QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR D'AMATO Drug Trafficking Question: Do you believe the Department of Defense can and should be doing more to help stop the flood of illegal drugs entering the United States? Answer: No. Stopping drug abuse in America is the number one domestic policy of this Administration. Eliminating the demand for drugs at home is the key to stemming the flow of drugs from abroad. Efforts to eradicate drugs at their source and to interdict their shipment are, at best, only important holding actions. The Department of Defense is involved in the crusade against illicit drugs to the fullest extent permitted by law, and currently provides significant support to drug law enforcement agencies. That support includes: the loan of equipment ($303.5M provided in FY87); intelligence sharing; assignment of personnel; secure communications support; surveillance and maritime support as a by-product of military operations and training; and staff planning. Employment of the military in drug interdiction, outside its appropriate support role or in lieu of legitimate law enforcement agencies, would be no more effective, would seriously degrade our military readiness to defend against armed aggression, would violate Federal laws, and would probably be viewed as an act of war if conducted unilaterally. Creation of ASD for Drug Support Question: Would you support the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense position to oversee the coordination of DoD's enforcement and interdiction support effort? Answer: No, because the Secretary of Defense has already taken action to that effect when on October 9, 1986, he designated the Assistant Secreatry of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) as the DoD focal point for monitoring and coordinating all DOD activities in implementation of the President's six goals to eradicate drug abuse. ASD (FM&P) is assisted in these expanded duties by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Drug Policy and Enforcement, a new Deputate established by the Secretary of Defense on 5 January 1987. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict QUESTION: Congress created, over the Department's active opposition, the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. This position remains vacant to this day. Reportedly, someone has now been selected to fill it, but the person is still in the Presidential personnel process. Has the Department's attitude toward this position changed? ANSWER: As you know, the President submitted a nomination for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict in June 1987 and no congressional confirmation hearings were held until December. Following the relatively recent withdrawal of this nominee from further consideration, the President began reviewing the qualifications of another candidate and will await results of the candidate's background investigation before submitting his name for official consideration. Despite the lengthy nomination process, the Department remains committed to complying with the spirit and intent of the law. QUESTION: When do you expect to fill the Deputy Assistant ANSWER: There have been three Deputy Assistant Secretary positions created to fall under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resources position was filled on 1 March 1988. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations is expected to arrive about 1 April 1988. The position for Deputy Assistant Secretary for Low Intensity Conflict is still vacant, but a nominee is expected in the near future. QUESTION: Can you explain the Department's program priorities in the Special Operations area? ANSWER: The Department's program priorities are based on Special Operations requirements established by the CINCS in response to threats posed in every theater. Emphasis is placed on specialized training, technical proficiency, development of individual skills, mobility, readiness, and the proper amount of Special Operations-peculiar equipment to enhance mission survivability and success. These priorities are outlined in the Services' SOF Master Plans, contained in the SOF Congressional Justification Book, and are detailed in the Secretary of Defense's Defense Guidance . QUESTION: (U) This will be the fourth fiscal year in which U.S. defense spending has declined in real terms. What has happened to the Soviet military budget during this period? FOLLOWUP: (U) We are cutting both force structure and programs in this year's budget. What have the Soviets been doing with their force structure and programs during the past four years? ANSWER: [Deleted.] Question: You said that we have to accept increased risks to our security because of these cuts. Can you be more specific? Answer: The peacetime military strategy of the U.S. is designed to deter war, prevent Soviet domination of the Eurasian landmass, to expand U.S. influence among less developed countries, and to facilitate projection of military power abroad in defense of U.S. interests, wherever and whenever they may be threatened. Should deterrence fail, the U.S. will endeavor to achieve national objectives swiftly without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. The fundamental objective of U.S. strategic policy is to deter direct attack--particularly nuclear attack--on the United States and its allies by ensuring that any adversary would perceive that it could not achieve its war aims and, should it initiate an attack, would suffer losses that were unacceptable. Today, the strategic forces of the United States are capable of achieving this objective. The Soviets are expected to expand and to improve offensive and defensive strategic force capabilities through 1994. The U.S. must, therefore, continue its strategic modernization program to be in a position to overcome increasingly robust defenses and be able to successfully attack harder and more mobile Soviet targets. In a conventional conflict the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would enjoy a significant military advantage in central Europe over the U.S. and its allies, because the Warsaw Pact maintains a significant numerical advantage in manpower and weapons systems. As a result, questions arise concerning current capabilities to execute Alliance or U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently contended that the degree of risk is high. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 1987 Military Net Assessment concludes that U.S. forces are currently capable of deterring war. However, if the capability of those forces is reduced because of budget cuts then the capability to deter war is likewise reduced and the risk to our security is increased. Question: What will happen, in your opinion, if the 2% real growth rate you project for defense spending beginning in fiscal year 1990 does not materialize? Answer: Great progress has been made over the past seven years in improving the capabilities of U.S. forces in readiness, modernization, and sustainability. Unfortunately, the Soviets have continued to improve their forces both in quantity and especially in quality. As a matter of fact, the The improved capability of U.S. forces over the past seven years has increased the ability of U.S. forces to deter war. If the improvement of U.S. forces does not continue because of reduced defense spending, the Soviets will achieve even greater advantages. The risk will therefore increase of the U.S. not being able to deter war. Aircraft Industrial Base QUESTION: Major aircraft procurement decisions were made last year. These decisions may materially reduce the number of prime contractors available to build new tactical aircraft in the 21st Century. Did you take into account the shrinkage of our defense industrial base when you made these decisions? ANSWER: Decisions on major aircraft procurements involve many complex issues including maintaining sufficient prime contractors, as well as subtier contractors. All of our contracts involve vigorous competition. This is healthy both for the economy and for DOD, in that it brings about efficiencies in the weapon system process. is true that as weapon systems become more complex and more costly and that we buy fewer systems, our capacity to build weapon systems has been shrinking since World War II. Maintaining the base at its earlier levels would cause inefficiencies. SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS It Chairman STENNIS. The subcommittee will now be in recess subject to the call of the Chair. [Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., Thursday, March 3, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989 TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1988 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met at 10:01 a.m. in room 192, Dirksen SenateOffice Building, Hon. J. Bennett Johnston presiding. Present: Senators Johnston, DeConcini, Stevens, Kasten, D'Amato and Cochran. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY U.S. MARINE CORPS STATEMENT OF HON. H. LAWRENCE GARRETT III, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY OVERVIEW OF NAVY BUDGET REQUEST OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSTON Senator JOHNSTON. Good morning. The subject of the hearing today is the fiscal year 1989 amended budget for the Navy and Marine Corps. The request before this subcommittee is for $94.2 billion. This covers all but military construction programs for the Navy. The funding request is nearly $12 billion below the amount projected last year. While all the service budgets have been reduced from the amounts projected last year in order to comply with the budget summit agreement, the reductions to the Navy are particularly large. In fact, they are the largest. The Navy is, in fact, the only military department with a request below the amount provided for in fiscal year 1988. PROCUREMENT PROGRAM REDUCTIONS The largest dollar reductions are for procurement programs. Shipbuilding has fallen by more than $7 billion from the amount appropriated last year primarily because Congress fully funded $6.3 billion for two new aircraft carriers. After accounting for the carriers, the request is still $1.9 billion below the level projected last year. The change reduces Aegis ship production from the five funded during each of the past 2 years to just three ships. |