explosions in their neighborhood. The Coalition also states that the University has a "strong disregard for the well-being of its neighbors" and that the Coalition must therefore insure that all laws concerning the installation of the facility are enforced.

The Coalition states that it is possible that the calculations used to demonstrate that the facility will meet the operating and efficiency standards of the Commission's regulations3 were not based on operating history and reflect data which were designed primarily to achieve the desired answers. The Coalition also alleges that the assumed steam requirements for the University are possibly based on anticipated loads from buildings not yet constructed. The Coalition requests that Georgetown be required to provide additional data (fuel consumption and operating data for the last three years, projected steam demand for the facility, and details on each of the University's projected loads and any alternative sources of steam on campus) to support the application. The Coalition requests that the application for certification of the facility be held in abeyance until the data are provided.

On November 16, 1990, Dr. Thomas Stauffer filed a motion to intervene on behalf of himself and the Cloisters in Georgetown Homeowners' Association (collectively "Dr. Stauffer"). Dr. Stauffer contests the application. Dr. Stauffer alleges inconsistencies between data in the application and data presented elsewhere. Dr. Stauffer alleges that the University has indicated elsewhere that its steam needs are less than described in Georgetown's application and that, therefore, Georgetown has not demonstrated that it has met the operating and efficiency standards of the Commission's regulations. Dr. Stauffer also alleges that existing and proposed business relationships between the PEPCO and Dominion Energy's affiliate, Virginia Electric Power Company (VEPCO), must be investigated to ensure against self-dealing.

On November 26, 1990, the Maryland People's Counsel (Maryland People's Counsel) filed an untimely motion to intervene, requesting party status but raising no substantive issues.

On December 3, 1990, Georgetown filed an answer in opposition to the motions to intervene. Specifically, Georgetown opposes intervention by both the Coalition and Dr. Stauffer. Georgetown also states that neither provides any factual or legal basis for its position. Moreover, Georgetown believes that both interventions are too vague to permit a response.

3 18 C.F.R. § 292.205 (1990).

4 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (1990).

On December 13, 1990, the Coalition filed a "supplement" to its protest and motion to intervene in which it responds to Georgetown's December 3, 1990 filing.

On December 28, 1990, the University filed an untimely motion to intervene. The University states that its motion to intervene was untimely because it did not foresee the need to intervene until it saw the motions to intervene filed by the Coalition and Dr. Stauffer, which it states are in part based on generalized complaints against the University. The University supports Georgetown's application. The University states that under the contract between Georgetown and the University, the University will be obligated to obtain all its steam needs from the proposed facility when it is operating. The University further states that development and construction of the facility is critical to the University's obtaining a modern, reliable source of steam for its growing needs. Finally, the University states that it has reviewed the application and that the data submitted with the application regarding the University's steam needs are accurate.

Discussion

Under Rule 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, the timely, unopposed motions to intervene serve to make the D.C. People's Counsel and PEPCO parties to this proceeding. Notwithstanding Georgetown's opposition to the Coalition's and Dr. Stauffer's interventions, we find that good cause exists to grant their motions. We are satisfied that both the Coalition and Dr. Stauffer have expressed an interest in the outcome of this proceeding that is not represented by another party and that their participation may be in the public interest. Accordingly, we shall grant their motions to intervene. Furthermore, we find that good cause exists to grant the Maryland People's Counsel's and the University's untimely, unopposed interventions, given the interests they represent, the early stage of this proceeding, and the absence of any undue prejudice or delay.

We will reject the Coalition's December 13, 1990 filing. Our regulations do not permit an answer to an answer.5

As a preliminary matter, we believe that it is necessary, in view of some of the comments and arguments raised, to summarize the Commission's qualifying certification (QF) process before addressing the merits of Georgetown's application. First, the Commission, in acting on an application for certification of qualifying status, essentially renders a declaratory order.

5 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2) (1990).

That is, the Commission determines, based on the information in the application and pleadings, whether or not a facility, as described in the application, meets or does not meet the statutory and regulatory requirements for qualifying status set forth in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) and our implementing regulations." Second, the scope of the proceeding is rather narrow; the purpose of the proceeding is to determine whether the facility meets the requirements established by the Commission respecting fuel efficiency, and if it is owned by a person not primarily engaged in the generation or sale of electric power (other than electric power solely from cogeneration facilities or small power production facilities). Third, the critical date, for purposes of QF certification, is the date the facility first produces electrical energy; at that moment, the factual representations in the application must be satisfied if the Commission's order granting certification is to be meaningful.8

The operating and efficiency standards for a qualifying cogeneration facility are set forth in section 292.205 of the Commission's regulations. For a topping-cycle cogeneration facility, the useful thermal energy output of the facility must be no less than 5 percent of the total energy output.' 10 For a topping-cycle cogeneration facility for which any of the energy input is natural gas or oil, and the installation of which began on or after March 31, 1980, as proposed here, the useful power output of the facility plus one-half the useful thermal energy output during any calendar year period must be no less than 42.5 percent of the total energy input of natural gas and oil or, if the thermal output is less than 15 percent of the total energy output of the facility, be no less than 45 percent of the total energy input of natural gas and oil to the facility. Based on the data provided in Georgetown's application, Georgetown's proposed facility will exceed these requirements. The intervenors opposing the application do not challenge the calculations. The intervenors opposing the application instead attempt to cast doubt on the validity of the data underlying the calculations. However, the intervenors, as explained below, have not persuaded us that the data submitted by Georgetown are not valid.

11

The ownership criteria are set forth in section 292.206 of the Commission's regulations.12

6 See CMS Midland, Inc., 50 FERC ¶ 61,098, at pp. 61,277-78 (1990), reh'g pending.

7 Id. 8 Id.

918 C.F.R. § 292.205 (1990).

10 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(1) (1990).

"A cogeneration facility or small power production facility may not be owned by a person primarily engaged in the generation or sale of electric power (other than electric power solely from cogeneration facilities or small power production facilities)." For purposes of the rule, a cogeneration or small power production facility "shall be considered to be owned by a person primarily engaged in the generation or sale of electric power, if more than 50 percent of the equity interest in the facility is held by an electric utility or utilities, or by an electric utility holding company, or companies, or any combination thereof."

13

Georgetown has not specifically identified the entities that will hold an ownership interest in the facility when it first produces electric energy or their respective ownership interests. However, Georgetown has stated, in effect, that not more than 50 percent of the equity interest in the facility will at that time be held by electric utilities, electric utility holding companies or any combination thereof. Accordingly, our finding that the facility will satisfy the requirements of section 292.206 of our regulations, as interpreted in our prior cases, is specifically based on this understanding.

14

Based on the information provided by Georgetown and the Commission's analysis of that information, if the proposed facility is as described in the application, the proposed facility will meet, as of the date the facility first produces electric energy, the requirements regarding both ownership criteria and operating and efficiency standards for certification as a qualifying cogeneration facility under section 292.203(b) of the Commission's regulations. The Commission will therefore grant Georgetown's application for certification as a qualifying cogeneration facility.

Nothing raised by the intervenors changes our conclusion that Georgetown's facility will meet the ownership and technical requirements for certification on the critical date. As we found above, Georgetown's application indicates that the proposed facility will satisfy the criteria for a qualifying cogeneration facility.

Dr. Stauffer alleges that there are inconsistencies between the data reported by Georgetown in the instant application and data presented elsewhere. Dr. Stauffer does not provide specifics, not even a statement as to what

11 18 C.F.R. § § 292.205(a)(2)(i)(A) and (B) (1990).

12 18 C.F.R. § 292.206 (1990).

13 See n.1, supra.

14 See generally, CMS Midland, Inc., 38 FERC 61,244 (1987).

Dr. Stauffer also questions whether the proposed facility will satisfy the Commission's operating and efficiency standards. Dr. Stauffer alleges that the University has indicated elsewhere that its steam requirements are less than those specified in the application. Again Dr. Stauffer does not provide specifics; his comments amount to mere allegations that something may not be right with Georgetown's numbers. Moreover, Georgetown states that it is aware that the University has made statements concerning its steam demand based on average hourly steam demand for a one-year period, and then notes the application reflects steam demand based only on the hours during which the facility will operate. Georgetown also states that the University intends to install additional absorption cooling capacity, which will result in higher steam demand. Moreover, the University itself states that the application accurately reflects its steam needs. Our analysis of the application, Dr. Stauffer's intervention, Georgetown's answer to that intervention and the University's intervention indicates that the operating and efficiency standards will be satisfied.

Finally, Dr. Stauffer requests that the Commission investigate the business relationships between PEPCO and VEPCO to ensure that there is no self-dealing. 17 The allegations of self-dealing are beyond the scope of this proceeding.18 We note that the price which PEPCO will pay for the electric power from the facility is at a rate approved by the District of Columbia Public Service Commission (D.C. Commission) pursuant to PURPA and the Commission's regulations implementing PURPA 19 In addition, the contract between

15 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(1) (1990).

16 Southern California Edison Company, 27 FERC 61,105, at p. 61,199 (1984); Louisiana Power & Light Company, 24 FERC 61,301, at pp. 61,651-52 (1983).

17 VEPCO is an affiliate of Dominion Energy. See n.1 supra.

18 See 50 FERC at pp. 61,277-78, 61,298.

19 See American REF-FUEL Company of Hempstead, 47 FERC 61,161 (1989); Signal Shasta Energy Company, 41 FERC ¶ 61,120 (1987).

20 In the Matter of the Complaint of Georgetown University v. Potomac Electric Power Company, Formal Case No. 888, Order No. 9507 (1990).

Georgetown and PEPCO has been approved by the D.C. Commission.20

The Coalition alleges that the data which Georgetown has used to demonstrate that the facility meets the operating and efficiency standards may be unreliable and requests that Georgetown be required to provide certain historical fuel and kilowatt output data as well as projected steam demand data to support the figures in the application. The Coalition asks that the application be held in abeyance until such data are filed and until it has the opportunity to analyze the data. The Coalition has provided no basis for its allegation that the data may be unreliable. Moreover, the University confirms that the data submitted by Georgetown concerning its steam needs are accurate.2 21

Our review of Georgetown's application and the interventions indicates that Georgetown has provided sufficient information on its projected operations in order for the Commission to make a determination that the proposed facility will satisfy the criteria for qualifying cogeneration facilities set forth in section 292.205 of our regulations.22 Moreover, a grant of certification is premised on the facility being owned and operated as described in the application.23 We will therefore deny the Coalition's request to hold the application in abeyance. The Commission orders:

(A) Dr. Stauffer's, the Coalition's, the Maryland People's Counsel's and the University's motions to intervene are hereby granted.

(B) The Coalition's request that the application be held in abeyance is hereby denied.

(C) The application for certification of qualifying status filed on October 2, 1990 by Georgetown Cogeneration, L.P., pursuant to section 292.207 of the Commission's regulations and section 3(18)(B) of the Federal Power Act, as amended by section 201 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, is hereby granted, provided the facility operates in the manner described in the application.24

21 As to the Coalition's request for historical data, we assume that the Coalition wishes to see data relating to some existing equipment on the University campus, since there is no data for a facility which is not scheduled to be in service until 1992. The data relating to other equipment is not relevant to a determination of whether the proposed facility meets the requirements established by the Commission respecting fuel efficiency.

22 18 C.F.R. § 292.205 (1990).

23 50 FERC at p. 61,277.

24 Certification as a qualifying facility serves only to establish eligibility for benefits provided by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, as implemented by the Commission's regulations, 18

ity to deliver gas to UTOS and Stingray. In American Central Gas Pipeline Corporation, et al., 40 FERC ¶ 61,098 (1987), as amended, 42 FERC 61,395 (1988), 46 FERC 61,425 (1989), and 50 FERC ¶ 61,422 (1990), TXG states that we authorized it to make sales for resale in interstate commerce of all NGPA categories of gas to any purchaser "including interstate pipelines . . . holding capacity on the UTOS and Stingray systems." Thus, TXG conIcludes that it is irrelevant whether UTOS or Stingray were open-access pipelines at the time the January 19 and April 7 orders were issued.5

TXG maintains that limiting HIOS' authority to deliver gas "preclude[s] TXG from making sales for resale which the Commission had authorized at the UTOS and Stingray delivery points." TXG states that its "sales would require no transportation capacity on behalf of TXG, firm or otherwise, on [UTOS' or Stingray's] systems," since its sales are delivery point sales.

Discussion

We conclude that TXG has shown good cause to permit its late intervention. Accordingly, we will grant TXG's untimely motion to intervene.

The issue raised in this proceeding is moot. The case-specific certificate was for a limited term that expired when HIOS accepted its blanket certificate. HIOS has accepted a blanket certificate. Under its blanket certificate, HIOS can now transport gas to delivery points with UTOS and Stingray for TXG. Accordingly, we will dismiss TXG's request as moot.

The Commission orders:

(A) TXG's untimely motion to intervene is granted.

(B) TXG's request for reconsideration is dismissed as moot.

Introduction

This proceeding originally involved the resolution of protests filed by Colorado Interstate Gas Company (CIG) pursuant to Order Nos. 473 and 473-A,1 against the claims of two producers, Martin Exploration Management Company (Martin) and Texaco, Inc (Texaco), for production-related delivery allowances established in the Order No. 94 series2 under section 110 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) and codified at 18 C.F.R. § 1104(c). On October 3, 1989, the presiding judge issued an Initial Decision granting summary judgment in favor

4 TXG also alleges, incorrectly, that on appeal the Commission eliminated the condition limiting the term of the certificate authorizing HIOS to transport for TXG. The Commission did not eliminate this condition.

5UTOS and Stingray now have blanket transportation certificates under Order No. 509.

1 Compression Allowances and Protest Procedures Under NGPA Section 110, Order No. 473, FERC Statutes and Regulations ¶ 30,747 (1987); Order No. 473-A, FERC Statutes and Regulations ¶30,788 (1987).

2 Regulations Implementing section 110 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and Establishing Policy Under the Natural Gas Act, Order No. 94,

of the producers. However, on January 11, 1991, CIG withdrew its protest and all other pleadings related to Texaco's claims for production-related costs. The Initial Decision has therefore become moot with respect to the dispute between CIG and Texaco. The Commission in this order affirms in part and reverses in part the Initial Decision dealing with Martin's claims.

Procedural History

This proceeding was set for hearing on April 27, 1989 by order of the chief judge, 47 FERC

FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles 1977-1981 ¶30,178 (1980); Order No. 94-A, FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles 1982-1985 ¶30,419, affirmed in part and remanded. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 769 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1967 (1986). Order Nos. 94-B through 94-G [FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles 1982-1985 ¶30,421, 30,454; Order No. 94-D, 23 FERC 61,279 (1983); FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles 1982-1985 ¶ 30,528, 30,654; Order No. 94-G, 32 FERC ¶ 61,433 (1985)] further amended and clarified Order No. 94-A in response to public comments and requests for rehearing.