Bear Lake and Resort townships - Agreement between to maintain a highway betweenSince then said townships have been detached and made a part of Emmet county. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, M. F. GUINON, Prosecuting Attorney, Petoskey, Mich. : } MY DEAR SIR-Your letter of 16, inst., received and considered, relative to agreement between the townships of Bear Lake and Resort, to maintain a highway between such townships. You ask for my opinion as to whether such agreement would still be in force, the townships in question being a part of Charlevoix county at the time said agreement was made, and having since been detached from said county, and annexed to the county of Emmet, and the territory so annexed to Emmet county being divided into townships on different lines, which townships are now known as Resort and Bear Lake. I am inclined to the opinion that your conclusion in the premises is correct, which is to the effect that the agreement formerly existing between the townships of Resort and Bear Lake, is not in force at this time, and that in order for the townships in question to have and maintain the benefits of a division of the highway in question for the purpose of maintaining the same, there must be a new division made in accordance with the provisions of the law pertaining thereto. Yours respectfully, HORACE M. OREN, Soldiers' relief act-County relief bourds, their duties in extending aid to sick, disabled and needy ex-soldiers, sailors and marines. S. F. MASTER, Esq., Prosecuting Attorney, Kalamazoo, Mich. : DEAR SIR-Your letter of 24, inst., received and considered, whereby you submit for my consideration, certain questions relative to: "An act to provide for the relief of sick, disabled and needy ex-soldiers," etc., recently enacted by the Legislature, which questions are as follows: First. "Is this board authorized to pay any attention to soldiers or sailors who are not residents of its respective counties?" Second. "Do these boards have authority to investigate matters and pay bills arising prior to the time of the honorable discharge of such persons?" Third. "Is it contemplated that this board shall afford temporary relief to needy soldiers, etc., who are temporarily within their respective counties, but not residents thereof?" In answer to your first question, I would state that this is a statute that should be liberally construed in furtherance of its beneficent purpose and policy, and any doubts or ambiguities arising upon its terms should be resolved in favor of the intended beneficiaries. The act permits the relief board to extend aid to any ex-soldiers, etc., within the county. No test of residence is prescribed as in the ordinary laws for the relief of dependent persons. Any ex-soldier, sailor or marine within the limits of the county, even though temporarily, who needs help, is entitled to receive it under this act. Replying to your second question, I would state that after a very careful examination of the act, it seems to me that its terms are so specific and clear as to the status of the soldier, etc., who is entitled to receive relief, that there is no room for construction. The title of the act indicates that it is confined to ex-soldiers, and in Section 1, it is limited to soldiers honorably discharged, or who may be honorably discharged prior to July 1, 1899. Moreover, the act seems to be solely prospective in its operation, limited to the period from the approval of the act until July first next. Ex-soldiers, who are sick, disabled or needy during that period are entitled to the relief afforded by the act. I would be glad, if I saw my way clear, to take the view that this act was broader and covered reimbursement for relief afforded prior to the approval of the act, but it would be a dangerous precedent to attempt to extend an act by construction, where its terms so clearly and unequivocally evidence a contrary intent. If such a construction were attempted, questions innumerable would arise as to the practical operation of the act; and an adjudication of claims would be entered upon without the rules and limitations that are ordinarily prescribed by the legislature in similar cases, and which are necessary to properly conserve the interests of the state and of all concerned. The relief boards, in my judgment, cannot go back of the date of honorable discharge, or back of the date this act was approved, in affording the relief which the act provides for. If the legislature had intended anything else, the terms of the act would not have been so unequivocally the other way. I think I have fully covered your third question in the answers already given. Yours respectfully, HORACE M. OREN, Inspectors of election; who shall be—If disqualified, how succeeded-Citizenship papers— Man required to take oath as to, when. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, P. J. LEUWER, Esq., Justice of the Peace, Ludington, Mich. : MY DEAR SIR-In reply to yours of 29, inst., will say that the law provides that the supervisor, two justices of the peace not holding the office of supervisor or township clerk, whose term of office shall first expire, and the township clerk of each township, shall be the inspectors of election; and in case they are not present, and fail to attend, or, if they are disqualified by reason of the fact that they are candidates, then, at the opening of the polls, the electors present may choose by viva voce vote a sufficient number to make up a full board of four inspectors. In other words, if the supervisor, township clerk and two justices of the peace whose terms will first expire, are disqualified from acting as inspectors, or are not present at the opening of the polls on election day, the electors should choose electors to take their places, and act as inspectors. I would consider it perfectly proper to insist upon a man taking an oath as to his citizenship papers, if he did not have them with him and it was a question whether or not he was a citizen. Yours respectfully, HORACE M. OREN, Voting for a "money" tax for highways, and a division of the townships into road districts, and election of overseers of highways. MR. H. A. RACKLIFFE, Benton Harbor, Mich. : ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, } MY DEAR SIR-Your letter of 29, inst., received and considered, relative to voting on the question of a "money tax for highways," and a division of the townships into roads districts, and the election of overseers of highways therefor. I desire to say in answer thereto, that a division of the township into road districts by the township board and commissioner in pursuance of Section 1361, Howell's Annotated Statutes, Volume 3, should not be done in advance of a determination of the question submitted to the voters of the township under Section 1355. Under the old system, the township is divided into road districts, and overseers therefor annually elected, which should be done at your next election, and the overseers so elected should perform the duties of overseer of their respective road districts until such time as the township board and commissioner should make a new division of the township, under and pursuant to Section 1361. Yours respectfully, HORACE M. OREN, Health officer who makes a post mortem examination—Bill for. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, HON. HENRY B. BAKER, Secretary State Board of Health, Lansing, Mich. : MY DEAR SIR-Your letter of recent date, received and considered, whereby you submit for my consideration, the following: "Will you have the kindness to inform me to what officer or officers a bill should be presented by a health officer who makes a post mortem operation and examination, in order to report to a registrar of deaths, as provided in Section 2, Act 217, 1897, wherein it says: 'In case of death without the attendance of a physician, or it shall appear probable that the deceased person came to his death by unlawful or suspicious means, then the registrar shall refer the certificate to the health officer or coroner for immediate investigation and report prior to issuing the permit.'" In answer thereto, I desire to say that the law in question makes no provision with reference to the compensation of the officer who makes post mortem examination, etc. This act applies to townships, cities and villages, and I am of the opinion that the bill for such services should be presented to the township board, in townships, and in a village or city, to the common council, as the health officer performing such services should be compensated in the same manner that he would be compensated for other services pertaining to his office. Yours respectfully, HORACE M. OREN, Townships of Glencoe and Yates disorganized - Office of justice of the peace vacated-Circuit judge, when remove beyond limits of his jurisdiction- Vacates his office. MR. R. H. HOLLISTER, Baldwin, Mich. : ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, MY DEAR SIR-Your letter of recent date, received and considered, whereby you call my attention to an act recently passed by the Legislature to vacate the townships of Glencoe and Yates of Lake county, same being House bill No. 291, and asking whether or not the several justices of the peace in the disorganized townships are to hold office until the expiration of the term to which they were elected. In answer thereto, I desire to say that at the present time there is no township in Lake county known as Glencoe or Yates, the same having been vacated absolutely by the legislature in the act in question, and the territory formerly comprising the township of Glencoe is attached to the township of Newkirk, and that of the township of Yates to the township of Cherry Valley. Section 22, Article VI, of the constitution of this state provides as follows: "Whenever a judge shall remove beyond the limits of the jurisdiction for which he was elected, or a justice of the peace from the township in which he was elected, or by a change in the boundaries of such township shall be placed without the same, they shall be deemed to have vacated their respective offices." In the case of People v. Geddes, 3 Mich., 70, the court held that a justice of the peace who was elected in the township of Madison, Lenawee county, that part of Madison where he resided being detached from the township and added to the city of Adrian, the constitutional provision above cited applied, and that such office of justice of the peace was deemed to have been vacated. I think the rule laid down in this case applies to the one in question, and that the justices of the peace who were elected in the townships of Glencoe and Yates, by reason of the fact that the townships wherein they were elected have been vacated by the legislature would have no authority to act as such officers from and after the passage of the act in question. Yours respectfully, HORACE M. OREN, School law-Person leasing property and stipulating to pay taxes thereon—Qualification of, to vote. HON. JOHN LEIDLEIN, Lansing: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE. } DEAR SIR-You ask if a man, leasing property in a school district and residing thereon, in which lease it is stipulated that he has to pay the taxes assessed against the property, is entitled to vote at the school elections held in the district. Section 24 of the General School Laws of this State (compilation of 1898), with reference to the qualification of voters in school districts, provides as follows: "Every citizen of the age of twenty-one years who has property assessed for school taxes in any school district and who has resided therein three months next preceding any school meeting held in said district, or who has resided three months next preceding such meeting on any territory belonging to such district at the time of holding said meeting, shall be a qualified voter in said meeting upon all questions, and all other citizens who are twenty-one years of age and are the parents or legal guardians of any children included in the school census of the district, and who have for three months as aforesaid, been residents of said district or upon territory belonging thereto at the time of holding any school meeting, shall be entitled to vote on all questions arising in said district which do not directly involve the raising of money by tax." It will be noticed, that the persons qualified to vote at school meetings are divided into two classes: Those who have property assessed for school taxes, and those who are the parents or legal guardians of children of school age. I am of the opinion that the right of a person to vote at any school meeting does not wholly depend, as to the property qualifications, upon the fact that the person pays taxes upon property in the district, but that the point to be determined is whether or not such person has any property liable to assessment for school taxes therein, and not whether he be actually assessed and a tax paid thereon. If a person is otherwise quali fied, and has property, real or personal, liable to assessment for school purposes, such person would be a qualified voter. |