replaces the A-6 for the Navy and replaces the F-111 for the Air Force. (F/A-18 is a strikefighter which is different aircraft with a different mission.) The Navy A-6 and Air Force F-111 aircraft could singly attack targets in North Vietnam in 1972 and survive. (Deleted) Navy looked at upgrading an A-6 aircraft (deleted) and developing a new design. All of our analysis shows that a quantum leap in combat effectiveness is not only possible but very cost effective with a new design, (deleted). Upgrades that can be accomodated will help through the early 1990's, (deleted) now to maintain U.S. advantage in conventional forces capability in the late 1990s and into the next century.

NAVAL AVIATION

QUESTION: In regard to the AV-8B Harrier II aircraft, the Defense Department has proposed a multi year procurement plan whereby 24 aircraft would be procured annually in the FY 1989-1991 period. The proposed plan would reduce procurement of this vertical/short take-off and landing (v/STOL) aircraft from the 328 production aircraft originally projected to 276 AV-8B's. Because of its flexible basing and rapid response capabilities, the AV-8B has been the Marine Corps' highest priority for close air support of ground troops. Please explain how the proposed reduction to a 276-plane program will affect Marine Corps force structure.

ANSWER: The AV-8B remains the Marine Corps' highest priority for close air support. The reduction to a 276-plane program will not immediately impact on the Marine Corps' current AV-8B transition plan to standup eight AV-8B light attack squadrons by 1991. Because the aircraft is expected to achieve a significantly reduced attrition rate as compared to its predecessor, the Department of the Navy expects to be able to sustain the force structure into the mid-1990's. Beyond that time, and depending on the actual attrition rate, selective management actions involving the pipeline and training aircraft will be utilized to support the force structure until a decision regarding a follow-on aircraft and requirement is made.

Senator Byrd: How will the force structure be affected if the 24 AV-8B's requested in the FY-89 budget are not funded? Answer: There are several major impacts on Marine Corps CAS force structure and capability if the 24 aircraft requested in FY-89 are not funded. Chart (1) depicts the resultant force structure degradation over the life of the AV-8B program.

First, AV-8B procurement through FY-88 is only sufficient to stand up six of eight planned AV-8B attack squadrons and would leave the Marine Corps with no funded alternative to replace its remaining two A-4M squadrons. Further, given historic AV-8B attrition to date, procurement through FY-88 would only be sufficient to sustain this reduced force level through 1995. AV-8B force structure would continue to erode through the 1990's to 5 attack squadrons by 1998 and less than 4 squadrons by 2004; the soonest that a suitable replacement is forecast to be available.

Second, termination of AV-8B procurement after FY-88 will, in all likelihood, neccessiate the cancellation of the AV-8B night attack program. Production of the AV-8B night attack variant commenced with FY-88 procurement. While a 24 hours CAS capability is essential, FY-88 AV-8B night attack procurement is only sufficient to standup one night attack squadron. Logistically it would be neither cost effective nor operationally practical to support a single night attack squadron.

Third, arresting AV-8B procurement after FY-88 will significantly degrade the number of daily CAS sorties available to the ground combat element over the 1990's. When operating fram conventional airfields the AV-8B can sustain a 1.25:1 sortie rate advantage over conventional aircraft such as the F/A-18. When forward based from a VSTOL facility or austere site located 75 NM or less from the front lines, this sortie rate advantage increases to 2:1 over conventional aircraft due to shorter mission flight times and rapid turnaround capability. Therein lies the real combat advantage of the AV-8B. Chart (2) depicts the erosion in daily CAS sortie capability should the 24 aircraft requested in FY-89 not be funded. As shown, by the year 2001, the residual AV-8B force would only be capable of generating approximately 50% of daily CAS sorties of our currently planned AV-8B force.

Senator Byrd: Will a 276-plane program provide enough attrition assets to maintain the Marines' VSTOL capability through the

1990's?

Answer: The answer to this question must be predicated upon fleet AV-8B attrition experience to date. Based on a limited sample of four operational squadrons and one training squadron, actual attrition to date has been equal to or slightly greater than predicted. Should we continue to realize the predicted AV8B attrition rate, the 328 aircraft program requirement is valid and a 276-plane force will only be sufficient to standup and sustain our planned force structure through approximately 19961997. After 1997, this force would continue to erode through normal attrition to less than six attack squadrons by 2004 as shown in Chart (1). Concurrently, as shown in Chart (2), the AV-8B daily CAS sortie capability would be reduced by 30% over this period.

However, experience in other programs has shown that attrition rates may decrease as operational experience is gained in an aircraft and as sources of material related accidents are eliminated through equipment corrections and upgrades. The Marine Corps expects that programs such as the AV-8B engine upgrade program will have a positive effect on AV-8B attrition. The AV-8B multi-year proposal in front of the Congress will give us adequate time to continue our assessment of total attrition requirements.

Senator Byrd: What would be the budgetary effect in both acquisition costs and operating costs of using F/A-18s instead of AV-8Bs for close air support missions?

Answer: The F/A-18 would be a far more costly alternative to meet the Marine Corps' CAS requirements. Any cost comparison must be viewed from two perspectives. First, as a simple onefor-one-replacement and second, replacement with equivalent capability.

a. The average multi-year unit procurement cost of an AV-8B is $21.2M compared with $31.8M for the F/A-18 over the same period. The additional cost of simply maintaining the Marine Corps' light attack structure at eight squadrons of 20 aircraft using the F/A-18 as an alternative is, at minimum, $1,405M in FY-90 dollars. This breaks down to additional $1,005M in acquisition costs, $300M in MILCON costs and approximately $200M in operating costs. Additionally, this alternative could not be accommodated within our current manpower structure without a commensurate reduction in another warfighting area.

b. The dollars cost of providing equivalent, capability is far greater. Since the AV-8B has a CAS sortie generation rate advantage over the F/A-18 of 1.25:1 from conventional airfields and 2:1 when operating from a VSTOL facility within 75NM of the front lines, a true replacement must be capable of generating an equal number of daily CAS sorties. Using an average 1.7:1 AV-8B CAS sortie generation advantage over the F/A-18, the additional acquisition cost of the F/A-18 would be over $2.2B for an equivalent capability.

The above cost comparisons do not include the inherent advantages of a VSTOL aircraft such as response time and basing flexibility. The AV-8B meets the Marine Corps CAS requirements better than any aircraft in the world today. No other aircraft can sustain such a high CAS sortie rate day after day. By any measure it is truly the lowest cost alternative, in both dollars and manpower, to meet the Marine Corps' CAS requirement.