had no solution,1 for the originators of the law had been able to come to an understanding on its negative side, only on condition that they renounced every attempt at an understanding of its positive side. Nothing, absolutely nothing, was clear and undoubted in the long repealing clause, except that the Missouri restriction should henceforth be " inoperative and void." About this doublepointed thorn was wound into a Gordian knot, a series of insinuating, double-meaning sophisms, half-truths and skillfully concealed contradictions, the disentanglement of which the federal supreme court might undertake, if it wished to bear the responsibility and odium thereof or could not withdraw itself therefrom. But whatever the federal supreme court might decide or not decide, the thorn forced itself deeper and deeper in the flesh of the people south as well as north of Mason and Dixon's line, until it had to be drawn out with an heroic effort, to keep it from reaching the very citadel of life.

1 The grey-haired Benton, whose language had lost nothing of its drastic sturdiness, said of the bill: "Three dogmas now afflict the land: videlicet, squatter sovereignty, non-intervention, and no power in congress to legislate upon slavery in territories. And this bill as serts the whole three, and beautifully illustrates the whole three, by knocking one on the head with the other, and trampling each under foot in its turn. Sir, the bill does deny squatter sovereignty, and it does intervene, and it does legislate upon slavery in territories; and for the proof of that, see the bill; and see it, as the lawyers say, passim; that is to say, here, and there, and everywhere. It is a bill of assumptions and contradictions-assuming what is unfounded, and contradicting what it assumes-and balancing every affirmation by a negation. It is a see-saw bill; but not the innocent see-saw which children play, on a plank stuck through a fence; but the up and down game of politicians, played at the expense of the peace and harmony of the Union, and to the sacrifice of all business in congress. It is an amphibological bill, stuffed with monstrosities, hobbled with contradictions, and Badgered with a proviso." Ib., p. 560.

CHAPTER VII.

THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL.

BILL.

CRITICISM OF THE

The drawing of the slavery question into the bill for the organization of the territory of Nebraska, which was so complete a surprise, was originally intended, as we have seen, to be only a tactical manoeuvre. Douglas wished to avert the injury which threatened the party because of the attitude assumed by the president towards the Softs of New York. The first condition of the success of his plan was, of course, the emphatic co-operation of Pierce. But Pierce's co-operation, he could reckon on with certainty only because his procedure subjected the president to a pressure from which the latter could not escape except at the expense of a rupture with his southern patrons. If this had not been the case, it might easily have happened that Douglas would have been poorly thanked for his labor of love, for at the head of the cabinet stood the man whom the Softs looked upon as their standard bearer. Marcy, of course, could not be greatly edified by the project of the ambitious head of the Young American fraction, and Pierce rightly considered him the strongest pillar of his administration. His advice, therefore, would presumably have been controlling, if he had given it with all his influence, and if the president had really had freedom of choice. The former had to be avoided and Pierce made entirely clear that the latter was not the case, in order, if possible, to prevent a breach with the secretary of state, for Douglas appreciated his importance as

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statesman and party leader sufficiently not to force a breach. The possibility of one did not permit him to waver or delay a moment; but if the president were forced to choose between him and the head of his cabinet, the latter would be obliged formally to take the initiative.

Marcy was not drawn into the conferences which Douglas and his assistants held, on the 21st and 22nd of January, with the president. At the request of the latter, they had, indeed, subsequently gone to the secretary of state to hear his views, but Pierce had already bound himself, as he had formulated the fatal paragraph in whole or in part and copied it in his own hand. Douglas who had taken the paper with him, in order to be fully secure, thought best to confine himself, in dealing with Marcy, to what politeness demanded of him. By accident, he did not meet Marcy at his house, and did not consider a second journey necessary. A resolution which was destined not only to determine the fate of the administration, but on which, perhaps, the whole future of the republic depended, was not communicated to the secretary of state until the moment that it reached the senate in the form of a motion. 1

When it became known what a mischievous piece of work had been done in the White House that Sunday, the Softs of New York, held a consultation at Fenton's house, as to the position they should assume towards the intrigue. Fenton was sent to the president to endeavor to change his views. Instead of listening to rational representations, Pierce was only chagrined that the Softs were dissatisfied although he had remembered them so richly in the distribution of offices. The conversation led to no result. Fenton declared that he could not act contrary to his con

I here follow Wilson's account, which is based on Fenton's communications. Hist. of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, II., pp. 282, 283.

victions, in this question, for the sake of government patronage, and Pierce requested him to think again before he joined the opposition to the administration because of a measure which was evidently based on Democratic principles.

case.

With the secretary of state, Fenton had not much better luck. Marcy, too, declared the "principle" to be democratic, and only considered it questionable whether such an application of the principle was proper in this But he could not conceal his disappointment, and, in the course of the conversation, confessed that he had not been consulted. He said that if Fenton had come to a resolve, it was useless to talk of the matter any more. However, a few days after, he invited some trusted members of congress to his room, to hear their views as to whether, under the circumstances, his remaining in the cabinet was desirable. They expressed themselves in favor of his continuing in it, since, otherwise, the Hards would become sole masters of the field. Marcy remained, and, during the entire struggle over the bill, endeavored to maintain as far as possible the part of a spectator.

If his advisers had not thought merely of the petty, selfish interests of their fraction, but had wished to be understood as meaning that Marcy should endeavor, to the extent of his ability, to keep Young America in check, they were bitterly disappointed. They would have served the interests of the country and those of Marcy himself much better, if they had given him the contrary advice. Whether he would have followed it, we need not inquire, but if he had followed it, it is probable that much evil would have been averted, and certain that his name would have shone with greater brilliancy in the history of the country. If he had been penetrating, courageous, and unselfish enough to subordinate all other considerations to

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this question and to act in accordance with his real conviction, that is if he had withdrawn from the cabinet, giving an unreserved exposition of the grounds of his action, he would have destroyed the network of intrigue. in the very beginning. This would, indeed, have excited a storm, in which the Democratic party might easily have gone to pieces, but the situation would immediately have become so clear that the people would never again have allowed deception and deceit to become the pilots of the ship of state. The catastrophe, which was unavoidable under all circumstances, might have been accelerated, but it would have been less frightful and Marcy would have had the best prospect to be able to play the part which fate had reserved for an unknown lawyer from Illinois. But Marcy had not the penetration and character necessary to use his short hour, when events brought the crown of immortality within the reach of his hand. He and his friends considered it possible and right to enter into an agreement with their convictions and their consciences on the one hand and their obligations and interests as party men on the other.

Pierce, too, firmly cherished, for a long time, the illusion that this piece of jugglery could and would succeed. The Washington Union of the 5th of February, had adopted a declaration of the Detroit Free Press, that the administration was fully and entirely in favor of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and was resolved to look upon it as a test of party fidelity. But, on the 5th of March, the

1 "On the 17th of February, the Albany Argus charged that Mr. Marcy had openly expressed himself against the repeal of the Missouri line. The Atlas tacitly admitted the charge." The New York Hards and Softs, p. 52.

2 "The territorial bill reported by Mr. Douglas is an administration measure. Every true Democrat and every true patriot in congress will vote for it. . . . It erects a platform upon which the Demo