his principles more practical and useful. Yet he certainly opened the door at the same time to the charge of dogmatism. In the Treatises he evolved morality from the law of nature; and in certain sections of the Essay he evolved it from the idea of God. In both cases he thus brought in ideas of substances in a realistic way. But in all the types of rationalistic ethics reviewed in this chapter, he was in error in expecting to end up with moral distinctions instead of starting with them. This procedure was not, however, the only one which Locke followed. An entirely different type of ethical theory will be reviewed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

HEDONISTIC ELEMENTS IN LOCKE'S ETHICS

I. In addition to the attempts which have been outlined to define morality in terms of the rational connections of ideas, there is also in Locke another quite different approach to the ethical problems. This approach is the hedonistic theory which is stated most fully in the latter half of the second book of the Essay, and appears occasionally in other parts of the Essay and in the Treatises of Government. These hedonistic elements probably came to Locke from two sources. One source was surely the work of Hobbes. The definition of good and evil in terms of pleasure and pain, the analytic discourse upon the passions in the twentieth chapter of the second book of the Essay, the theory of human liberty which was given in the first edition of the Essay, are all so akin to Hobbes that it is almost incredible to suppose that Locke could here have been independent of his great predecessor. The other source was probably the work of the deists. For like the deists Locke tended to resolve virtue into implicit obedience to the will of God, which will is binding because it is enforced by the rewards and punishments of the future life. All of the hedonistic elements in Locke can be understood easily in the light of these two sources of influence. Locke's statement of the hedonistic position is quite simple. Sometimes he identified good and evil immediately with pleasure and pain themselves; more often he applied the terms to the objects which produce pleasures and pains in us; and occasionally, he recognized that both usages were legitimate, the former in a primary, the latter in a secondary, sense. Thus the predicates good and evil may be affirmed either of pleasures and pains directly or of their causes. A characteristic passage is the following: "Now, because pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds or on our bodies, and in different degrees, therefore, what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call good, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil; for no other reason but for its aptness. to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein consists our happiness and misery."

There is little in this initial statement of hedonism in which Locke did not agree with Hobbes. Happiness is defined altogether in terms of pleasure. The removal or lessening of pain is included within the

2

1 Essay, II, 21, 43.

2 Essay, II, 21, 13.

Cf. II, 20, 1-2, 21, 63, 28, 5. Also King: Life of Locke, p. 310.
King: Op. cit., p. 116.

meaning of the term pleasure, and the loss or diminishing of pleasure is included within the term pain. The distant consequences of actions are to be taken into account as well as the immediate ones; and though every pleasure is in itself good, yet, since some pleasures bear pains in their trains, men should choose those things which produce the greatest balance of pleasure in the long run. "If I prefer a short pleasure to a lasting one, it is plain I cross my own happiness."4 Moreover, the determination of what objects are good is entirely relative to each individual's tastes. What arouses pleasure in one person may not do so in another, so that nothing can be considered as good in and of itself apart from its effects on men's minds. "The happiness of man consists in pleasure, whether of body or mind, according to every one's relish." 5 In any case the hedonistic standard is clearly emphasized. "It is a man's proper business to seek happiness and avoid misery." Men should seek to have "as much of the one and as little of the other as may be;" for in pleasure and pain lies the ultimate distinction between good and evil.

6

Yet even at the outset Locke differed from Hobbes on one important point. Whereas Hobbes identified pleasure and pain with the harmony or conflict of the internal motions of the body, Locke regarded pleasure and pain as subjective states of mind which “join themselves to almost all our ideas," and which may be the result of thoughts within the mind as well as of impressions on the body." "By pleasure and pain, delight and uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection." Thus while Hobbes's view tended to be materialistic, Locke's hedonism avoided any such implication. Locke was not concerned in the Essay with the physiology of sensation, as Hobbes always was; and his medical knowledge did not lead him to assign a material basis for all feelings of pleasure and pain. Pleasure does, to be sure, come from health and sensuous experiences; but it also comes from reputation, from the possession of knowledge, from doing good to others, and from the expectation of future bliss." And these other sources of pleasure were not traced back by Locke to any necessary bodily conditions.

2. Locke, however, as was mentioned above, regarded Hobbes with extreme disdain. Consequently, even if he learned much from Hobbes he would hardly be found to concur in all the doctrines of the Leviathan.

3 Essay, II, 20, 16,

4 King: Op. cit., p. 306.

5 Idem, p. 116.

• Idem, p. 306.

7 Essay, II, 7, 2.

8 Idem, II, 20, 15.

9 King: Op. cit., pp. 306–307.

He not only avoided a materialistic interpretation of pleasure, but also gave hedonism a devout and pious turn by putting behind it a theological sanction. That is, he differed from Hobbes, not in his willingness to define good in terms of pleasure, but in his view of the source whence the greatest pleasures are found to come. In other words, though he took over much from Hobbes in the way of psychological basis of ethics, he stood more with the deists in his theory of the relative values of the different pleasures which men may seek to enjoy. Locke distinguished between what he called natural good and evil, and moral good and evil. The pleasures and pains which occur naturally in the normal course of things fall into the first class; those which are annexed as rewards and punishments to a law ordained by some law-maker fall into the second class. "The difference between moral and natural good and evil is only this: that we call that naturally good and evil which, by the natural efficiency of the thing, produces pleasure or pain in us; and that is morally good or evil which by the intervention of the will of an intelligent free agent, draws pleasure or pain from it, not by any natural consequence, but by the intervention of that power.” 10 Men are justified in taking into account all sources of pleasure and pain; for all pleasure and pain, from whatever source derived, are good and evil. Yet when men are concerned with those pleasures and pains which are the "natural" results of their actions, they are merely prudent." Only when they concern themselves primarily with the extra-natural results which are imposed upon them by some law-maker are they really moral.

The only law-maker whom Locke deemed as capable of making a law which could bind men's consciences is God. Men live under the law of God, and that law is the measure of their duty. The pleasures he confers and the pains he inflicts are so overwhelmingly great that in comparison with them all other pleasures and pains may be overlooked by the moralist as trivial. The divine rewards and punishments must not be confused with the natural pleasures and pains which come upon men in this life in the normal course of things. If God did not use additional quotas of pleasure and pain to enforce obedience to his decrees, his decrees would be in vain-i.e., what he commanded would have authority over men only in so far as the natural consequences of the same conduct were good. In order to get from the natural to the moral sphere, one must leave consideration of the

10 King: Op. cit., p. 311. Cf. also Essay, II, 28, 5-6.

11 Cf. Works, Vol. X, p. 307. Also King: Op. cit. pp. 88, 97-98. Locke was not indifferent to the good things of this life. "The next thing to happiness in the other world is a quiet, prosperous passage through this.. The study of prudence then seems to me to deserve the second place in our thoughts and studies." Patten (The Development of English Thought, p. 160) speaks of Locke as "a puritan plus the ideal of comfort." Such a characterization is excellent. Locke did not despise worldly success and fortune. Cf. his Thoughts concerning Education, §§ 67-70, 141-146. Yet he would not hesitate for a moment to sacrifice such success and comfort for the sake of the joys of heaven.

ordinary pleasures and pains of this life in favor of the special rewards and punishments which would not follow unless the course of nature were interfered with by God's supernatural power.

The effect of a theological sanction for a hedonistic ethics is to remove the emphasis from the present life to the next. Thus immortality becomes a fundamental necessity for morality; without it only natural good, and not moral good, would be possible. Locke spoke very slightingly of the kind of morality which is based on the rewards and punishments of this life only.12 Heaven he regarded as "our great business and interest." 13 The present life is but a probation which cannot give men any deep happiness. "This life is a scene of vanity, that soon passes away; and affords no solid satisfaction, but in the consciousness of doing well, and in the hopes of another life." 14 To be sure, Locke sometimes settled moral issues on the hedonistic basis without considering anything but the consequences for men in the present world, as in the case of some of the moral rules put forth in the Treatises of Government. But whenever he became more conscious of the philosophical principles of his thought, and whenever he was engaged upon a religious theme, he stressed the importance of immortality and the fate which awaited men in the future world.

3. In spite of Locke's supposition that no other law than that of God was so enforced by large quantities of pleasure and pain as to have a moral claim over men, yet he recognized it as obvious that most men actually do judge of the morality of their actions by other standards. God is not the only law-maker who as a matter of fact controls men's consciences; indeed, he is hardly the chief factor in popular opinions of right and wrong. "The laws that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude or obliquity, seem to me to be these three: (1) the divine law, (2) the civil law, (3) the law of opinion or reputation, if I may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices." 15 Thus three distinct standards are used, some by some men, others by others. Few men in the world may know the will of the true God; but many have an idea of a rule supposed to be derived from some divine being and enforced by future rewards and punishments. Practically all men take account to some extent of the laws of the commonwealth; for the penalties attached to offenses committed against these laws are usually quick to overtake the guilty. Far the most influential law upon men's conduct is probably the law of opinion; for while the judgments of God do not fall 12 In a letter to Tyrrell in 1690. Cf. King: Op. cit., p. 199.

13 King: Op. cit., p. 97.

14 In a letter to Anthony Collins, Aug. 23, 1704. Works, Vol. X, p. 298. Cf. also King: Op. cit., p. 89. 15 Essay, II, 28, 7. Cf. II, 28, 13.