(a) if the cause of action accrues on or after May 14, 1947-may be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued;

(b) if the cause of action accrued prior to May 14, 1947-may be commenced within whichever of the following periods is the shorter: (1) two years after the cause of action accrued, or (2) the period prescribed by the applicable State statute of limitations; and, except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within the shorter of such two periods;

(c) if the cause of action accrued prior to May 14, 1947, the action shall not be barred by paragraph (b) of this section if it is commenced within one hundred and twenty days after May 14, 1947 unless at the time commenced it is barred by an applicable State statute of limitations. (May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 6, 61 Stat. 87; Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. 89-601, title VI, § 601 (b), 80 Stat. 844.)

(d) with respect to any cause of action brought under section 16 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 against a State or a political subdivision of a State in a district court of the United States on or before April 18, 1973, the running of the statutory periods of limitation shall be deemed suspended during the period beginning with the commencement of any such action and ending one hundred and eighty days after the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, except that such suspension shall not be applicable if in such action judgment has been entered for the defendant on the grounds other than State immunity from Federal jurisdiction.

§ 256. Determination of commencement of future actions.

In determining when an action is commenced for the purposes of section 255 of this title, an action commenced on or after May 14, 1947 under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the WalshHealey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act, shall be considered to be commenced on the date when the complaint is filed; except that in the case of a collective or class action instituted under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, or the Bacon-Davis Act, it shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any individual claimant

(a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to become a party plaintiff is filed on such date in the court in which the action is brought; or

(b) if such written consent was not so filed or if his name did not so appear on the subsequent date on which such written consent is filed in the court in which the action was commenced. (May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 7, 61 Stat. 88.)

§ 257. Pending collective and representative actions.

The statute of limitations prescribed in section 255 (b) of this title shall also be applicable (in the case of a collective or representative action commenced prior to May 14, 1947 under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended) to an individual claimant who has

not been specifically named as a party plaintiff to the action prior to the expiration of one hundred and twenty days after May 14, 1947. In the application of such statute of limitations such action shall be considered to have been commenced as to him when, and only when, his written consent to become a party plaintiff to the action is filed in the court in which the action was brought. (May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 8, 61 Stat. 88.)

§ 258. Reliance on past administrative rulings, etc.

In any action or proceeding, commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 based on any act or omission prior to May 14, 1947, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healey Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act, if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of any agency of the United States, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of any such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged. Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that after such act or omission, such administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, practice, or enforcement policy is modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect. (May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 9, 61 Stat. 88.)

§ 259. Reliance in future on administrative rulings, etc.

(a) In any action or proceeding based on any act or omission on or after May 14, 1947, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healy Act, or the Bacon-Davis Act, if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of the agency of the United States specified in subsection (b) of this section, or any administrative practice or enforcement policy of such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged. Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that after such act or omission, such administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, interpretation, practice, or enforcement policy is modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or of no legal effect. (b) The agency referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall be

(1) In the case of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended-the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor:

(2) In the case of the Walsh-Healy Act-the Secretary of Labor, or any Federal officer utilized by him in the administration of such Act; and

(3) In the case of the Bacon-Davis Act-the Secretary of Labor.

(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 10, 61 Stat. 89.)

§ 260. Liquidated damages.

In any action commenced prior to or on or after the date of the enactment of this Act to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 16 of such Act.

§ 261. Applicability of "area of production" regulations.

No employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of an activity engaged in by such employee prior to December 26, 1946, if such employer

(1) was not so subject by reason of the definition of an "area of production", by a regulation of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, which regulation was applicable at the time of performance of the activity even though at that time the regulation was invalid; or

(2) would not have been so subject if the regulation signed on December 18, 1946 (Federal Register, Vol. 11, p. 14648) had been in force on and after October 24, 1938.

(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 12, 61 Stat. 89.)

§ 262. Definitions.

(a) When the terms "employer", "employee", and "wage" are used in this chapter in relation to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, they shall have the same meaning as when used in such Act of 1938.

(b) When the term "employer" is used in this chapter in relation to the Walsh-Healey Act or Bacon-Davis Act it shall mean the contractor or subcontractor covered by such Act.

(c) When the term "employee" is used in this chapter in relation to the Walsh-Healey Act or the Bacon-Davis Act it shall mean any individual employed by the contractor or subcontractor covered by such Act in the performance of his contract or subcontract.

(d) The term "Wash-Healey Act" means sections 35 to 45 of Title 41; and the term "Bacon-Davis Act" means sections 276a to 276a-5 of Title 40.

(e) As used in section 255 of this title the term "State" means any State of the United States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United States. (May 14, 1947, ch. 52, § 13, 61 Stat. 90.)

CONTRACT WORK HOURS AND SAFETY

STANDARDS ACT

40 U.S.C. 327-333

Summary and Description

WORK HOURS STANDARD

This act provides a uniform standard, namely, an 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek with overtime compensation of 11⁄2 times the basic rate of pay for all work in excess of that standard performed under certain Federal and federally assisted contracts. It consolidates a series of "Eight Hour Laws" into a single statute with simplified provisions which apply in the same way to all contractors and subcontractors performing work coming within its terms.

The acts work hours standard applies to any contract involving the employment of laborers or mechanics, including watchmen and guards: (1) on a public work of the United States, of any Territory, or the District of Columbia,

(2) to which the Federal Government (including any Federal agency or instrumentality), any Territory, or the District of Columbia is a party, or which is made for or on behalf thereof, or

(3) which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants from the Federal Government and to which Federal laws providing wage standards for such work apply. An exception is made to work where the assistance from the United States is only in the nature of a loan guarantee, or insurance.

The act makes clear that the contractor or subcontractor is liable to employees for unpaid overtime compensation. In addition, such an employer is liable to the Government for liquidated damages of $10 for each day an employee was permitted or required to work in excess of the work-hours standard without payment of overtime compensation. Criminal penalties are provided for intentional violations. The Secretary of Labor is given the authority and functions set forth in Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950, and pursuant to this plan an employer violating the act's work hours standard may be barred from receiving further Government contracts for a period of up to three years. The act also contains a provision making applicable in accordance with its terms, section 2 of the Copeland Act, as amended. (See p. 180.)

However, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to issue rules and regulations under which such adjustments may be made in the application of the act as he finds necessary and proper in the public interest to prevent injustice and serious impairment of the conduct of Government business.

75-623 O 74 pt. 2 - 7