duty of the superintendent of the school at Adrian had been made clear in the premises. The reason I have given why claim covered by Voucher 3831 should be allowed applies with equal force to the claim covered by Voucher 3832. The extra expense incurred was in no way due to any failure upon the part of Elliott S. Gray to perform his full duty under the law, and he apparently exercised the best judgment possible under the circumstances. I can see no reason why these claims, if reasonable, under all of the circumstances of the case should not be allowed by the Board of State Auditors.

Yours respectfully,

HORACE M. .OREN,
Attorney General.

School law-Vote to adopt free text-books-Reconsideration of such action may be taken at any subsequent annual meeting.

MARK L. BORLAND, Ribble, Mich. :

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, }

June 22, 1899.

MY DEAR SIR-Your letter of recent date received. You state, that at the last annual meeting of your school district, the district voted to adopt free text books under and pursuant to Act 147 of the Public Acts of 1889. You ask if the district can reconsider its action in this matter. You also ask with reference to the qualifications of those voting on the subject. This act providing for free text-books is found in the general compilation of the School Laws for 1898, Sections 192 to 196 inclusive. Section 2 of this act provides that only those who are qualified to vote upon the question of raising money in said district shall vote upon the proposition. This section also contains the following proviso: "Provided, further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent any district having once adopted or rejected free text-books from taking further action on the same at any subsequent annual meeting." Under this proviso I am of the opinion that the district has ample authority to reconsider the matter at its next annual meeting if it so desires. Section 24 of the general school law defines the qualifications of voters at school meetings. Under this section only those who are citizens of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, and who have property assessed for school taxes and reside in the district, have a right to vote upon the question of raising money. If this question is again voted upon at your next annual meeting only those qualified to vote for the raising of money by tax would have a right to vote upon the question. Yours respectfully,

HORACE M. OREN,
Attorney General.

Liquor bond-Overseer of highways, eligibility of as surety-Supervisor, where he looks up records of mortgages in adjoining counties - Authority to make extra charge for.

LUKE LUGERS, Holland, Mich. :

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
June 23, 1899.

}

MY DEAR SIR-Your letter of 20, inst., received, whereby you submit. for my consideration the following: "Can an overseer of highways go on a liquor bond in any township; is he considered a township officer? Also, could a supervisor charge townships for looking up records of mortgages in adjoining counties?"

Section 1 of article 11 of the constitution of this state provides: "There shall be elected annually on the first Monday of April in every organized township, one supervisor, one township clerk, who shall be ex-officio school inspectors, one commissioner of highways, one township treasurer, one school inspector, not exceeding four constables, and one overseer of highways for each highway district, who shall perform the duties prescribed by law." It is therefore plain that an overseer of highways is a township officer under the constitution of this state, and cannot legally be surety on a liquor bond, under and pursuant to section 8 of act 213, Public Acts of 1887, as amended by act 93, Public Acts of 1895. I am unable to find any provision in the laws of this state that makes it the duty of the supervisor to examine the record of mortgages in adjoining counties, and in the absence of such a provision he would have the same right to examine the records in every county in the state. It does not appear in your letter by what authority these services were performed by the supervisor in question.

If performed in pursuance to a resolution of the township board there would be no question as to the same being a charge against the township for services performed. The matter, therefore, would depend upon the particular circumstances of the case, which are not given in your

letter.

Yours respectfully,

HORACE M. OREN, -
Attorney General.

Board of State Auditors-Duty of, on claim for expense of one King, ordered by the Wayne county superintendents of the poor to convey a dependent child to the State Public School-Law not mandatory upon county agent to perform the work above

mentioned.

BOARD OF STATE AUDITORS, Capitol Lansing:

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, )
June 28, 1899.

GENTLEMEN-Your letter of May 27, received, whereby you submit for my consideration, letter dated May 12, from P. H. Dwyer with attached letter of May 26, from L. C. Storrs; also letter of February 1, from L. C. Storrs, in the matter of the claim of Herschel D. Lane, claim No. 2214,

and certain correspondence relating thereto from F. H. Williams, judge of probate, Allegan county. P. H. Dwyer is secretary of the Wayne county superintendents of the poor, and the question submitted is, whether or not the Board of State Auditors should allow a claim for conveying a child to the State Public School at Coldwater, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 115, Public Acts of 1893, and acts amendatory thereof. This act provides for proceedings before the probate court, and Section 5 of said act provides: "That if, on such examination, the said judge shall find that said child is dependent on the public for support," etc., "he shall enter such finding by a proper order in the journal of the probate court in his office certifying that the child is dependent on the public for support and is entitled to admission to the State Public School at Coldwater, and ordering that it be taken to said school by the superintendents of the poor or by the agent of the Board of Corrections and Charities of the county from which the child is sent."

In the Wayne county case the child in question was turned over to the superintendents of poor, and they engaged a man by the name of King to convey said child to the State Public School at Coldwater, and advanced the necessary funds to cover the expenses incident thereto. The Board of State Auditors refused to allow said claim for the reason that the statute requires a child under such circumstances to be conveyed to the State Public School by the county agent or the superintendents of the poor. It is therefore, necessary to determine whether or not this particular provision of the statute is mandatory or directory, and on this proposition I desire to quote from Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 334, as follows:

"It would seem to be more logical, as well as precise, to say that a statute or statutory provision is directory when the legislature intended that strict compliance with it should be left to the discretion of the party empowered to act under it and the convenience and necessities of the occasion upon which it was to be applied, and did not intend that a failure to exercise the power conferred, or a failure to exact conformity with all the prescribed details in the execution of it, should render the same void; while a mandatory statute or provision would be one which the legislature intended to be strictly complied with, contemplating an exercise of the power conferred in it at all events, and in exact conformity with the prescribed details in the execution of it as a condition of the legality and validity of the same."

Also, on page 335, where the author quotes from Judge Cooley as follows:

"All the provisions of a statute, not on their face merely permissory or discretionary, are intended to be obeyed, or they would not be enacted at all; and therefore they come to the several officers who are to act under them as commands. But the negligence of officers, their mistakes of fact or law, and many other causes, will sometimes prevent a strict obedience, and when the provisions which have been disregarded constitute parts of an important and perhaps complicated system, it becomes of the highest importance to ascertain the effect the failure to obey them shall have on the other proceedings with which they are associated in the law. The form the question most commonly assumes is this: Some official act which the law provides for, and which constitutes one step to be followed by others in reaching a specified result, having failed to be taken, does

the authority to proceed toward the intended result terminate when that particular step has been neglected, or may the proceedings go on to a conclusion, treating the negligence as immaterial? If the proceeding fails at that point, the requirement of the official act which has been neglected is said to be mandatory; but if it may still proceed, the requirement is directory only; that is to say, the law directs that particular act to be performed, but does not imperatively command it as a condition precedent of anything further." Also, page 340: "There are undoubtedly many statutory requisitions intended for the guidance of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them, which do not limit their power or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineffectual. Such generally are regulations designed to secure order, system, and dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which the rights of parties interested cannot be injuriously affected. Provisions of this character are not usually regarded as mandatory, unless accompanied by negative words, importing that the acts required shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated.”

Also, on page 346:

"Irregularities in official action, consisting in the neglect or lack of strict compliance with statutory directions, should not be allowed to vitiate the proceedings taken under a statute, when the objects and ends of the statute have been substantially accomplished, and neither the public nor private persons are injured by the course of proceedings."

These general rules of construction I believe are clearly in accord with the decisions of the supreme court of this State. While the provisions of the statute referred to in this case should be strictly complied with where possible, yet, it does not necessarily follow that some other person under the direction of the county superintendents of poor, or under the direction of a county agent, could not discharge the duties required under the law without in any way invalidating the proceedings or result ing in any injury to the public welfare. I am of the opinion that this provision of the statute is directory; that the services charged for were performed in good faith, and under the direction of the superintedents of the poor of Wayne county, and that unless it should appear to the board that the same are unreasonable, the claim should be audited and paid.

In the matter of the claim of Herschel D. Lane, the facts are somewhat different. As I understand it, Herschel D. Lane is the county agent for Allegan county, and under the statute above referred to, Louise Levant, an infant nine months old, was sent to the public school at Coldwater by order of F. H. Williams, judge of probate. Under the advice and instructions of the judge of probate, Mr. Lane secured a female attendant to accompany him to Coldwater to aid him in caring for said infant, and that part of the bill covering the expenses incurred by engaging said female attendant was disallowed by your board for the reason that it was unnecessary that two persons accompany said child to the State Public School at Coldwater. I think this objection is purely technical; that the expense was incurred in good faith, and was a neces

sary expense, and was incurred with a desire to comply with the law in the best manner possible, and in my opinion the claim should be allowed. Yours respectfully,

HORACE M. OREN,

Attorney General.

Law regulating the care and management of asylums for the insane, and of the inmates therein-Construction of act of 1899, amending Sections 23 and 29.

The

In amending the law relative to the care and management of insane persons, the legislature of 1899 made an amendment providing that insane persons shall become State patients after they have been supported by the county one year. other provisions of the law on this particular subject were not likewise amended, thus leaving the old law stand, thereby causing an inconsistency.

WILLIAM M. EDWARDS, M. D., Medical Superintendent, Kalamazoo, Mich.: MY DEAR SIR-Your letter of 27, inst., received, whereby you call my attention to certain conflicting provisions of an act amending sections 1915 and 1922 of the Compiled Laws of 1897, and requesting my opinion thereon. The act in question is a substitute for house bills No. 213 and No. 324, the same being No. 280 of house file, and house enrolled No. 329. This act amends Sections 23 and 29 of Act No. 135 of the Public Acts of 1885, entitled "An act to amend, revise and consolidate the laws organizing asylums for the insane and regulating the care and management thereof and of the inmates therein." etc.

The law in force on this subject in this State prior to the enactment of the act of 1899 required the counties of this State to pay the expense of caring for indigent insane people sent to the asylums from the respective counties for two years, and after a period of two years, such persons became State charges and were maintained at the asylums at State expense. One of the amendments to Section 23, as indicated by the act of 1899, is to the effect that such patients are to become State charges after their maintenance in the asylums for one year. The original substitute bill contained no such provision. When this bill came up for third reading in the house on May 9, certain amendments were proposed, as found on page 742 of the house journal, as follows:

"Mr. Wayne moved to amend the bill by striking out in line 197 of recited section 23 the word 'two' and inserting the word 'one' in lieu thereof. Also by striking out the word 'two' where it occurs in lines 11 and 13 of recited section 29, and inserting the word 'one' in lieu thereof. Which motion prevailed, two-thirds of all the members present voting therefor."

In this form the bill went to the Senate, and was concurred in, and thereafter was enrolled and sent to the Governor, and signed by him. In Section 23 a provision is made for an order to be entered by the judge of probate, the latter part of which reads as follows: