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U.S. SECRET SERVICE-LAW ENFORCEMENT
ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETS
Date Response Prepared.-April 12, 1973
File Control No.-SS-06
File Medium.-Magnetic Tape File
National Security Classification.-None-data considered sensitive
(1) Describe briefly the major categories of data on individuals presently maintained and stored under auspices of the Treasury Department and its agencies and the approximate number of subject individuals covered in each category.
Data on individuals considered by the Department of Justice to be Organized Crime Racketeers or individuals associated with Organized Crime.
Approximately 5,000 names.
(2) Under what statutory and administrative authority was each data bank established and for what purpose? Please supply copies of pertinent federal statutes regulations and memoranda on which this authority is based and by which it is implemented.
Secret Service authority derived from 18 U.S.C. 3056, 3 U.S.C. 202. [Omitted. See Attachments 1 and 2 to Passholder Files above.]
The Secret Service automated this file, which was formerly maintained manually, to facilitate its administration.
(3) Are Treasury Department controls, guidelines, or advice required by or offered to state officials and private individuals who either administer or who utilize this data-gathering program? Please supply copies of pertinent rules or advisory documents as issued by federal and state agencies.
The Secret Service file is used only by the Secret Service in its protective and investigative responsibilities.
(4) For each category and each conglomerate of data, indicate its present state of computerization or other mechanization for access and retrieval as well as for evaluation and analysis.
Data is extracted from a master file provided by the Department of Justice each quarter. Names are loaded onto a Secret Service magnetic disk file for name searching purposes.
(5) Describe plans for further computerization or mechanization in each
(6) In what instances would each system be utilized? By what officials and by what agencies?
See No. 5.
(7) For each new data storage and processing program, please describe: (a) the advantages; and (b) the extent to which it permits correlating, common storage and multi-faceted analysis of data on a scale not hitherto available.
See No. 5.
(8) What specific subject areas concerning an individual's background, personal life, personality and habits are noted in each data program?
Name, address, date and place of birth, alias, and social security number. (9) Has the Treasury Department and it component agencies developed comprehensive guidelines governing maintenance of any or all the various data systems, access to them, review and disclosure of material in them, and distribution of data to other agencies? If so, please supply copies.
Treasury Department Administrative Circular No. 73 (June 27, 1962) provides guidelines to Treasury agencies recomputerization of activities. (10-A) Is the subject individual or his representative notified of the fact that he is in the data bank?
(B) Is he allowed to review the data on record about him; to supplement his file; or to explain or rebut inaccurate material? Please describe the precise limitations on such rights for each restriction.
(11) What aspects of the recorded data are available to other persons? Who, specifically? For what purpose? By what authority?
(12) Is a record maintained of each inspection or use of the individual's record? No.
(13) For each data bank, please indicate how the information is collected, whether it is solicited from the individual, from third persons, or from existing records.
Received from the Department of Justice.
(14) What officials in your agency are responsible for determining the accuracy of information in the data bank? What provisions are made, procedurally, for deleting information found to be inaccurate or inappropriate, either on the initiative of the agency or on motion of the individual?
The Special Agent in Charge of the Special Investigations Division maintains liaison with the Department of Justice for this purpose.
Quarterly replacement of file. Compare to previous quarter tapes made by computer to initiate inactivation or purging of manual index records created from Organized Crime and Rackets file.
(15) What other agencies have access to information or use of information in each data bank?
None, except as stated in No. 11.
(16) What states and federal agencies may utilize the data in your computerized files by coding, interfacing and other devices relating to their own computers? None directly with our computer.
(17) What security devices and procedures are utilized to prevent: (a) unauthorized access to the data file; and (b) improper use of the information? (a) The magnetic tape files and computer generated listings are kept in secured areas that are available only after passing a guard station where unauthorized access is prohibited.
All personnel authorized for access to the system or any products of the system have Top Secret security clearance.
All terininals with access to the system are located in a secured area.
Terminals and terminal operators must pass a programmed identification test before access to the file is permitted.
(b) Administrative and judicial sanctions.
(18) What formal or informal arrangement does the Treasury Department have with congressional committees for the authorizing and reviewing of new data banks and the clearance of new electronic or mechanized record-management techniques?
Discussions with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees at appropriation hearings.
(19-A) Have any data programs or the development of other comprehensive records systems been discussed before other congressional committees by Treasury Department representatives?
None except as indicated in No. 18.
(B) Have any been specifically approved by Congress or congressional committees?
Only to the extent discussed in No. 18.
(C) If so, would you please supply any available testimony, or citations to such hearings?
Hearings Subcommittee on Treasury, Post Office and General Appropriations-House of Representatives
1966-Pages 3, 4, 42, 70, 71, 400, 404, 405, 406, 408, 411, 414, 420, 421, 422,
423, 424, 425, 426, 427.
1967-19, 53, 377, 378, 384, 385, 395, 396, 397, 406, 407.
1968-11, 100, 107, 116, 117, 133, 134.
1969-Pages 22, 731, 732, 739, 740, 749, 751, 752.
1970-450, 464, 465, 479, 480, 487, 488, 494, 495.
1971-894, 895, 896, 897, 899, 927, 930, 931.
1972-239, 244, 245.
Hearings-Subcommittee on Treasury, Post Office and General Appropria
The following attachments accompanied the Secret Service Intelligence Files response.
1. 18 U.S.C. 871
2. The Warren Commission Recommendations concerning Data Processing in the Secret Service
3. Memorandum of February 9, 1965
As noted in the text of the Agency Response above, a number of attachments have been omitted for reasons of economy.
18 U.S.C. 871
THREATS AGAINST PRESIDENT AND SUCCESSORS TO THE PRESIDENCY
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, the President-elect. the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President of the United States, or the Vice President-elect, or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President, President-elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, or Vice President-elect, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) The terms "President-elect" and "Vice President-elect" as used in this section shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the offices of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained from the results of the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2. The phrase "other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President" as used in this section shall mean the person next in the order of succession to act as President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 19 and 20. As amended June 1, 1955, c. 115, section 1, 69 Stat. 80; Oct. 15, 1962, Pub. L. 87-829, section 1, 76 Stat. 956.
THE WARREN COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING DATA PROCESSING IN THE SECRET SERVICE
The report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy states:
In attempting to identify those individuals who might prove a danger to the President, the Secret Service has largely been the passive recipient of threatening communications to the President and reports from other agencies which independently evaluate their information for potential sources of danger. This was the consequence of the Service's lack of an adequate investigative staff, its inability to process large amounts of data, and its failure to provide specific descriptions of the kind of information it sought. (Page 461)
The Commission also made recommendations to the Secret Service requiring broader and more selective criteria to be applied to persons who might represent a danger to the President. They also recommended an extensive expansion of liaison activities of the Secret Service with other agencies regarding intelligence. (Pages 461, 462 and 463)
The Warren Commission Report sets out the following:
Automatic data processing.-Unless the Secret Service is able to deal rapidly and accurately with a growing body of data, the increased information supplied by other agencies will be wasted. PRS must develop the capacity to classify its subjects on a more sophisticated basis than the present geographic breakdown. Its present manual filing system is obsolete; it makes no use of the recent developments in automatic data processing which are widely used in the business world and in other Government offices.
The Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury now recognize this critical need. In the planning document currently under review by the Bureau of the Budget, the Department recommends that it be permitted to hire five qualified persons "to plan and develop a workable and efficient automated file and retrieval system." Also the Department requests the sum of $100,000 to conduct a detailed feasibility study; this money would be used to compensate consultants, to lease standard equipment or to purchase specially designed pilot equipment. On the basis of such a feasibility study, the Department hopes to design a practical system which will fully meet the needs of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service.
The Commission recommends that prompt and favorable consideration be given to this request. The Commission further recommends that the Secret Service coordinate its planning as closely as possible with all of the Federal agencies from which it receives information. The Secret Service should not and does not plan to develop its own intelligence gathering facilities to duplicate the existing facilities of other Federal agencies. In planning its data processing techniques, the Secret Service should attempt to develop a system compatible with those of the agencies from which most of its data will come.*
ATTACHMENT 3 FEBRUARY 9, 1965.
Memorandum to: Mr. James J. Rowley, Chief, U.S. Secret Service. Subject: Advisory Committee to the Secret Service on a System for Automating the Protective Research Section.
Pursuant to Executive Order 11007 of February 26, 1962, I hereby find that the formation and use of the Advisory Committee to the Secret Service on a System for Automating the Protective Research Section are in the public interest in connection with the administration by this Department of Section 3056, title 18, of the United States Code, and I hereby authorize the formation of such advisory committee.
*In evaluating data processing techniques of the Secret Service, the Commission had occasion to become informed, to a limited extent, about the data processing techniques of other Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Commission was struck by the apparent lack of effort, on an interagency basis, to develop coordinated and mutually compatible systems, even where such coordination would not seem incon sistent with the particular purposes of the agency involved. The Commission recognizes that this is a controversial area and that many strongly held views are advanced in resistance to any suggestion that an effort be made to impose any degree of coordination. This matter is obviously beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, but it seems to warrant further study before each agency becomes irrevocably committed to separate action. The Commission, therefore, recommends that the President consider ordering an inquiry into the possibility that coordination might be achieved to a greater extent than seems now to be contemplated, with. out interference with the primary mission of each agency involved. (Pages 464 and 465)
PART XI-TREASURY DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL FILES
The Bureau of Accounts; Customs; Engraving and Printing; Mint; Public Debt; Internal Revenue Service; Office of the Treasurer; and the Secret Service all maintain personnel files. These eight files are similar to one another in most respects. The summary below refers to personnel files generally; individual exceptions are noted.
The Treasury Department's answers regarding personnel files were generally straightforward and to the point. There were no significant omissions.
A. Statutory Authority
Several provisions of the United States Code refer to personnel. recordkeeping, as do Executive Orders. 5 U.S.C. 1302 requires the maintenance by agencies of personnel folders. Express statutory authorization is therefore available.
B. Subject Notification and Review
Individual employees are either notified of their inclusion in the files or are aware of it through having supplied information. The various bureaus allow individuals to review and update files and, indeed, encourage such review. The Bureau of the Public Debt, Chicago office, is an exception in that an individual is not allowed access to his file nor is he allowed to review and update his file.
C. Access by Other Agencies
In general, responses indicated that information is provided to the Civil Service Commission. The Customs Bureau processes agency requests for information on an individual via the manual personnel. file. IRS provides information to "[a]ny and all [agencies] who are fully authorized to do so either by law or by the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury." Such authorized agencies include the Office of Management and Budget, Federal Housing Authorities, state and local taxing authorities, Department of Labor. The authorities cited apply not only to the IRS but to federal agencies generally.