By a curious coincidence, for the second time in our history, a decisive blow was struck by us in a war after peace had actually been declared between. our opponents and ourselves. The first was the battle of New Orleans, which took place January 8, 1815, although the treaty of peace (Ghent) was signed on the preceding December 24th; the second was the capitulation of the city of Manila and the Spanish army defending it. This took place twenty-four hours after the signing of the Protocol providing for the cessation of hostilities between Spain and ourselves. In neither case, of course, did either party know that the war had ended. Whether the Protocol of the 12th of August, the 3d condition of which provided that the United States should hold and occupy the

city and bay of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should determine "the control, disposition and government of the Philippines," superseded or only acted co-ordinately with the capitulation of the next day it is unnecessary to consider. Under either capitulation or Protocol, our obligations were the same toward everybody. Either way the question be decided, the fact remains that we were in "military occupation" of Manila. That is the important point, not how it was that we occupied Manila but that we did occupy it.

Then the situation sharply changed. The United States military and naval forces took possession. The moment that military occupation took place the United States assumed new liabilities. What they are has already been well defined. We went over the authorities sometime ago when we were considering why Dewey had to have help before he could accept the surrender of Manila and its garrison. These new liabilities were the same that Spain had before the surrender.

The obligations that would have attached to us on May 1, 1898, had Dewey then taken Manila and its garrison, are the same obligations that we actually did assume on the 13th of August, 1898.

To sum up these authorities, they all mean that both by the capitulation of Manila on the 13th of August and by the Protocol of the 12th, we were charged by international law and by our own laws to "provide for the administration of justice" there from August 13, 1898, and, by the Hague 2nd Convention, we were bound to "take all steps in (our) power to re-establish and insure, so far as possible, public order and safety" in Manila, or, as Mr. Adams puts it, "by all the efforts in (our) power."

PRESIDENT MCKINLEY'S COURSE INFLEXIBLY FIXED BY LAW

Mr. McKinley's hands were tied, and his course directed, by his oath of office, by the foregoing authorities. The following is sufficient to restate here: Mr. Hannis Taylor, in § 579, says:

"Hostile territory subdued by the armies of the United States does not pass under the dominion either of its constitution or its laws. . . While war continues it is the military duty of the President as Commander-in-chief, to provide for the security of persons and property, and for the administration of justice. (The Grape Shop, 9 Wall. 129.) Such government may be carried on under an entirely new code made by the authority of the Commander-inchief." (Scott v. Bilgerry, 40 Miss. 119.)

Now we have the problem right in front of us. If you had been President of the United States what would, what could you have done if you had had it to do? As President, you would have been charged with protecting the lives and property of every peaceable person in Manila. You would have done it if you could. That was what President McKinley did nothing more. We were getting into strained relations with Aguinaldo's troops, some 20,000 or 30,000 of whom were just outside of our lines surrounding the city, clamoring to get in. Would you have withdrawn any of the troops that we had there with Aguinaldo's men watching for a chance to get by us? No. Nobody would suggest such a thing. We had to do everything in our power to maintain order. We should not have done that if we had withdrawn any of our troops, and so Mr. McKinley simply kept them there.

Soon up came the question of the basis upon which we should settle the war. Almost exactly a third of the entire Spanish Empire, both in extent and in people, was comprised in the Philippines, and I am informed and I believe that Mr. McKinley considered the situation in this way, viz.: “According to the best information now at our disposi

tion, it would appear that the Filipinos are probably not now capable of self-government. Fortunately or not for us, we are the controlling factor in the Philippines. If the inhabitants cannot govern themselves and we withdraw, the chances are that there will be a reign of terror-chaos. That will continue unless stopped by the seizure of the islands by some other nation. If that other nation does step in, it is likely to enslave, practically, the Filipinos and forever condemn them to the same sort of tyranny, misrule, plunder and ignorance as that which they have suffered for three centuries under Spain. A monarchy usually maintains colonies only for what it can get out of them-for what it can milk them.

"If we are to gauge the future fate of the prospective Filipino colonist by his experience under Spain, the difference between chaos and a colony is not very great.

66

There seems to be no course but one of these, chaos or colony, that is open to the Filipino (unless he can govern himself), if we fail to take hold of him. If we stay where we are, there will be no chaos-there will be no colony on the usual European basis of plunder, poverty, ignorance and