on Gulf today are underway 75-85 days per three month quarter. The Navy is funded for an average of 50.5 days per quarter. The difference is made up by decreasing the underway time of nondeployed units, keeping them in home port rather than exercises and weapons ranges preparing for combat. The incremental cost for Persian Gulf contingency operations in FY 1988 may be as high as $240 million. To date, Congress has provided $100 million. Family separation resulting from high levels of operational deployment remains the primary reason why young officers and enlisted men choose to leave the Navy. Long months of vigilance in crisis areas are today stressing the Fleet. In the holiday period at the end of 1987, 96 ships were forward deployed: 30 in the Persian Gulf, 9 in the Indian Ocean, 34 in the Western Pacific, and 23 in the Mediterranean Sea. Congressional support is necessary if we are to adhere to our commitment to reasonable deployment schedules of a maximum of six months away from home port. Naval personnel on sea duty are assured they will be in home port at least 50 percent of the time between overhaul cycles, with a deployment turnaround ratio of 2:1 or better, meaning that if a person is deployed for six months, the next twelve months will be spent in or near the home port. Joint Training and Exercises Events in the Persian Gulf area in the past year have naturally heightened public awareness of the utility and demands placed on our sea services. But the Navy and Marine Corps operate globally, with the U.S. Army and Air Force and the forces of our allies and friends, maintaining the levels of training and readiness that contribute to deterrence against the entire spectrum of possible adversaries. The only real difference between the sea services' activities in peace and war is in operating tempo and casualties. We exercise our forces in the environments and the geographic areas in which they may see action. Here are only a few examples from the past year: In the Atlantic area, the U.S. Second Fleet conducted a series of multi-ship and battlegroup exercises such as Fleet Exercise 1-87 in the Atlantic and Western Caribbean Sea. The exercise included 18 U.S. ships and over 5500 U.S. servicemen. Allied participation included British naval units of their Caribbean Training Task Force, the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, with three destroyers and two frigates, as well as NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic, with combatant ships from The Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. The USS Forrestal (CV 59) battle group, along with Navy logistics support and mine countermeasure ships, participated in NATO's 1987 Ocean Safari exercise where they practiced the protection of resupply and reinforcement shipping in support of NATO. In the Mediterranean, our sea services participated in exercise National Week, involving 29 ships and 180 aircraft. French armed forces, including the aircraft carrier Foch, participated in some parts of the exercise with the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) battle groups. The exercise involved simulated strikes against land and sea targets, as well as sea control and amphibious actions. Soviet units in the area at the same time included the aircraft carrier Kiev with four escorts. • In the Pacific area, our forces participated in the first amphibious operation in Alaska's Aleutian Islands area since World War 11. Its purpose was to provide training in landing assault forces during extreme cold weather, in this case 18-20 foot seas and gale force winds. The forces included an aircraft carrier battle group, with more than 10,000 sailors and 14 ships, supporting an amphibious squadron with 1,900 marines. Both sea and air landings were accomplished, demonstrating our national resolve to defend our interests in the northern Pacific area. Multi-national exercises in the Northeast Asia included Team Spirit with forces of the Republic of Korea and exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. • In Central America, more than 40,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen participated in Solid Shield 87, an exercise designed to emphasize command and control of military forces with a friendly nation in a combat environment. Navy and Marine forces joined Honduran Army and Navy forces to conduct a amphibious assault on a beach on the north coast of Honduras. During the amphibious assault phases, U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marine aircraft, along with Navy and Coast Guard ships, simulated anti-air, surface and submarine attacks on the amphibious task force. The Navy continued in 1987 to expand its proficiency in Arctic Operations. Included in our efforts was ICEX 1-87, a coordinated U.S. and British mission conducted to collect scientific data in the Arctic Ocean and to continue validation of the readiness of our nuclear submarine forces to operate in the harsh Arctic environment. ICEX 1-87 was highlighted by the first simultaneous surfacing at the geographic north pole by one UK and two U.S. nuclear submarines. In the past three years almost half of our Arctic capable nuclear submarine crews have operated in the deep Arctic environment. The maintenance of our proficiency in conducting Arctic operations ensures that we are "combat ready" to engage potential adversaries as far forward as possible including under the ice. Our tactical capability in this vital area will be expanded further with the delivery of the first fully Arctic capable Improved SSN688 class submarine in FY 1988. • The Marine Corps will participate in 195 exercises in FY 1988 and in 190 exercises in FY 1989. Marines refine their skills in exercises worldwide in a variety of missions ranging from special operations to support for naval campaigns. In the Republic of Korea during Team Spirit, Marines conducted a brigade size amphibious assault, including a Maritime Prepositioning Force. Two ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Squadron were unloaded and the equipment distributed to arriving Marines. During Solid Shield in Central America, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade conducted a joint-combined amphibious operation with the U.S. Army 82nd Airborne Division, and Royal Marines from the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. In Norway, in exercise Cold Winter, Marines exercised the land prepositioning program, demonstrating the capability to support NATO's northern flank. Also in support of our national interests, USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) completed a 62-day humanitarian training mission, providing medical care to more than 62,000 Filipinos. Her staff performed major surgery on 848 patients aboard ship and 1,108 minor operations ashore at local medical/dental civic action projects in seven Philippine ports. Naval Special Warfare Operations Naval Special Warfare Operations saw a marked increase in tempo in 1987-1988. While both Seals and Special Boats deployed in the Persian Gulf, Special Warfare assets continued to participate in major fleet, joint, and combined exercises worldwide. Special Boat Unit 26 (Panama) was commissioned to provide USCINCSOUTH an organic coastal and riverine capability. Naval Special Warfare Command (Coronado) was commissioned as the Naval component of the newly created U.S. Special Operations Command. Groundwork was laid for forming Seal Team 8 (Norfolk) and Naval Special Warfare Unit 8 (Panama) in 1988, and Naval Special Warfare Unit 6 (Southern Europe) in 1989. Navy and Marine Corps Reserve The Naval Reserve contains several components which exist only in the Reserve: 100 percent of the Navy's U. S. based logistics support squadrons; 100 percent of light-attack helicopter squadrons; 100 percent of our combat helicopter search and rescue capability; and 100 percent of naval mobile inshore/undersea warfare units the "Brown-Water Navy" structured for combat on inland waterways. The Naval Reserve also provides: 99 percent of Naval Control of Shipping organization manning for merchant ship mobilization and convoy formation; 93 percent of the cargo-handling battalions vital to port management and loading operations in combat theaters; 82 percent of our ocean-going minesweepers; 65 percent of naval mobile construction battalions, the famed Seabees; 57 percent of special boat forces; 49 percent of naval intelligence personnel; 35 percent of antisubmarine patrol aircraft squadrons; 25 percent of airborne mine countermeasures squadrons (HM); 18 percent of ASW helicopter squadrons (LAMPS I) needed for fleet and convoy antisubmarine defense efforts; and 13 percent of our tactical sea based aviation capabilities. Perhaps our most critical reliance on the Reserves is in medical services, where 5 of our 12 fleet hospitals in FY 1989 will be reserve manned, with Reserve medical personnel also needed for expanding capabilities at other U.S. based hospitals. Reorganization of the Naval Reserve to a "horizontal integration" with the active force, begun in 1982, has had the effect of shifting a substantial portion of our force structure manning to the Ready Reserve. Increased reliance on the Ready Reserve has enabled us to reduce our original estimates of required active end-strength growth. • In FY 1988 and 1989, 48 ships will be manned by Selected Reserves, in addition to the augmentation of essentially all naval units by Selected Reserves upon mobilization. о о о The 14th active carrier air wing has been deleted from the program for FY 1989. 1he 14th carrier will carry a reserve air wing. Twenty-one modern Oliver Hazard Perry and Knox class frigates have been transferred to the Naval Reserve Force, with a total program of 26 frigates planned by 1990. By the mid-1990s, 14 MCM and 7 MHC mine warfare ships will join the Naval Reserve. The first reserve squadron has now completed transition to the F/A-18 with a second squadron transitioning this year. Two fighter squadrons have transitioned to the F-14A and the other two will complete transition this fiscal year. The first reserve A-6E squadron stands up this fiscal year, and the second one will follow in FY 1990. Squadron augmentation flying units have been established and are operating successfully in Fleet Replacement Squadrons on both coasts, providing currently trained aviators and maintenance personnel for immediate augmentation to active duty squadrons. The Marine Corps relies heavily on a fully trained and capable Reserve component to complement its active force. Upon mobilization, this Reserve component provides up to 33 percent of the Marine Corps' wartime manpower requirements. The Reserves provide 40 percent of Marine tanks; 33 percent of the heavy artillery; 30 percent of the light attack aircraft; and 33 percent of the anti-aircraft missile capability. The Marine Corps Reserve has made great progress over the past six years. Enhancements in military capability include equipping the Marine artillery battalions with the M-198 howitzer in FYS 1988 and 1989, increasing the deliveries of the TOW missile systems in FY 1988, and the activation of a light armored vehicle (LAV) battalion in FYS 1987 and 1988. Marine Reserve aviation assets also have been the subject of an intensive modernization effort. Increased combat capability has been gained by the activation of an additional Ah-1J Cobra attack helicopter squadron and a new KC-130 refueler squadron in FY 1988. Additional enhancements include the employment of the F-21A Kfir aircraft by Reserve squadron to provide adversary training for Marine tactical air assets. In 1989, the Marine Reserve will begin transitioning to an all F/A-18 Reserve fighter/attack force, providing advanced aircraft and commonality and interoperability with the active wings. a Navy Department Programs The effectiveness and combat readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps, as tangibly demonstrated by the real-world operations and exercises conducted in 1987, depend on motivated, highly trained people who man effective ships, fly modern aircraft, control reliable weapons, and who can count on filled weapons bins. These 84-883 0 - 88 - 5 are the contours that define the Department of the Navy's portion of the President's Defense Budget. In revising the FY 1989 budget submission, our watchwords have been balance and acceptable risk. There is no indication that the future holds any reduction in the commitments our forces will keep around the world. We have been forced to accept an increased level of risk in being able to respond to threats to our national security. We have worked hard to ensure that our program reductions are balanced and that we have not introduced unacceptable risk levels in any program area. Highlights and key details of the programs which describe our priorities in shipbuilding, aircraft, weapon systems, Marine Corps systems and support requirements are presented in the statements of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In the sections that follow, I will address several issues of personal importance to me that affect all of our people and programs in sea services. 111. PEOPLE The Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and 1 are in absolute agreement on the vital nature of proper recruitment, training and retention of our most precious asset, our people. The best of our technology is only as good as the individual sailor and Marine at its controls. Our men and women's selfless dedication and strength of character are evident daily in the Fleet as they honor national commitments, endure the stress of prolonged absences from families and accept the risks of armed service in troubled areas around the world. End Strength After a detailed review of our personnel policies, we have adopted the most austere manning policies possible for our operational units. Navy active and reserve end strength for FY 1989 has been held to the FY 1988 levels of 593,200 and 152,600 respectively. Marine Corps active strength has been reduced to 197,200 while reserve end strength has been capped at the FY 1988 level of 43,600. This is an end strength reduction of 9,600 for Navy and 2,900 for the Marine Corps from the President's FY 1988 budget request. Our global commitments highlight the danger in adopting a posture that would degrade our readiness and capabilities. In effecting this austere policy we have taken balanced reductions to protect our ability to respond to crises without mortgaging our future. Our challenge now is the precise management of our personnel to maintain readiness without sacrificing the basic needs of our people. Further forced reductions in our officer corps proposed for FY 1989 pose serious challenges to our ability to man and manage the sea services without serious hardships for our people. We have only to look at the recent past to see how honoring our commitments with insufficient manpower can wear out our people. Operating tempo is not likely to decrease. At the same time that operational officer requirements are increasing, we must assign substantial numbers of top mid-grade officers to joint duty assignments ashore to comply with new joint officer management policies. These joint duty requirements are also likely to affect adversely our graduate education programs which are vital, not only to adequately performing many jobs requiring such training, but also to the proper broadening of our future leaders. officer requirements are not decreasing. Our best officers, Our |