the liberty we enjoy, and to weigh the objections against, and the reasons for, a continuance of the laws which had created these respective classes of officers, agents, and dependants. The table appended to the report of the committee, and from which he had derived the preceding classifications, showed that 4,508 of this fearful array of 100,687 office-holders and dependants upon executive patronage remained to be accounted for. And here he found it necessary to notice an error in the addition of the table, by which the total number of persons intended to be exhibited, was less by 608 than the true number. Two items had been accidentally omitted, to wit: 119 persons employed in the Department of War in this city, and 489 pensioners upon the navy pension fund; so that the aggregate presented by the committee, was 100,079, while the number in fact, as shown by their own table, was 100,687. Who, then, composed the remaining 4,508 of these dangerous men, and "supple instruments of power?" [FEB. 16, 1835. description of officers towards whom the public attention had been particularly directed for the last year, as using their official situations to influence the electors of their respective districts. The officers of the customs and of the land offices have been broadly accused of these practices. Of the latter he knew nothing, but many of the former he knew personally and intimately. Every Senator must know personally a greater or less number of the officers of the customs, for every one must reside within some collection district. He called upon all, then, to state their knowledge of the malpractices of these officers, if such practices were known. For himself he should feel bound, as a sacred duty to his country, to present any such officer, if he was satisfied his conduct was unworthy of his trust; much more if it was calculated to corrupt the public morals, trammel the freedom of opinion of the electors, or endanger the liberties of the country. Would any Senator fail to pursue this course? Surely not. Still we had heard no such presentments from any quarter of the country; and ought not this single fact to be taken as strong evidence that these sweeping denunciations of a party press, and of partisan politicians, were unmerited by the officers against whom they were directed? Ought it not to be satisfactory evidence that our liberties are not endanger. ed by these officers, so necessary and indispensable to the security of the revenue of the country? If this whole class of officers had become the "supple instruments of power," "subservient partisans, ready for every service, however base and corrupt," would not some Senator be able to name a single instance from the whole country? to present a single example to the public eye? Mr. W. said he could not feel alarm for the safety of the country while no single officer of the whole corps could be designated as guilty of the suppleness and subserviency which the committee seem to apprehend. So much for the persons employed in and connected with the Treasury Department. In the Department of War, one hundred and nineteen persons are employed, as shown by the table. This number, Mr. W. said, he supposed to include the topographical bureau and the engineer corps, and he would inquire whether the principles and policy of this adminThere appeared to be employed in the State Depart-istration were such as to authorize the belief that an exment in this city, and connected with and deriving tension of the influence of this corps to the local and their appointments from and through that Department, private interests of the citizens was intended? Had not 456 persons. This number, Mr. W. said, he understood both, in the discouragements of works of internal imto include the Department itself, all our foreign minis-provement of a local character, a direct and powerful ters, diplomatic agents, consuls, and cfficers abroad of tendency to circumscribe the power and influence of every description, and all the members of the federal these engineers, and to debar them from an interference Judiciary, district attorneys, marshals, and all other with the local inertests of the States? Such would seem officers connected with the courts. He surely need not to him to be the fair and just conclusion. Of the dansay that the persons employed in an office here could ger to be apprehended from the influence upon public have little influence over the public opinion of the voters opinion to be exerted by persons in the employ of the of the States, the individuals themselves not being en- War Department in this city, he had nothing to add to titled to a vote upon any national question, and their his remarks in relation to persons similarly employed in locations separating them from contact or associations the Departments of which he had before spoken. with the citizens of the States. Much less could he consider it necessary to say that the officers and agents of the Government abroad were not to be suspected of exercising a dangerous influence over the opinions and wills of their fellow-citizens at home. There only remained, then, of this number, the federal Judiciary, and their district attorneys and marshals, to excite alarm or create apprehension. From the same table furnished by the committee, it would be found that 3,824 persons were employed in connexion with the Treasury Department. This number is understood to include all persons engaged in the collection of the customs, all persons engaged in the survey and sale of the public lands, and in every other branch of the Treasury Department, including the Department itself. Here, Mr. W. said, he met with a The same table showed twenty-nine persons in the employ of the Navy Department, and eighty persons in the employ of the General Post Office, in this District. They are principally humble clerks, at very moderate salaries, and, he doubted not, respectable and industrious men, faithfully earning the money paid to them; and if the liberties of this country remained until destroyed by them, he must be permitted to express an entire confidence that alarm now was ill timed and uncalled for. This, Mr. W. said, cloed the fearful catalogue of office-holders and dependants, which had given to the reports its sad and boding aspect, and, thus analyzed, he hoped the danger, impending or in prospect, would appear less to the good and peaceable citizens of the country than it had to the honorable committee. The whole might be summed up as follows: FEB. 16, 1835.] The four classes first mentioned, to wit: the The persons employed in and connected with The persons employed in and connected with the General Post Office, Executive Patronage. 456 3,824 119 [SENATE. Mr. W. said he referred to the assumption found in the report, that offices are bestowed" as rewards for partisan service, without respect to merit." This broad charge appears upon the face of this paper wholly unsupported by proof, or by an attempt at proof, against 96,179 whom? Against a Chief Magistrate elected by the people; and, after an exercise of the appointing power for the term of four years, again re-elected by a much stronger expression of the public approbation than that which first elected him to the presidency. How, then, does this assumption comport with the respect we owe to the popular will? To the judgment and intelligence of those we represent here? To the free and intelligent people of this free country? But how, said Mr. W., are these office-holders selected by the Chief Magistrate? Upon the petitions and recommendations of the people themselves; upon certificates of character, respectability, and worth, made by those who are the neighbors and friends of the candidate, and know him personally and intimately; and most usually upon thefrecommendation of the representatives here of the person appointed. Are we then to assume that offices are "bestowed as rewards for partisan services, without respect to merit?" The people ask, the representative recommends, and the office is conferred, and who shall say that it is done "without respect to merit?" Surely this committee will not be sustained in making the assertion by that people whose will is followed in the appointments made, when the assertion rests upon itself alone, without an effort to support it by evidence. It is, Mr. President, said Mr. W., another of those mistakes into which the gloomy imaginations of the committee seem too frequently to have led them. These assumptions, as erroneous as they are unfounded, in his judgment appeared to him to constitute the reasons offered by the committee for the presentation of the bill now before the Senate. The abuses existing in the minds of the committee were those which had been examined, and the bill purported to provide for their correction for the future. 29 80 Making the aggregate before given of - 100,687 Let these hundred thousand individuals stand before the intelligent people of our country in their true character, and let them say how far they are likely to undermine and destroy their liberties. For himself, Mr. W. said, he could feel no apprehension. He believed them, as a mass, an honor, and not a danger to the country; and so he thought they were, and would continue to be, viewed by the people. Here he would leave this most alarming assumption of the committee, and proceed to examine another, not less erroneous. The committee assume, without attempting to prove, that those hundred thousand office-holders and dependants can influence and direct the will of the American people; can control their action at the polls, and dictate the results of their free elections. Mr. President, said Mr. W., this is an assumption as violent as it is unfounded, and does great injustice to the inflexible integrity of our intelligent yeomanry. They, sir, controlled in the exercise of that right which they consider above all price, the right of giving a vote for the man who is to rule over them, by office-holders, by soldiers, sailors, laborers in the employ of the Government, mail contractors, mail carriers, and coach drivers, or by pensioners! No, sir, never. The idea does injustice to their integrity and intelligence. They are controlled by no.earthly power in their exercise of that dearest right of a freeman; and the supposition that they are, is, to use the mildest term, a mistake of the committee of a glaring character. The thirteen millions of free people of this country controlled in their elections by a few thousand office-holders and dependants upon the Government! By a few of their own servants! No, sir. The American people are not thus "supple" and "subservient," whatever may be the character of those who receive their favors and bounty. But is it fair to presume, from any known facts, that those holding office and patronage are inclined to influence the people for evil to the country? Mr. W. said be knew of no evidence to warrant such an assumption. That, among the great numbers holding office, bad men might be found, was more than probable; but he believed the exceptions would be so few, if the whole number were taken into the account, as to prove that good men generally hold the offices of trust, rather than to impeach the body of office-holders. This brought him to notice a third assumption of the committee, not less unfounded, in his judgment, and more violent and unjust, than either of the former. What, then, was the remedy proposed? A law of 1820 had limited the terms of a large class of officers therein named to four years, and had thus compelled those officers, once in that term, to pass in review before the President and Senate, when their characters and conduct, official and private, would of course be inquired into and examined, and when the state of their accounts with the Government would be ascertained. This law, too, was calculated to secure the cardinal republican principle of rotation in office, by causing periodical expirations of official terms, when those who had enjoyed a reasonable share of official patronage might give place to other citizens equally deserving, without resorting to the unpleasant alternative of a removal. The first section of the bill reported by the committee, and now under consideration, proposes to repeal this law of 1820, and, by doing so, to make these offices perpetual or dependent alone upon the pleasure of the President. The latter would be the consequence, were it not that the third section of the bill virtually imposes restrictions upon the power of the President to remove from office; and, taken in connexion with the second section, would seem fairly to imply a design that the President shall remove for one cause alone-that of a defalcation in paying over or accounting for public moneys. If this be the tendency of this bill, and this, Mr. W. said, was his understanding, then its effect will be to give to the country district attorneys, marshals, collectors of the customs, naval officers, surveyors of the customs, navy agents, receivers of public moneys for lands, registers of the land offices, surveyors of the public lands, paymasters of the army, and commissaries general of purchases, for life, instead of the short term of four years; and nothing can remove the officer but his |