Political Control Over the Use of Force: A Clausewitzian PerspectiveDIANE Publishing |
Common terms and phrases
absolute war abstract According to Clausewitz analysis armed forces Aron Book VIII Carl von Clausewitz chapters of Book character civil-military relations Clausewitz argues Clausewitz discusses Clausewitz expects Clausewitz says Clausewitz seems Clausewitz writes Clausewitz’s views commander-in-chief concept conflict control over military course decision ends and means enemy exert factors four key implications friction given guide the conduct guiding intelligence highest levels Huntington Ibid idea important involved issues knows the instrument logic Major Nielsen Michael Howard military advice military commander military leaders military means military objective military operational expertise military perspective Napoleon nature operational details Peter Paret political aims political and military political considerations political control political ends political forces political guidance political leaders political object political purposes primacy of political principles purely military Raymond Aron Samuel Huntington statesman statesmen and commanders Strategic Studies Institute strategy Sun Tzu theory total war U.S. Army U.S. Military U.S. Military Academy war’s warfare wars
Popular passages
Page 14 - ... the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.
Page 19 - Clearly the tremendous effects of the French Revolution abroad were caused not so much by new military methods and concepts as by radical changes in policies and administration, by the new character of government, altered conditions of the French people, and the like.
Page 4 - Just as some plants bear fruit only if they don't shoot up too high, so in the practical arts the leaves and flowers of theory must be pruned and the plant kept close to its proper soil...
Page 21 - Not every war need be fought until one side collapses. When the motives and tensions of war are slight we can imagine that the very faintest prospect of defeat might be enough to cause one side to yield.
Page 10 - The good general must know friction in order to overcome it whenever possible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in his operations which this very friction makes impossible.
Page 44 - The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish. ..the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.
Page 22 - Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed...
Page 17 - ... complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence (as the pure concept would require), war would of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting.
Page 16 - ... or to the same degree. At times they will expand sufficiently to overcome the resistance of inertia or friction; at others they are too weak to have any effect. War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy. War moves on its goal with varying speeds; but it always lasts long enough for influence to be exerted on the goal and for its own course to be changed in one way or another — long enough, in other...
Page 6 - Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield...