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Even assuming that the CADPIN response does accurately reflect some facts about the TECS system, a reading of it makes clear that it applies more appropriately to pre-TECS operations; the answers provided relate only to the Customs Bureau and not to the network of bureaus participating in TECS. Giving full credence to Mr. Merchant's assurances, material presented in the CADPIN response is cited for each of the subject areas in this summary. However, the major portion of the material in which the subcommittee is interested had to be inferred from information provided in the cover letter to the Treasury Department response. (See Part I above.)
A. Statutory Authority
The CADPIN response cities authorities that have to do specifically with Customs duties. The cover letter was silent as to statutory authority for TECS.
B. Subject Notification and Review
The CADPIN response states that individuals are not allowed access to their files, nor are they permitted to udpate files. Presumably, though, the matter of notification and access for a particular individual would depend upon the segment of the data bank of which his file is a part. For instance, a person included in the Firearms Registration and Transfer Records of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is required to keep his file up to date.
C. Access by Agencies
The CADPIN response states that information about individuals may be made available to Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, apparently at the discretion of Customs agents and inspectors. Information comes to agents and inspectors through CADPIN's 180 remote terminals located in Customs stations.
Given the nature of TECS, as described in the cover letter, the CADPIN response cannot apply to the total TECS system. The reasonable inference is that the extent of access will be governed by the policy of the Treasury Bureau to which an outside agency submits its request for information.
The CADPIN response states that information is not available to others by interfacing. The cover letter, however, reveals that there is a one-way interface with the FBI's National Crime Information Center. TECS has electronic access to NCIC information; NCIC does not have access to the TECS data base.
D. Public Access
The CADPIN response mentions only those to whom information is made available (i.e., law enforcement agencies, as mentioned above); it is silent as to those to whom information is not made available. Thus, the reader must draw his own conclusion as to whether information would be divulged to an outside individual if a request were made. Once again, the reasonable inference to draw with regard to public access to the TECS system is that the extent of access would depend upon the policy of the Bureau to which the individual applied for information.
E. Security Precautions
The CADPIN response discusses the Customs network, noting that remote terminals are identified by code number, and that hard copies of data are destroyed by burning or shredding. However, Customs is only one part of the TECS system. Thus, the CADPÍN response cannot accurately describe security for TECS as a whole. Security for TECS must be determined by the policies of the participating bureaus. F. Sources of Information
The CADPIN response states that information for files is obtained from subject individuals, from third persons, and from existing records, with no further elaboration.
The cover letter is more specific about sources of information. The TECS data base is made up of information from participating bureaus, the Justice Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section files, the Immigration and Naturalization Service Soundex File, and the NCÍC. This last file is directly accessed by TECS by means of an "electronic interface."
TECS appears to provide a comprehensive network of intelligence information. No statutory authority for the system was stated in the response.
To the extent that access to information is provided by participating bureaus, the party whose request for information is granted apparently gains access to a much broader data base than would have been true prior to the inception of TECS. It appears that access is not limited to the information gathered by the bureau to which a request is submitted; rather, information from the files of participating bureaus, NCIC, Justice Department Organized Crime Files, and Immigration and Naturalization Service Files all becomes available to a requesting party.
Security in such a system is extremely difficult to maintain; but is of the highest importance. The description of TECS in the cover letter suggests that security for the system is only as good as that of the participating agency which provides the weakest precautions.
The information provided by the Treasury regarding TECS was not detailed nor did it respond to the specific questions posed by the Subcommittee; vital facts about access, security, and exchange of information have undoubtedly not been disclosed. However, if the TECS organization is as unstructured as the cover letter would lead a reader to believe it is, and if no more constraints exist than are stated, the system presents a grave possibility of abuse of data on individuals. rightly or wrongly included in the files of one or more of the participating bureaus. The subcommittee currently has a detailed inquiry dated November 16, 1973, requesting extensive information about TECS, awaiting a response from the Department of the Treasury.
The Bureau of Customs prepared the following response to the subcommittee's October 15, 1971 request for replies to the standard questionnaire (see inside back cover), on February 8, 1973 and updated it on April 13, 1973. It was received May 8, 1973.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
Department. The Department of the Treasury
Date of Response.—February 8, 1973, Updated April 13, 1973
File Medium.-Magnetic disk
National Security Classification.-Unclassified
Name of File.—ČADPIN (Customs ADP Intelligence Network)
On December 11, 1972, the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) was implemented. TECS uses CADPIN hardware and technical personnel exclusively. TECS will provide for sharing of Treasury enforcement agency investigative indices, and an electronic interface with the National Crime Information Center (NCÍC). NCIC does not have access to the CADPIN or TECS data base.
Question 1.-Describe briefly the major categories of data on individuals presently maintained and stored under auspices of the Treasury Department and its agencies and the approximate number of subject individuals covered in each category.
Answer.-Information contained in the data bank is used to indentify suspect persons and vehicles. The maximum data contained in each of the master records are as follows: Name, Addresses, City, State, Social Security Number, Miscellaneous Identifying Numbers, Citizenship, Race and Sex, Height, Weight, Hair, Eyes, Date of Birth, Driver's License Number, Case Classification, Warrant Type/Warrant Number, Warrant_Date/Warrant Location, Vehicle Style, Vehicle Color, Year, Make, and Model, License Year, State and Number, Plate Type, Vehicle Identification Number, Aliases, Associates, Remarks (Such as arrested 9/11/71 smuggling 10 lbs. marihuana at Brownsville, Texas. May be armed and dangerous).
At present there are a total of approximately 150,000 records of individuals and vehicles in the CADPIN file.
Question 2.-Under what statutory and administrative authority was each data bank established and for what purpose? Please supply copies of pertinent Federal statutes, regulations and memoranda on which this authority is based and by which it is implemented.
Answer. (a) Statutory authority.—This file was established under the broad statutory authority of the Bureau of Customs to prevent the smuggling of narcotics, drugs, and other contraband into the United States, to effect seizures of contraband, and to arrest smugglers. Congress conferred this authority in sections 482, 1461, 1467, 1496, 1581, and 1582 of Title 19 of the United States Code. (b) Administrative authority. The information collected and maintained in the data bank increases the effectiveness and efficiency of Customs operations, and the computerization technique is an essential tool in the performance of the search and seizure authority.
Question 3.-Are Treasury Department controls, guidelines, or advice required by or offered to state officials and private individuals who either administer or who utilize this data-gathering program? Please supply copies of pertinent rules or advisory documents as issued by Federal and state agencies.
Answer.-State officials and private individuals do not utilize or administer Customs data-gathering programs.
Question 4.-For each category and each conglomerate of data, indicate its present state of computerization or other mechanization for access and retrieval as well as for evaluation and analysis.
Answer. The present state of computerization of our data base is set forth in the answer to question 1 above. The data is accessed and retrieved via approximately 180 remote terminals located in Customs stations and controlled by Customs officers. There is no evaluation or analysis of the data in this file performed by the CADPIN computer.
1 The Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) also uses CADPIN hardware for its computerized files. However, there is no interface between CADPIN and the ODALE files.
NOTE.-Effective March 30, 1973, the Bureau of Customs substituted the acronym TECS for CADPIN.
Question 5.-Describe plans for further computerization or mechanization in each program. Answer. No further computerization or mechanization of this file is planned at this time; however, modifications, refinements and horizontal expansion, that is the addition of terminals at other Customs offices and ports, is anticipated. Question 6.-In what instances would each system be utilized? By what officials and by what agencies?
Answer. (a) Instances of utilization.-Lookouts are used to check against traffic crossing the border.
(b) Officials and agencies.-Customs officers use the system to determine if a vehicle or person is of record with U.S. Customs.
Question 7.-For each new data storage and processing program, please describe: (a) the advantages; and (b) the extent to which it permits correlating, common storage and multifaceted analysis of data on a scale not hitherto available.
Answer. (a) The advantages.-The major advantage of the CADPIN system is that record information or lookout data is available within a matter of seconds on a servicewide basis to any querying Customs officer. Previously only individual, regional and in some cases segments of national files were maintained in each individual field office. An additional advantage is the capability to rapidly disseminate to all Customs stations lookouts or other urgent data.
(b) Extent of correlation, common storage, and multifaceted analysis.-This system provides a common storage of Customs lookout and suspect information. It does not involve a correlation or multifaceted analysis of data.
Question 8.-What specific subject areas concerning an individual's background, personal life, personality and habits are noted in each data program?
Answer. There are no notations concerning the individual's background, life, personality or habits in the data bank, except the above items of citizenship, race, aliases, and associates, etc., listed in the answer to question 1.
Question 9.-Has the Treasury Department and its component agencies developed comprehensive guidelines governing maintenance of any or all the various data systems, access to them, review and disclosure of material in them, and distribution of data to other agencies? If so, please supply copies.
Answer. (a) Maintenance.-Yes. See Bureau Circular INT-2-INT dated March 17, 1971, and Bureau Circular ADP-2-OI dated December 3, 1970, copies attached. [ADP-2-OI omitted]
(b) Access.-Yes. See Bureau Circular ADM-3-INT dated October 21, 1972, copy attached.
(c) Review.-There are no written guidelines governing review of material in this data system. However, review for quality control is accomplished on the complete data base every additional 100,000 records. This review tests each record for validity and correctness and is accomplished by supervisory special agents. (d) Disclosure.-Yes. See Bureau Circular ADM-9-OI dated March 9, 1971, and Bureau Circular ADM-3-OI dated February 17, 1971, copies attached. In addition, guidelines defining disclosure procedures are published in section 10 of the CADPIN system Manual, copy attached.
(e) Distribution to other agencies.-See answer to questions 9(d) and 11
Question 10.-(A) Is the subject individual or his representative notified of the fact that he is in the data bank?
(B) Is he allowed to review the data on record about him; to supplement his file; or to explain or rebut inaccurate material? Please describe the precise limitations on such rights for each restriction.
Answer. (A) No, (B) No.
Question 11.-What aspects of the recorded data are available to other persons? Who, specifically? For what purpose? By what authority?
Answer. Recorded data within the system is directly available to Customs agents and inspectors. Customs may check individual referrals and queries for other Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies on a selective basis with a legitimate law enforcement need for it, subject to the restrictions arising from security classification of the data, the application of the third agency rule, or the exigencies of a Customs operation.
Question 12.-Is a record maintained of each inspection or use of the individual record?
Answer.-No. However, a record is maintained of each use of suspect vehicle records for the purpose of purging those records which are no longer of current interest to Customs. As a records management device it is contemplated that a count of every transaction and the date of the last transaction will be added to every CADPİN record.
Question 13.-For each data bank, please indicate how the information is collected, whether it is solicited from the individual, from third persons, or from existing records.
Answer.-Information is collected from all three sources.
Question 14.-What officials in your agency are responsible for determining the accuracy of information in the data bank? What provisions are made, procedurally, for deleting information found to be inaccurate or inappropriate, either on the initiative of the agency or on motion of the individual?
Answer. Customs officers obtaining information are responsible for its accuracy. Information is further evaluated by supervisors and intelligence officers. In addition, records are reviewed each time they are used. Information found to be inaccurate or inappropriate is either corrected or deleted. Periodic quality control reviews of the data base are conducted by supervisory special agents. Question 15.-What other agencies have access to information or use of information in each data bank?
Answer. (a) Access; None. (b) Use; See answer to question 11.
Question 16.-What states and Federal agencies may utilize the data in your computerized files by coding, interfacing and other devices relating to their own computers?
Question 17.-What security devices and procedures are utilized to prevent: (a) unauthorized access to the data file; and (b) improper use of the information? Answer.-(a) Unauthorized access.-The entire terminal network connected to the Customs system is provided through "private circuits." With this direct connection, it is virtually impossible for an unauthorized organization to gain access to the system through normal channels. Each terminal has its own unique identifying code number. Hard copy printouts of data are destroyed by burning or shredding.
(b) Improper use.-Improper use of the information is handled no differently from improper use of information from investigative files generally.
Question 18.-What formal or informal arrangement does the Treasury Department have with congressional committees for the authorizing and reviewing of new data banks and the clearance of new electronic or mechanized record-management techniques?
Answer. New data banks and new electronic or mechanized record-management techniques are provided for in the Bureau of Customs annual budget request submitted to the House Appropriations Subcommittee. Authorization and review is provided by that Subcommittee.
Question 19.-(A) Have any data programs or the development of other comprehensive records systems been discussed before other congressional committees by Treasury Department representatives?
(B) Have any been specifically approved by Congress or congressional committees?
(C) If so, would you please supply any available testimony, or citations to such hearings?
Answer. (A) The Bureau of Customs supplemental budget request for Fiscal Year 1970 contained a specific request for funds to develop an ADP Intelligence Network. The budget requests for Fiscal Years 1971 through 1973 contained similar requests for expansion and/or continuation of the system. This matter was the subject of congressional hearings on the budget requests.
(B) This ADP system was given approval by the House Appropriations Subcommittee by the granting of requested funds in Fiscal Years 1970–1973.
(C) Please see the attached material as it relates to appropriation requests and testimony on the ADP Intelligence Network.
A sample printout is attached.
The following attachments accompanied the Bureau of Customs TECS response:
1. Automatic Cancellation of CADPIN Records Entered by Stations Other than Sector Intelligence Units.
2. Disclosure of Information-Requesting CADPIN Record Information from the Computer Center.
3. Dissemination of Information Concerning Violations of Customs Laws.