in the District of Columbia. I am pleased to submit this Committee's statement as an enclosure to this letter. I also take pleasure in advising you that the Board of Commissioners endorses the statement of the Policy Advisory Committee. As you will note, the Committee advises that certain freeway projects, for which construction is either underway or imminent, should proceed without delay, and that future project plans be reviewed with increased emphasis on the reduction of the impact of such construction on our communities. The Commissioners strongly support actions to reduce such community impact in the District of Columbia, even though the obvious measures that are contemplated by the Committee will undoubtedly result in increased construction costs. The Committee's report confirms the need for additional highway funds, and thus lends fresh support to the need for passage of the revenue bill pending before the Senate District Committee. The Board assures you and the community that such future project plans will be reviewed and presented to the regularly established agencies for their approval in due course. Respectfully, President, Board of Commissioners, D.C. MARCH 31, 1966. STATEMENT OF THE POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CURRENT FREEWAY PLANS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA The Policy Advisory Committee recognizes its responsibility to reach sound and immediate conclusions on this most critical subject. A consultant recently engaged by the Committee concluded that the social and aesthetic impact of freeway construction on urban neighborhoods had not been given sufficient weight in relation to the requirement to accommodate the transportation needs of the Metropolitan Area. His report drew attention to the city's critical housing need. It also reminded us that Washington, as the Nation's Capital, has a special obligation to protect aesthetic values and, with its freeway program so relatively incomplete, a special opportunity to do so. The Committee has again carefully reviewed the freeway program and is of the opinion that certain projects which have been approved and on which construction is either underway or imminent should proceed. Construction of the Center Leg under the Mall and north to New York Avenue should continue. The final plans for the section between Massachusetts Avenue and New York Avenue should be reviewed to insure compatibility with the proposed K Street alternate and to permit flexibility in subsequent decisions pertaining to the North Central Freeway. Construction of the Southeast Freeway and Interchange C to Barney Circle should continue. The final design of additional freeways in the eastern portion of the District must depend on further study, including consideration of connecting with Kenilworth Avenue. Consummation of plans for the construction of the South Leg under the Lincoln Memorial and under the Tidal Basin should also proceed. The final plans should provide for the maximum amount of tunneling permitted by traffic service requirements and fund availability in order to preserve the parks and monumental area through which this freeway must pass. The November 1963 recommendation of the Committee that in the construction of the North Leg "maximum consideration should be given to the concept of tunneling" has resulted in an attractive plan to construct this segment of freeway entirely in a tunnel under K Street, N.W. The Committee will proceed promptly to review this plan and will make further recommendation. It now appears that the Potomac River Freeway from Rock Creek Park along the Georgetown Waterfront should be tunneled to the maximum extent permitted by traffic service requirements and fund availability; however, the final design of this freeway will depend upon further study of the most practical way to connect Route 66 and the Palisades Parkway to downtown Washington. This study will include the possibility of utilizing Jefferson-Davis Highway in this connection. Planning for extensions of the freeway system to provide east-west and northsouth connections through the District should remain flexible. This will permit the utilization of more current statistical data, future modifications in freeway design criteria, and the National Capital Planning Commission's latest land-use plan for the District. In these future plans, even greater emphasis must be placed on the protection of the homes and businesses of the District's citizens. The Committee reiterates its commitment to a balanced transportation plan for the District and the National Capital Area and emphasizes the concomitant necessity of proceeding with all diligence to implement the area's Rapid Transit Plan. The freeway system generally indicated in the scope of this statement can be accommodated in the city of Washington. We are confident that such a system can be developed and constructed to meet transportation requirements with proper consideration of neighborhood values. The National Capital Planning Commission can be expected to protect the community values so essential in a determination of route, size and location. In like manner, the Commission of Fine Arts can be expected to insure the incorporation of proper aesthetic qualities into future freeway construction. The Committee considers it essential that future transportation planning be thoroughly integrated with land-use planning on a metropolitan basis. In this connection, the Committee also notes that the current deadline of October 1, 1972, poses a potential deterrent to full consideration of all metropolitan area planning factors. The Committee feels that adherence to principles enunciated above will result in a freeway system which, when integrated with other components of the transportation network, will provide essential transportation services and also protect neighborhood values that are so important to the community. GEORGE B. HARTZOG, Jr., Director, National Park Service. Chairman, National Capital Planning Commission. Administrator, National Capital Transportation Agency. WILLIAM WALTON, Chairman, Commission of Fine Arts. Federal Highway Administrator. ROBERT C. WEAVER, Director, Office of Metropolitan Development, HUD. Engineer Commissioner, Chairman. COMMITTEE OF 100 ON THE FEDERAL CITY, Re H.R. 12119. Hon. BASIL L. WHITENER, House District Committee, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. WHITENER: By this letter, I would like to present the studied views of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City with respect to H.R. 12119, a bill that would authorize the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to build a third bridge in the area of 14th Street. We respectfully submit that serious consideration to such a proposal is at least ten years premature. We take this position cognizant of the facts that (a) the District Commissioners have recommended this bridge, (b) the National Capital Planning Commission unanimously approved the general concept of such a bridge at its meeting of November 5, 1964, and (c) the proposal undoubtedly is the “least controversial" of pending proposals by the D.C. Highway Department to add 40 new lanes of freeways entering Washington, largely because there would be no immediately discernible displacement of homes, businesses, schools or other urban amenities. In examining the premises of the actions by the District Commissioners and the Planning Commission, however, we find that they were based upon the following: 1. A decision by the Virginia Highway Department to widen Shirley Highway to eight lanes a decision, however, that was premised upon an "all highway" or "auto dominant" transportation system, a premise flatly rejected by Congress in 1960 and 1965. If the Congress is going to accept unilateral action by Virginia as a basis for new highway bridges, it should, at least for the sake of economy, reconsider the wisdom of constructing a rapid transit line to Virginia. 2. A so-called "1985" traffic forecast, prepared by the D.C. Highway Department in 1964 as a basis for an expansion of the proposed system of interstate freeways in Washington. Subsequent studies are in agreement that this "1985" forecast is worthless, and the D.C. Highway Department itself has recently abandoned it. 3. A desire, at least on the part of many Planning Commission members, to appease the Highway Lobby in the hopes that this would reduce their irresponsible clamor and pressures for much more controversial projects, particularly a proposed Three Sisters Bridge. We find none of these reasons to be sound affirmative grounds for the proposed legislation. To the contrary, whether the Congress desires to face up to the issue or not, it should recognize that the construction of new bridges to funnel more traffic into the central city may seriously jeopardize the economic feasibility of the recently-authorized rapid transit system and may destroy, for the foreseeable future, Washington's chance to secure a "balanced transportation system." THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS Twenty-five years ago, a former D.C. Highway Director (Captain Whitehurst) advised the House District Committee that in his judgment it would be a mistake to build any more bridges from Washington to Virginia. His reason: the central city was already overloaded with motor vehicles. Since that time, Congress has authorized and the Commissioners have constructed three new bridges. Of the four bridges in existence in 1941, one (Highway) has been retired and the capacity has been increased on the other three by widening (Key), unbalanced lanes (Chain and Memorial) and improved access roads (Key, Chain and Memorial). When ground was broken on the most recent of these bridge improvements (Roosevelt Bridge) in 1960, Engineer Commissioner Welling declared that this was the last bridge to be built between Washington and Virginia. With its completion, the number of peak-hour inbound highway lanes from Virginia to Washington has been increased 100% since 1950-from 8 lanes to 16, which is more than from New Jersey to Manhattan, which has over twice as many peakhour commuters as Washington. In the same 15-year period, from 1950 to 1965, the total number of peak-hour commuters from Virignia to Washington increased by only 37.5%, from 29,900 in 1950 to 41,170 as of 1965. Transit commuting not only failed to increase, but declined; all of the increase was reflected in increased auto traffic. With the opening of each new bridge, the number of bus commuters dipped. Where once over 50% of all peak-hour travel from Virginia to Washington was by bus, this ratio dropped to 28% by 1965. New bridge construction has so outstripped increased travel requirements that Washington today has more unused bridge capacity than ever before in its history. Traffic on Memorial Bridge is at its lowest point in over a decade; Key Bridge and Chain Bridge traffic are both substantially lower than in recent years; Roosevelt Bridge is being used at only one-third of its capacity. THE CLOUDED CRYSTAL BALL Sophisticated transportation planners are today only beginning to realize how grossly inaccurate and misleading have been their previous forecasts of "need" on which existing bridges have been built. Thus, the Mass Transportation Survey of 1959, relying upon a 1958 forecast by Wilbur Smith & Associates, New Haven, Connecticut, recommended a bridge system on the basis of the following projected increases from 1955 to 1965: As of today, all of the bridges have been built which the MTS deemed necessary for a peak-hour inbound flow of about 60,000 commuters, without rapid transit, but 1965 has come and gone with total travel, and traffic in all categories far below the levels previously assumed. It is also recognized that the MTS made a "1980" forecast, which was the basis for its recommendation for bridges at Three Sisters Islands and Arizona Avenue. But, we are so far away from even the "1965" forecast that it seems pointless to be concerned with "1980" as well. Needless to say, however, even the still higher "1980" forecast found no need for a third bridge at 14th Street. CURRENT ESTIMATES OF NEED A singular fact which we would hope would have some weight with your committee is that all published studies of future transportation requirements since the MTS except one are in full agreement that with a balanced transportation system (including rapid transit) there is no present indication of any additional bridge requirements in the next 20 years. And the one exception (by the Highway Department) has been abandoned by its sponsor. That one exception is a pamphlet, issued by the D.C. Highway Department, November 4, 1964, entitled "Supplementary Report on Interstate Route 266: 1985 Traffic Forecast For Central Potomac River Crossings." For an early refutation of this report, see Committee of 100 on the Federal City, "Rush-Hour Commuting From Virginia to Washington," November, 1964. Subsequent analyses by the Clarkeson Engineering Company, Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, Wilbur Smith & Associates and Arthur D. Little, Inc., also confirm the worthlessness of the conclusions of that report, and the D.C. Highway Department has quietly buried its "1985" forecast, although the resulting freeway proposals remain on its drawing boards. The first study was that conducted by the NCTA in 1962 in carrying out its Congressional mandate to review and revise the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey. It found no need for any new Virginia-Washington bridges, at 14th street or at any other location. Initially, the D.C. Highway Department ridiculed the NCTA's forecast as "too low", pointing out that it was related to the year "1977" whereas it felt it should be planning for 1985. It has now been confirmed, however, by two consultants retained by the Highway Department that the NCTA forecast, far from being low, is in fact optimistic. The joint report formally submitted by Wilbur S. Smith & Associates and Alan Voorhees & Associates, Inc., to the D.Č. Highway Department, April 15, 1966, concludes that the NCTA forecast was too high for 1977 and may, indeed, be optimistic for the year 1985! Finally, of course, there is the recent evaluation of the D.C. Highway program by Arthur D. Little, Inc., prepared under the direction of President Johnson. This report, "Transportation Planning in the District of Columbia, 1955 to 1965: A Review and Critique", March 22, 1966, included the following conclusions and recommendations: "Present plans for freeway extensions in the District are based on insufficient data, and on questionable assumptions and forecasting techniques. "Transportation planning has been carried out with inadequate regard for long-range economic and social impact. "The competitive aspects of freeways vs. rapid-transit have been given only cursory treatment in the reports. And, with specific reference to D.C. Highway Department proposals for new radial freeways and bridges, Arthur D. Little, Inc., recommended that the Policy Advisory Committee urge: "The District Government and the Bureau of Public Roads to delay action on all proposals for extending the District's freeway network until the highway plan has been re-examined." The Policy Advisory Committee, which included in its membership both the District Engineer Commissioner and the Federal Highway Administrator, unanimously concurred in the substance of this recommendation, stating: "Planning for extensions of the freeway system to provide east-west and northsouth connections through the District should remain flexible. This will permit the utilization of more current statistical data, future modifications in freeway design criteria, and the National Capital Planning Commission's latest land-use plan for the District." Detailed studies by the Committee of 100 on the Federal City have reached essentially the same conclusions, finding a total absence of any need for more bridge capacity than the present 29 lanes between Washington and Virginia. Three of the most recent of these studies, which include documentation for factual statements in this letter, are attached. They are: 1. "Transportation Recommendations for the 1965-85 Plan," as approved at the annual meeting of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City, November 30, 1965; 2. "The 1965 'Gravity Model' Traffic Forecast of the Mass Transportation Survey: Forecast Vs. Actual Traffic Growth," a report dated Sept. 9, 1965, as revised Feb. 15, 1966; 3. "Forecasting 1985 Transportation Requirements," a report dated Feb. 26, 1966, that includes as an appendix, “Assumptions Employed By Highway Planners To Inflate 1985 Traffic Forecast," which is pertinent to the "1985" forecast recently abandoned by the D.C. Highway Department. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS This letter focuses primarily on the economic and transportation balance considerations posed by the proposal to build a third 14th Street Bridge that, by current planning data, is excessive to future needs. We would be remiss, however, if we did not point to other practical problems that are raised by the proposal. We note that no scale model, diagrams or maps were presented at the hearing to show how two new two-lane roadways from the 14th Street bridges would be integrated into the already complex highway network fronting the Jefferson Memorial in West Potomac Park. Under the pro posal, this area would have to accommodate the junction of at least 36 lanes of highways-12 lanes from the 14th Street bridge added to 8 lanes of the Southwest Freeway, 6 lanes on 14th Street, 6 lanes on the proposed South Leg Freeway, 4 lanes on Maine Avenue, plus other lanes on park roads. One cannot help wonder how this "gateway to our Nation's Capital" would look with such a maze of highways. We would think that Congress, most of all, would want to insist on a visual plan, including a scale model, before giving serious consideration to the present proposal. We should also point out that the contemplated widening of Shirley Highway, without the addition of new bridge capacity, could actually promote achievement of a better balance in Washington's transportation system. The presentlyauthorized southern terminus of the rapid transit system is located at approximately the northern terminus of the Virginia highway widening proposal, offering an ideal place on the south side of the Potomac River for a fringe parking facility for motorists or bus riders to connect to rapid transit for swift movement to their Washington destinations. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS We find ourselves in full concurrence with the opinions, as expressed in several opinions by the Comptroller General and in statements by the members of your committee, that the Board of District Commissioners are without legislative authority to construct bridges within the District of Columbia across the Potomac River. Ever since the District of Columbia became the seat of the Federal government, Congress alone has had jurisdiction formerly exercised by Maryland and Virginia over the Potomac River within the District "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever." Constitution, Article I, Section 8. There has not been a single bridge built across the Potomac River in the 165 years since this cession that has not been built pursuant to special Congressional enactment, whether such bridge has been for vehicles, canal boats, railroads or (most recently) the proposed rapid transit line. As long ago as 1838, when a certain lawyer named Francis Scott Key unsuccessfully sought to enjoin construction of the original Aqueduct Bridge, the Supreme Court recognized that specific authority was required from Congress for bridges crossing any part of the Potomac River within the District of Columbia. City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91. Of the highway bridges presently standing across the Potomac River within the District of Columbia, the old Highway Bridge was authorized by the Act of Feb. 12, 1901, 31 Stat. 767, as amended by joint resolution of Feb. 19, 1906, 34 Stat. 821; Francis Scott Key Bridge was authorized by the Act of May 18, 1916, 39 Stat. 163; Memorial Bridge, by the Act of Feb. 24, 1925, 43 Stat. 974; the new super-structure on Chain Bridge, by the Act of June 23, 1936, 49 Stat. 1863; the two new bridges at 14th Street by the Act of July 16, 1946, 60 Stat. 566, as amended by the Act of July 3, 1958, 72 Stat. 320; Woodrow Wilson Bridge, by |